Certification formelle de preuves cryptographiques basées sur les séquences de jeux by Zanella-Béguelin, Santiago
Formal certification of game-based cryptographic proofs
Santiago Zanella Beguelin
To cite this version:
Santiago Zanella Beguelin. Formal certification of game-based cryptographic proofs. Com-
puter Science and Game Theory [cs.GT]. E´cole Nationale Supe´rieure des Mines de Paris, 2010.
English. <NNT : 2010ENMP0050>. <pastel-00584350>
HAL Id: pastel-00584350
https://pastel.archives-ouvertes.fr/pastel-00584350
Submitted on 8 Apr 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.




			ABCBD
École doctorale nO84 :
Sciences et technologies de l’information et de la communication
Doctorat ParisTech
T H È S E
pour obtenir le grade de docteur délivré par
l’École nationale supérieure des mines de Paris
Spécialité « Informatique temps-réel, robotique et automatique »
présentée et soutenue publiquement par
Santiago José ZANELLA BÉGUELIN
le 9 décembre 2010
Certification Formelle de Preuves Cryptographiques
Basées sur les Séquences de Jeux
———–
Formal Certification of Game-Based Cryptographic Proofs
Directeur de thèse : Gilles BARTHE
Jury
M. Michael BACKES, Professeur, Universität des Saarlandes Rapporteur
M. Yassine LAKHNECH, Professeur, Unversité Joseph Fourier, Verimag Rapporteur
Mme. Christine PAULIN-MOHRING, Professeur, Université Paris-Sud Rapporteur
M. David POINTCHEVAL, Directeur de Recherche, École Normale Supérieure Rapporteur
M. Nick BENTON, Docteur, Microsoft Research Examinateur
M. Cédric FOURNET, Docteur, Microsoft Research Examinateur
M. Jean-Jacques LÉVY, Directeur de Recherche, INRIA Examinateur
MINES ParisTech
Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées
Rue Claude Daunesse B.P. 207, 06904 Sophia Antipolis Cedex, France

Résumé
Les séquences de jeux sont une méthodologie établie pour structurer les preuves
cryptographiques. De telles preuves peuvent être formalisées rigoureusement en re-
gardant les jeux comme des programmes probabilistes et en utilisant des méthodes
de vérification de programmes. Cette thèse décrit CertiCrypt, un outil permettant
la construction et vérification automatique de preuves basées sur les jeux. Certi-
Crypt est implementé dans l’assistant à la preuve Coq, et repose sur de nombreux
domaines, en particulier les probabilités, la complexité, l’algèbre, et la sémantique
des langages de programmation. CertiCrypt fournit des outils certifiés pour rai-
sonner sur l’équivalence de programmes probabilistes, en particulier une logique de
Hoare relationnelle, une théorie équationnelle pour l’équivalence observationnelle,
une bibliothèque de transformations de programme, et des techniques propres aux
preuves cryptographiques, permettant de raisonner sur les évènements. Nous va-
lidons l’outil en formalisant les preuves de sécurité de plusieurs exemples emblé-
matiques, notamment le schéma de chiffrement OAEP et le schéma de signature
FDH.
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Abstract
The game-based approach is a popular methodology for structuring crypto-
graphic proofs as sequences of games. Game-based proofs can be rigorously formal-
ized by taking a code-centric view of games as probabilistic programs and relying
on programming language techniques to justify proof steps. In this dissertation
we present CertiCrypt, a framework that enables the machine-checked construc-
tion and verification of game-based cryptographic proofs. CertiCrypt is built upon
the general-purpose proof assistant Coq, from which it inherits the ability to pro-
vide independently verifiable evidence that proofs are correct, and draws on many
areas, including probability and complexity theory, algebra, and semantics of pro-
gramming languages. The framework provides certified tools to reason about the
equivalence of probabilistic programs, including a relational Hoare logic, a theory of
observational equivalence, verified program transformations, and ad-hoc program-
ming language techniques of particular interest in cryptographic proofs, such as rea-
soning about failure events. We validate our framework through the formalization
of several significant case studies, including proofs of security of the Optimal Asym-
metric Encryption Padding scheme against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, and
of existential unforgeability of Full-Domain Hash signatures.
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1
Introduction
D
esigning secure cryptographic systems is a notoriously difficult task. Indeed,
the history of modern cryptography is fraught with examples of cryptographic
systems that had been thought secure for a long time before being broken and with
flawed security proofs that stood unchallenged for years. Provable security [Gold-
wasser and Micali 1984; Stern 2003] is an approach that aims to establish the
security of cryptographic systems through a rigorous analysis in the form of a
mathematical proof, borrowing techniques from complexity theory. In a typical
provable security argument, security is proved by reduction, showing that any at-
tack against the security of the system would lead to an efficient way to solve some
computationally hard problem.
Provable security holds the promise of delivering strong guarantees that cryp-
tographic schemes meet their goals and is becoming unavoidable in the design and
evaluation of new schemes. Yet provable security per se does not provide spe-
cific tools for managing the complexity of proofs and as a result several purported
security arguments that followed the approach have been shown to be flawed. Con-
sequently, the cryptographic community is increasingly aware of the necessity of
developing methodologies that systematize the type of reasoning that pervade cryp-
tographic proofs, and that guarantee that such reasoning is applied correctly.
One prominent method for achieving a high degree of confidence in cryp-
tographic proofs is to cast security as a program verification problem: this is
achieved by formulating goals and hypotheses in terms of probabilistic programs,
and defining the adversarial model in terms of complexity classes, e.g. probabilis-
tic polynomial-time programs. This code-centric view leads to statements that are
unambiguous and amenable to formalization. However, standard methods to verify
programs (e.g. in terms of program logics) are ineffective to directly address the
kind of verification goals that arise from cryptographic statements. The game-based
approach [Bellare and Rogaway 2006; Halevi 2005; Shoup 2004] is an alternative to
standard program verification methods that establishes the verification goal through
successive program transformations. In a nutshell, a game-based proof is structured
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as a sequence of transformations of the form G,A→hG′, A′, where G and G′ are
probabilistic programs, A and A′ are events, and h is a monotonic function such
that Pr [G : A] ≤ h(Pr [G′ : A′]). When the security of a scheme is expressed as an
inequality of the form Pr [G0 : A0] ≤ p, it can be proved by exhibiting a sequence
of transformations
G0, A0 →
h1 G1, A1 → · · · →
hn Gn, An
and proving that h1 ◦ · · · ◦ hn(Pr [Gn : An]) ≤ p. Reductionist arguments can
be naturally formulated in this manner by exhibiting a sequence of games where
Pr [Gn : An] encodes the probability of success of some efficient algorithm in solv-
ing a problem assumed to be hard. Under this code-centric view of games, game
transformations become program transformations and can be justified rigorously
by semantic means; in particular, many transformations can be viewed as common
program optimizations.
1.1 The CertiCrypt Framework
Whereas Bellare and Rogaway [2006] already observed that code-based proofs could
be more easily amenable to machine-checking, Halevi [2005] argued that formal ver-
ification techniques should be used to improve trust in cryptographic proofs, and
set up a program for building a tool that could be used by the cryptographic com-
munity to mechanize their proofs. We take a first step towards Halevi’s ambitious
program by presenting CertiCrypt [Barthe et al. 2009c], a fully machine-checked
framework for constructing and verifying game-based cryptographic proofs. Cer-
tiCrypt builds on top of the Coq proof assistant [The Coq development team 2009]
a broad set of reasoning principles used by cryptographers, drawing on program
verification, algebraic reasoning, and probability and complexity theory. The most
notable features of the framework are:
Faithful and rigorous encoding of games. In order to be readily accessible to cryp-
tographers, we adopt a formalism that is commonly used to describe games.
Concretely, the lowest layer of CertiCrypt is an imperative programming lan-
guage with probabilistic assignments, structured datatypes, and procedure calls.
We formalize the syntax and semantics of programs; the latter uses the mea-
sure monad of Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring [2009]. (For the connoisseur, we
provide a deep and dependently-typed embedding of the syntax; thanks to de-
pendent types, the typeability of programs is obtained for free.) The semantics
is instrumented to calculate the cost of running programs; this offers the means
to define complexity classes, and in particular to define formally the notion of
efficient (probabilistic polynomial-time) adversary. We provide in addition a
precise formalization of the adversarial model that captures many assumptions
left informal in proofs, notably including policies on memory access.
Exact security. Many security proofs only show that the advantage of any effi-
cient adversary against the security of a cryptographic system is asymptotically
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negligible with respect to a security parameter (which typically determines the
length of keys or messages). However, the cryptographic community is increas-
ingly focusing on exact security, a more useful goal since it gives hints as to how
to choose system parameters in practice to satisfy a security requirement. The
goal of exact security is to provide a concrete upper bound for the advantage of
an adversary executing in a given amount of time. This is in general done by
reduction, constructing an algorithm that solves a problem believed to be hard
and giving a lower bound for its success probability and an upper bound for
its execution time in terms of the advantage and execution time of the original
adversary. We focus on bounding the success probability (and only provide
automation to bound the execution time asymptotically) since it is arguably
where lies most of the difficulty of a cryptographic proof.
Full and independently verifiable proofs. We adopt a formal semanticist perspec-
tive and go beyond Halevi’s vision in two respects. First, we provide a unified
framework to carry out full proofs; all intermediate steps of reasoning can be
justified formally, including complex side conditions that justify the correctness
of transformations (about probabilities, algebra, complexity, etc.). Second, one
notable feature of Coq, and thus CertiCrypt, is to deliver independently verifi-
able proofs, an important motivation behind the game-based approach. More
concretely, every proof yields a proof object that can be checked automati-
cally by a (small and trustworthy) proof checking engine. In order to trust a
cryptographic proof, one only needs to check its statement and not its details.
Powerful and automated reasoning methods. We formalize a relational Hoare logic
and a theory of observational equivalence, and use them as stepping stones
to support the main tools of code-based reasoning. In particular, we prove
that many transformations used in code-based proofs, including common op-
timizations, are semantics-preserving. In addition, we mechanize reasoning
patterns used ubiquitously in cryptographic proofs, such as reasoning about
failure events (the so-called fundamental lemma of game-playing), and a logic
for inter-procedural code-motion (used to justify the eager/lazy sampling of
random values).
1.2 Organization of the Dissertation
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide a high-level description of the Cer-
tiCrypt framework, overview the case studies that have been formalized, and stir
further interest in machine-checked cryptographic proofs. The rest of the disserta-
tion is organized as follows:
• In the rest of this chapter we briefly discuss the motivation behind formal proofs
and the features of modern proof assistants. We then present two introductory
examples of game-based proofs, namely the semantic security of the ElGamal
and Hashed ElGamal encryption schemes. These examples, although simple,
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
nicely illustrate the kind of verification problem that we study and the tech-
niques that we use to mechanize the construction of proofs.
• In Chapter 2 we overview the mathematical background behind our formal-
ization and present the probabilistic language that we use to describe games
and its semantics. We also discuss our model of adversaries and the notions of
complexity and termination of programs in a probabilistic setting;
• In Chapter 3 we present the probabilistic relational Hoare logic that constitutes
the core of the framework, and describe the formulation and mechanization of
game transformations. We describe as well two ubiquitous reasoning patterns of
cryptographic proofs and specializations of the relational Hoare logic that can
be used to automate them;
• In Chapter 4 we give a detailed description of two different formalizations of the
PRP/PRF switching lemma, an important result in cryptography that admits
an elegant proof using games;
• In Chapter 5 we describe two different machine-checked proofs of the existential
unforgeability against chosen-message attacks of the Full-Domain Hash digital
signature scheme. We compare the resulting security bounds and discuss the
practical importance of tight reductions and the role that exact security plays
in choosing adequate parameters when instantiating schemes;
• In Chapter 6 we describe in some detail a machine-checked proof of the semantic
security of the Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding scheme against chosen-
plaintext attacks, and we report on a significantly more challenging proof of the
security of the same scheme under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks;
• In Chapter 7 we overview a machine-checked theory of a large class of zero-
knowledge protocols. We illustrate how to use this theory to obtain short proofs
of several well-known zero-knowledge protocols from the literature;
• We conclude in Chapter 8 with a survey of related work in the area, a discussion
of the lessons we learned while building CertiCrypt and perspectives to improve
automation and further this line of research.
1.3 A Primer on Formal Proofs
Proof assistants are programs designed to support interactive construction and
automatic verification of mathematical statements (understood in a broad sense).
Initially developed by logicians to experiment with the expressive power of their
foundational formalisms, proof assistants are now emerging as a mature technology
that can be used effectively for verifying intricate mathematical proofs, such as the
Four Color theorem [Gonthier 2008] or the Kepler conjecture [Hales 2008; Hales
et al. 2010], or complex software systems, such as operating systems [Klein et al.
2009], virtual machines [Klein and Nipkow 2006] and optimizing compilers [Leroy
2006]. In the realm of cryptography, proof assistants have been used to formally
verify secrecy and authenticity properties of protocols [Paulson 1998].
Proof assistants rely on expressive specification languages that allow formalizing
arbitrary mathematical notions, and that provide a formal representation of proofs
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as proof objects. Their architecture is organized into two layers: a kernel, and a
proof engine.
• The kernel is the cornerstone for correctness. Its central component is a checker
for verifying the consistency of formal theories, including definitions and proofs.
In particular, the checker guarantees that definitions and proofs are well-typed,
that there are no missing cases or undefined notions in definitions, and that all
proofs are built from valid elementary logical steps and make a correct use of
assumptions.
• In contrast, the proof engine assists proof construction. The proof engine em-
braces a variety of tools. The primary tools are a set of pre-defined tactics; a
language for writing user-defined tactics is usually provided. Tactics allow to
reduce a proof goal to simpler ones. When invoked on a proof goal Q, a tactic
will compute a new set of goals P1 . . . Pn, and a proof that P1 ∧ . . .∧Pn =⇒ Q.
At the end of each demonstration, the proof engine outputs a proof object.
Proof objects are independently checked by the kernel. Therefore, the proof engine
needs not be trusted, and the validity of a formal proof—beyond the accuracy of
the statement itself—only depends on the correctness of the kernel. Pleasingly,
kernels are extremely reliable programs with restricted functionalities and solid
logical foundations.
As with any other mathematical activity, formal proofs strive for elegance and
conciseness. In our experience, they also provide a natural setting for improving
proofs—in the case of cryptography, improvement can be measured by comparing
exact security bounds. Yet, what matters most about a formal proof is that it
provides a nearly absolute degree of guarantee, without requiring expensive human
verification.
1.4 Introductory Examples
This section illustrates the principles of the CertiCrypt framework on two elemen-
tary examples of game-based proofs: the semantic security of ElGamal encryption
under the Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption, and the semantic security of Hashed
ElGamal encryption in the Random Oracle Model under the Computational Diffie-
Hellman assumption. The language used to represent games will be formally in-
troduced in the next chapter; an intuitive understanding should suffice to grasp
the meaning of the games appearing here. We begin with some background on
encryption schemes and their security.
Definition 1.1 (Asymmetric encryption scheme). An asymmetric encryption
scheme is composed of a triple of algorithms:
Key generation: Given a security parameter η, the key generation algorithm KG(η)
returns a public/secret key pair (pk, sk);
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Encryption: Given a public key pk and a plaintext m, the encryption algorithm
E(pk,m) computes a ciphertext corresponding to the encryption of
m under pk;
Decryption: Given a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, the decryption algorithm
D(sk, c) returns either the plaintext corresponding to the decryption
of c, if it is a valid ciphertext, or a distinguished value ⊥ otherwise.
Key generation and encryption may be probabilistic, while decryption is determin-
istic. We require that decryption undo encryption: for every pair of keys (pk, sk)
that can be output by the key generation algorithm, and every plaintext m, it must
be the case that D(sk, E(pk,m)) = m.
An asymmetric encryption scheme is said to be semantically secure if it is un-
feasible to gain significant information about a plaintext given only a corresponding
ciphertext and the public key. Goldwasser and Micali [1984] showed that seman-
tic security is equivalent to the property of ciphertext indistinguishability under
chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA, for short). This property can be formally de-
fined in terms of a game played between a challenger and an adversary A, repre-
sented as a pair of procedures (A1,A2) that may share state:
Game IND-CPA :
(pk, sk)← KG(η);
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
c← E(pk,mb);
b˜← A2(c)
In this game, the challenger first generates a new key pair and gives the public key
pk to the adversary, who returns two plaintextsm0,m1 of its choice. The challenger
then tosses a fair coin b and gives the encryption of mb back to the adversary, whose
goal is to guess which message has been encrypted.
Definition 1.2 (IND-CPA security). The advantage of an adversary A in the
above experiment is defined as
AdvIND-CPAA =
∣∣∣∣Pr [IND-CPA : b = b˜]− 12
∣∣∣∣
An encryption scheme is said to be IND-CPA secure if the advantage of any efficient
adversary is a negligible function of the security parameter η, i.e., the adversary
cannot do much better than a blind guess.
Definition 1.3 (Negligible function). A function ν : N→ R is said to be negli-
gible if it decreases asymptotically faster than the inverse of any polynomial:
∀c ∈ N. ∃nc ∈ N. ∀n ∈ N. n ≥ nc =⇒ |ν(n)| ≤ n
−c
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Note that in order to satisfy the above definition, an encryption scheme must
necessarily be probabilistic, otherwise an adversary could trivially detect to which
message corresponds the challenge ciphertext by simply encrypting one of the mes-
sages it has chosen and comparing the resulting ciphertext with the challenge ci-
phertext.
1.4.1 The ElGamal Encryption Scheme
Let {Gη} be a family of cyclic prime-order groups indexed by a security parameter
η ∈ N. For a specific value of the security parameter, which we leave implicit, let q
denote the order of the corresponding group in the family and let g be a generator.
ElGamal encryption is defined by the following triple of algorithms:
KG(η) def= x $← Zq; return (gx, x)
E(α,m) def= y $← Zq; return (gy, αy ×m)
D(x, (β, ζ)) def= return (ζ × β−x)
We prove the IND-CPA security of ElGamal encryption under the assumption that
the Decision Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard. Intuitively, for a family of
finite cyclic groups, the DDH problem consists in distinguishing between triples
of the form (gx, gy, gxy) and triples of the form (gx, gy, gz) , where the exponents
x, y, z are uniformly sampled from Zq. One characteristic of game-based proofs is to
formulate computational assumptions using games; the assumption that the DDH
problem is hard is no exception and can be formulated as follows:
Definition 1.4 (Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption). Consider the fol-
lowing games
Game DDH0 : x, y $← Zq; d← B(g
x, gy, gxy)
Game DDH1 : x, y, z $← Zq; d← B(gx, gy, gz)
and define the DDH-advantage of an adversary B as follows
AdvDDHB
def
= |Pr [DDH0 : d = 1]− Pr [DDH1 : d = 1]|
We say that the DDH assumption holds for the family of groups {Gη} when the ad-
vantage of any efficient adversary B in the above experiment is a negligible function
of the security parameter. Note that the semantics of the games (and in particular
the order q of the group) depends on the security parameter η.
ElGamal is an emblematic example of game-based proofs. The proof of its
security, which follows the proof by Shoup [2004], embodies many of the techniques
described in the next chapters. The proof is done by reduction and shows that
every adversary A against the chosen-plaintext security of ElGamal that achieves
a given advantage can be used to construct a distinguisher B that solves DDH with
the same advantage and in roughly the same amount of time. We exhibit a concrete
construction of this distinguisher:
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Adversary B(α, β, γ) :
(m0,m1)← A1(α);
b $← {0, 1};
b˜← A2(β, γ ×mb);
return b = b˜
We prove that AdvDDHB = Adv
IND-CPA
A for any given adversary A. To conclude the
proof (i.e. to show that the advantage of any efficient adversary A is negligible),
we show that the reduction is efficient: the adversary B executes in probabilistic
polynomial-time provided the IND-CPA adversary A does—we do not show a con-
crete bound for the execution time of B, although it is evident that it incurs only
a constant overhead.
Figure 1.1 gives a high-level view of the reduction: games appear inside white
background boxes, whereas gray background boxes contain the actual proof scripts
used to prove observational equivalence between consecutive games. A proof script
is simply a sequence of tactics, each intermediate tactic transforms the current goal
into a simpler one, whereas the last tactic in the script ultimately solves the goal.
The tactics that appear in the figure hopefully have self-explanatory names, but
are explained cursorily below and in more detail in Chapter 3.
The proof proceeds by constructing an adversary B against DDH such that
the distribution of b = b˜ (equivalently, d) after running the IND-CPA game for
ElGamal is exactly the same as the distribution obtained by running game DDH0.
In addition, we show that the probability of d being true in DDH1 is exactly 1/2
for the same adversary B. The remaining gap between DDH0 and DDH1 is the
DDH-advantage of B. The reduction is summarized by the following equations:∣∣∣Pr [IND-CPA : b = b˜]− 1/2∣∣∣ = |Pr [G1 : d]− 1/2| (1.1)
= |Pr [DDH0 : d]− 1/2| (1.2)
= |Pr [DDH0 : d]− Pr [G3 : d]| (1.3)
= |Pr [DDH0 : d]− Pr [G2 : d]| (1.4)
= |Pr [DDH0 : d]− Pr [DDH1 : d]| (1.5)
Equation (1.1) holds because games IND-CPA and G1 induce the same distribution
on d. We specify this as an observational equivalence judgment as IND-CPA ≃{d}
G1, and prove it using certified program transformations and decision procedures.
A graphical representation of the sequence of tactics used to prove this judgment is
shown in Figure 1.2. We first inline the procedure calls to KG and E in the IND-CPA
game and simplify the resulting games by propagating assignments and eliminating
dead code (tactics ep, deadcode). At this point we are left with two games almost
identical, except that y is sampled later in one game than in the other. The tactic
swap hoists instructions in one game whenever is possible in order to obtain a
maximal common prefix with another game, and allows us to hoist the sampling
of y in the program on the left hand side. We conclude the proof by applying the
tactic eqobs_in that decides observational equivalence of a program with itself.
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(1.1)
(1.2)
(1.4)
(1.5)
≃{d}
≃{d} ≃{d}
≃{d}
inline KG
inline E
ep
deadcode
swap
eqobs_in
inline B
ep
deadcode
eqobs_in
inline B
ep
deadcode
swap
eqobs_in
swap
eqobs_hd 4
eqobs_tl 2
apply otp
Game IND-CPA :
(α, x)← KG(η);
(m0,m1)← A1(α);
b $← {0, 1};
(β, ζ)← E(α,mb);
b˜← A2(β, ζ);
d← b = b˜
Game G1 :
x, y $← Zq;
(m0,m1)←A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
ζ ← gxy×mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, ζ);
d← b = b˜
Game DDH0 :
x, y $← Zq;
d← B(gx, gy, gxy)
AdversaryB(α, β, γ)
(m0,m1)← A1(α);
b $← {0, 1};
b′ ← A2(β, γ×mb);
return b = b′
Game DDH1 :
x, y, z $← Zq;
d← B(gx, gy, gz)
Game G2 :
x, y $← Zq;
(m0,m1)←A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1}; z $← Zq;
ζ ← gz×mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, ζ);
d← b = b˜
Game G3 :
x, y $← Zq;
(m0,m1)← A1(g
x);
z $← Zq; ζ ← g
z;
b˜← A2(g
y, ζ);
b $← {0, 1};
d← b = b˜
Fig. 1.1. Code-based proof of ElGamal semantic security.
Equations (1.2) and (1.5) are obtained similarly, while (1.3) is established by
simple probabilistic reasoning: because in game G3 the bit b˜ is independent from b,
the probability of both bits being equal is exactly 1/2. Finally, to prove (1.4) we
begin by removing the part the two games have in common with the exception of
the instruction z $← Zq (swap, eqobs_hd, eqobs_tl) and then apply an algebraic
property of cyclic groups that we have proved as a lemma (otp): if one applies the
group operation to a uniformly distributed element of the group and some other
constant element, the result is uniformly distributed—a random element acts as a
one-time pad. This allows to prove that z $← Zq; ζ ← gz×mb and z $← Zq; ζ ← gz
induce the same distribution on ζ, and thus remove the dependence of b˜ on b.
The proof concludes by applying the DDH assumption to show that the IND-CPA
advantage of A is negligible. For this, and in view that AdvIND-CPAA = Adv
DDH
B , it
suffices to prove that the adversary B is probabilistic polynomial-time (under the
assumption that the procedures A1 and A2 are so); the proof of this latter fact is
entirely automated in CertiCrypt.
1.4.2 The Hashed ElGamal Encryption Scheme
Hashed ElGamal is a variant of the ElGamal public-key encryption scheme that does
not require plaintexts to be members of the underlying group G. Instead, plaintexts
in Hashed ElGamal are just bitstrings of a certain length ℓ and group elements are
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(α, x)← KG(η);
(m0, m1)← A1(α);
b $← {0, 1};
(β, ζ)← E(α,mb);
b˜← A2(β, ζ);
d← b = b˜
x, y $← Zq;
(m0, m1)← A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
ζ ← gxy×mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, ζ);
d← b = b˜
≃{d}
inline KG; inline E
x $← Zq ; α← g
x;
(m0, m1)← A1(α);
b $← {0, 1};
y $← Zq ; β ← g
y;
ζ ← αy×mb;
b˜← A2(β, ζ);
d← b = b˜
x, y $← Zq;
(m0, m1)← A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
ζ ← gxy×mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, ζ);
d← b = b˜
≃{d}
ep; deadcode
x $← Zq ;
(m0, m1)← A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
y $← Zq ;
b˜← A2(g
y,gxy×mb);
d← b = b˜
x, y $← Zq;
(m0, m1)← A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
b˜← A2(g
y,gxy×mb);
d← b = b˜
≃{d}
swap
x, y $← Zq;
(m0, m1)← A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
b˜← A2(g
y,gxy×mb);
d← b = b˜
x, y $← Zq;
(m0, m1)← A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
b˜← A2(g
y,gxy×mb);
d← b = b˜
≃{d}
eqobs_in
Fig. 1.2. Sequence of transformations in the proof of IND-CPA ≃{d} G1.
mapped into bitstrings using a hash functionH : G→ {0, 1}ℓ. Formally, the scheme
is defined by the following triple of algorithms:
KG(η) def= x $← Zq; return (gx, x)
E(α,m) def= y $← Zq; h← H(αy); return (gy, h⊕m)
D(x, (β, ζ)) def= h← H(βx); return (ζ ⊕ h)
Hashed ElGamal encryption is semantically secure in the random oracle model un-
der the Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption on the underlying group
family {Gη}. This is the assumption that it is hard to compute g
xy given only gx
and gy where x and y are uniformly sampled from Zq. Clearly, the DDH assumption
implies the CDH assumption, but the converse need not necessarily hold.1
Definition 1.5 (Computational Diffie-Hellman assumption). Consider the
following game
1 Groups where DDH is easy and CDH is believed to be hard are of practical importance
in cryptography and are called Diffie-Hellman gap groups [Okamoto and Pointcheval
2001a].
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Game CDH : x, y $← Zq; γ ← B(g
x, gy)
and define the success probability of B against CDH as follows
AdvCDHB
def
= Pr [CDH : γ = gxy]
We say that the CDH assumption holds for the family of groups {Gη} when the
success probability of any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary B is a negligible
function of the security parameter.
We show that any adversary A against the IND-CPA security of Hashed ElGamal
that makes at most qH queries to the hash oracle H can be used to construct an
adversary B that achieves a success probability of q−1H Adv
IND-CPA
A in solving the
CDH problem. The reduction is done in the random oracle model, where hash
functions are modeled as truly random functions. We represent random oracles
using stateful procedures; queries are answered consistently: if some value is queried
twice, the same response is given. For instance, we code the hash function H as
follows:
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ /∈ dom(L) then
h $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
The proof is sketched in Figure 1.3. We follow the convention of typesetting global
variables in boldface. The figure shows the sequence of games used to relate the
success of the IND-CPA adversary in the original attack game to the success of the
CDH adversary B; the definition of the hash oracle is shown alongside each game.
As in the proof of the semantic security of ElGamal, we begin by inlining the calls
to KG and E in the IND-CPA game to obtain an observationally equivalent game
G1 such that
Pr
[
IND-CPA : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G1 : b = b˜
]
(1.6)
We then fix the value hˆ that the hash oracle gives in response to gxy. This is an
instance of the lazy sampling transformation: any value that is randomly sampled
at some point in a program can be sampled in advance, somewhere earlier in the
program. This transformation is automated in CertiCrypt and is described in greater
detail in Section 3.2.3. We get
Pr
[
G1 : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G2 : b = b˜
]
(1.7)
We can then modify the hash oracle so that it does not store in L the response
given to a gxy query; this will later let us remove hˆ altogether from the code of
the hash oracle. We prove that games G2 and G3 are equivalent by considering the
following relational invariant:
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Game IND-CPA :
L← nil;
(α, x)← KG(η);
(m0,m1)← A1(α);
b $← {0, 1};
(β, v)←E(α,mb);
b˜← A2(β, v)
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
≃{b,b˜}
Game G1 :
L← nil;
x, y $← Zq;
(m0,m1)←A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
h← H(gxy);
v ← h⊕mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, v)
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
≃{b,b˜}
Game G2 :
hˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← nil;
x, y $← Zq;
Λ← gxy;
(m0,m1)←A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
h← H(Λ);
v ← h⊕mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, v)
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ 6∈ dom(L) then
if λ = Λ then
h← hˆ
else h $← {0, 1}ℓ
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
∼{b,b˜}∧φ23
Game G3 :
hˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← nil;
x, y $← Zq;
Λ← gxy;
(m0,m1)←A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
h← hˆ;
v ← h⊕mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, v)
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ = Λ then
h← hˆ
else
if λ 6∈dom(L) then
h $← {0, 1}ℓ
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
Game G4 G5 :
bad← false;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← nil;
x, y $← Zq;
Λ← gxy;
(m0,m1)←A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
v ← hˆ⊕mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, v)
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ 6∈ dom(L) then
if λ = Λ then
bad← true;
h← hˆ
h $← {0, 1}ℓ
else h $← {0, 1}ℓ
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
∼{L,Λ,b,b˜}∧(bad=⇒Λ∈dom(L))〈1〉
Game G6 :
L← nil;
x, y $← Zq;
Λ← gxy;
(m0,m1)←A1(g
x);
b $← {0, 1};
v $← {0, 1}ℓ;
hˆ← v ⊕mb;
b˜← A2(g
y, v)
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
≃{L,x,y}
Game CDH :
x, y $← Zq;
γ ← B(gx, gy)
Adversary B(α, β)
L← nil;
(m0,m1)←A1(α);
v $← {0, 1}ℓ;
b˜← A2(β, v);
γ $← dom(L);
return γ
Oracle H(λ) :
if λ 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← (λ, h) :: L
else h← L[λ]
return h
Fig. 1.3. Game-based proof of semantic security of Hashed ElGamal encryption in the
Random Oracle Model.
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φ23
def
= (Λ ∈ dom(L) =⇒ L[Λ] = hˆ)〈1〉 ∧ ∀λ.λ 6= Λ〈1〉 =⇒ L[λ]〈1〉 = L[λ]〈2〉
where e〈1〉 (resp. e〈2〉) denotes the value that expression e takes in the left hand
side (resp. right hand side) program. Intuitively, this invariant shows that the
association list L, which represents the memory of the hash oracle, coincides in
both programs, except perhaps on the element Λ, which the list in the program
on the left hand side (G2) necessarily maps to hˆ. It is easy to prove that the
implementations of oracle H in games G2 and G3 are semantically equivalent under
this invariant and preserve it. Since φ23 is established just before calling A and is
preserved throughout the games, we can prove by inlining the call to H in game G2
that
Pr
[
G2 : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G3 : b = b˜
]
(1.8)
We then undo the previous modification to revert to the previous implementation
of the hash oracle and prove that games G3 and G4 are observationally equivalent,
from which we obtain
Pr
[
G3 : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G4 : b = b˜
]
(1.9)
Let us now introduce a Boolean flag bad that is set at program points where the
code of G4 and G5 differ. We argue that the difference in the probability of any
event in those games is bounded by the probability of bad being set in G5, and
therefore ∣∣∣Pr [G4 : b = b˜]− Pr [G5 : b = b˜]∣∣∣ ≤ Pr [G5 : bad] (1.10)
This form of reasoning is pervasive in game-based cryptographic proofs and is an in-
stance of the so-called Fundamental Lemma that we discuss in detail in Section 3.3.
In addition, we establish that bad =⇒ Λ ∈ dom(L) is a post-condition of game
G5 and thus
Pr [G5 : bad] ≤ Pr [G5 : Λ ∈ dom(L)] (1.11)
Since now both branches in the innermost conditional of the hash oracle are equiv-
alent, we coalesce them to recover the original random oracle implementation of H
in G6. We can now use the swap tactic to defer the sampling of hˆ to the point just
before computing v, and substitute
v $← {0, 1}ℓ; hˆ← v ⊕mb for hˆ $← {0, 1}
ℓ; v ← hˆ⊕mb
The semantic equivalence of these two program fragments can be proved using the
probabilistic relational Hoare logic presented in Section 3.1—a proof is given in
Section 3.2.2. Hence,
Pr
[
G5 : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G6 : b = b˜
]
(1.12)
and
Pr [G5 : Λ ∈ dom(L)] = Pr [G6 : Λ ∈ dom(L)] (1.13)
Observe that b˜ does not depend anymore on b in G6 (hˆ← v⊕mb is dead code), so
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Pr
[
G6 : b = b˜
]
=
1
2
(1.14)
We finally construct an adversary B against CDH that interacts with the adversary
A playing the role of an IND-CPA challenger. It returns a random element sampled
from the list of queries that adversary A made to the hash oracle. Observe that
B does not need to know x or y because it gets gx and gy as parameters. If the
correct answer Λ = gxy to the CDH challenge appears in the list of queries L when
the experiment terminates, adversary B has probability |L|−1 of returning it as an
answer. Since we know that A does not make more than qH queries to the hash
oracle, we finally have that
Pr [G6 : Λ ∈ dom(L)] = Pr [G6 : g
xy ∈ dom(L)] ≤ qH Pr [CDH : γ = g
xy] (1.15)
To summarize, from (1.6)—(1.15) we obtain∣∣∣Pr [IND-CPA : b = b˜]− 1/2∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣Pr [G4 : b = b˜]− 1/2∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr [G4 : b = b˜]− Pr [G6 : b = b˜]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣Pr [G4 : b = b˜]− Pr [G5 : b = b˜]∣∣∣
≤ Pr [G5 : bad]
≤ Pr [G6 : Λ ∈ dom(L)]
≤ qH Pr [CDH : γ = g
xy]
For any adversary A that executes in polynomial time, we can assume that the
bound qH on the number of queries is polynomial on the security parameter. Un-
der the CDH assumption, the IND-CPA advantage of adversary A must then be
negligible. Otherwise, the adversary B that we constructed would solve CDH with
non-negligible probability, contradicting our computational assumption. To see
this, we need to verify that adversary B runs in probabilistic polynomial time, but
this is the case because procedures A1,A2 do, and B does not perform any addi-
tional costly computations. As in the previous example, the proof of this latter fact
is completely automated in CertiCrypt.
We note that Hashed ElGamal can also be proved semantically secure in the
standard model, but under the stronger DDH assumption. A game-based proof
appears in [Barthe et al. 2009a]. The security reduction can be made under the
hypothesis that the family of hash functions H is entropy smoothing—such a family
of hash functions can be built without additional assumptions using the Leftover
Hash Lemma [Håstad et al. 1999].
2
A Language for Describing Games
s
W
e have tried so far to be as rigorous as possible in our treatment of crypto-
graphic proofs. We argued that a game-based approach can lead to tidier,
more understandable proofs that help eliminate conspicuous errors and make clear
the reasoning behind each step in a proof. We moved one step forward, taking a
language-based approach and regarding games as programs. But still, our under-
standing of what a game means remains purely intuitive. In this chapter we will
make this intuition precise by defining formally the probabilistic language we use
to describe games and its semantics. This semanticist perspective allows a pre-
cise specification of the interaction between an adversary and the challenger in a
game, and to readily answer questions that often arise in proofs, such as: Which
oracles does the adversary have access to? Can the adversary read/write this vari-
able? How many queries the adversary can make to a given oracle? What is the
type/length of a value returned by the adversary? Can the adversary repeat a
query? Furthermore, the framework enables us to give very precise definitions of
fundamental notions such as probabilistic polynomial-time complexity or termina-
tion which are of paramount importance in the specification of security definitions
and computational hardness assumptions.
2.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
2.1.1 The Unit Interval
The starting point of our formalization is the ALEA Coq library, developed by
Paulin-Mohring and described in [Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring 2009]. It provides
an axiomatization of the unit interval [0, 1], with the following operations:
Addition: (x, y) 7→ min(x+ y, 1), where + denotes addition over reals;
Inversion: x 7→ 1− x, where − denotes subtraction over reals;
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Multiplication: (x, y) 7→ x× y, where × denotes multiplication over reals;
Division: (x, y 6= 0) 7→ min(x/y, 1), where / denotes division over reals; more-
over, if y = 0, for convenience division is defined to be 0.
Other useful operations can be derived from these basic operations; for instance
the absolute value of the difference of two values x, y ∈ [0, 1] can be obtained by
computing (x − y) + (y − x) and their maximum by computing (x− y) + y.
The unit interval can be given an ω-complete partial order (cpo) structure.
Recall that an ω-cpo consists of a partially ordered set such that any monotonic
sequence has a least upper bound. The unit interval [0, 1] can be given the structure
of a ω-cpo by taking as order the usual ≤ relation and by defining an operator sup
that computes the least upper bound of a monotonic sequence f : N → [0, 1] as
follows:
sup f = max
n∈N
f(n)
More generally, for any complete partially ordered set D, we use sup f to denote the
least upper bound of a monotonic sequence f : N → D. Note that a cpo structure
on D induces a cpo structure in the function space A→ D by taking
f ≤A→D g
def
= ∀x : A. f(x) ≤D g(x)
0A→D
def
= λx. 0D
supA→D f
def
= λx. supD(f(x))
2.1.2 The Measure Monad
Programs are interpreted as functions from initial memories to sub-probability dis-
tributions over final memories. To give semantics to most programs used in crypto-
graphic proofs, it would be sufficient to consider sub-distributions with a countable
support, which admit a very direct formalization as functions of the form
µ : A→ [0, 1] such that
∑
x∈A
µ(x) ≤ 1
However, it is convenient to take a more general approach and represent instead a
distribution over a set A as a probability measure, by giving a function that maps
a [0, 1]-valued random variable (a function in A → [0, 1]) to its expected value,
i.e. the integral of the random variable with respect to the probability measure.
This view of distributions eliminates the need of cluttered definitions and proofs
involving summations, and allows us to give a continuation-passing style semantics
to programs by defining a suitable monadic structure on distributions. Formally,
we represent a distribution on A as a function µ of type
D(A) def= (A→ [0, 1])→ [0, 1]
satisfying the following properties:
Monotonicity: f ≤ g =⇒ µ f ≤ µ g;
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Compatibility with inverse: µ (1− f) ≤ 1− µ f ;
Additive linearity: f ≤ 1− g =⇒ µ (f + g) = µ f + µ g;
Multiplicative linearity: µ (k × f) = k × µ f ;
Continuity: if f : N → (A → [0, 1]) is monotonic and for all n ∈ N
f(n) is monotonic, then µ (sup f) ≤ sup (µ ◦ f)
We do not restrict our attention only to distributions with probability mass of 1,
but we consider as well sub-probability distributions, that may have a total mass
strictly less than 1. As we will see, this is key to give semantics to non-terminating
programs (i.e. programs that do not terminate with probability 1).
Distributions can be interpreted as a monad whose unit and bind operators are
defined as follows:
unit : A→ D(A) def= λx. λf. f x
bind : D(A) → (A→ D(B)) → D(B) def= λµ. λF. λf. µ (λx. (F x) f)
These operators satisfy the usual monadic laws
bind (unit x) F = F x
bind µ unit = µ
bind (bind µ F ) G = bind µ (λx. bind (F x) G)
The monad D was proposed by Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring [2009] as a variant
of the expectation monad used by Ramsey and Pfeffer [2002], and builds on earlier
work by Kozen [1981]. It is, in turn, a specialization of the continuation monad
(A→ B)→ B, with result type B = [0, 1].
2.1.3 Lifting Predicates and Relations to Distributions
For a distribution µ : D(A) over a countable set A, we let support(µ) denote the set
of values in A with positive probability, i.e. its support:
support(µ) def=
{
x ∈ A | 0 < µ I{x}
}
where IX denotes the indicator function of set X ,
IX
def
=
{
1 if x ∈ X
0 otherwise
To lift relations to probability distributions we follow the early work of Jonsson
et al. [2001] on probabilistic bisimulations.
Definition 2.1 (Lifting predicates to distributions). Let µ be a distribution
on a set A, and P be a predicate on A. We define the lifting of P to µ as follows:
range P µ def= ∀f. (∀x. P x =⇒ f x = 0) =⇒ µ f = 0
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This rather contrived definition is necessary because we consider sub-probability
distributions whose total measure may be less than 1; equivalently we could have
stated it as:
range P µ def= ∀f. (∀x. P x =⇒ f x = 1) =⇒ µ f = µ 1
Note also that due to the way distributions are formalized, the above definition is
strictly stronger than the following, more intuitive definition:
range P µ def= ∀x ∈ support(µ). 0 < µ(I{x}) =⇒ P x
This latter definition makes sense only for distributions with countable support, for
which it can be proved equivalent to the above definitions.
Definition 2.2 (Lifting relations to distributions). Let µ1 be a probability dis-
tribution on a set A and µ2 a probability distribution on a set B. We define the
lifting of a relation R ⊆ A×B to µ1 and µ2 as follows:
µ1 R
# µ2
def
= ∃µ : D(A×B). π1(µ) = µ1 ∧ π2(µ) = µ2 ∧ range R µ (2.1)
where range R µ stands for the lifting of R, seen as a predicate on pairs in A×B,
to distribution µ, and the projections π1(µ), π2(µ) of µ are given by
π1(µ)
def
= bind µ (unit ◦ fst) π2(µ)
def
= bind µ (unit ◦ snd)
In contrast to the definition given by Jonsson et al. [2001], the definition above
makes sense even when the distributions do not have a countable support. When
they do, both definitions coincide; in this case, µ1 R
# µ2 amounts to saying that
the probability of each element a in the support of µ1 can be divided among the
elements related to it in such a way that when summing up over these probabilities
for an element b ∈ B, one obtains µ2 I{b}.
Let us give an example that conveys a better intuition; suppose one wants to
prove UA R# UB, where UX stands for the uniform probability distribution on a
finite set X . When A and B have the same size, proving this is equivalent to
exhibiting a bijection f : A → B such that for every a ∈ A, R(a, f(a)) holds.
Indeed, using such f it is easy to build a distribution µ on A×B that satisfies the
condition in (2.1):
µ def= bind UA (λa.unit (a, f(a)))
This example, as trivial as it may seem, shows that probabilistic reasoning can
sometimes be replaced by simpler forms of reasoning. In typical cryptographic
proofs, purely probabilistic reasoning is seldom necessary and most mundane steps
in proofs can be either entirely automated or reduced to verifying simpler conditions,
much like in the above example, e.g. showing the existence of a bijection with
particular properties.
The way we chose to lift relations over memories to relations over distributions is
a generalization to arbitrary relations of the definition of Sabelfeld and Sands [2001]
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that applies only to equivalence relations. Indeed, there is a simpler but equivalent
(see [Jonsson et al. 2001]) way of lifting an equivalence relation to distributions:
if R is an equivalence relation on A, then µ1 R
# µ2 holds if and only if for all
equivalence classes [a] ⊆ A, µ1 I[a] = µ2 I[a].
Define two functions f and g to be equal modulo a relation Φ iff
f =Φ g
def
= ∀x y. x Φ y =⇒ f(x) = g(y)
It can be easily shown that the above general definition of lifting satisfies
µ1 Φ
# µ2 ∧ f =Φ g =⇒ µ1 f = µ2 g
and analogously.
µ1 Φ
# µ2 ∧ f ≤Φ g =⇒ µ1 f ≤ µ2 g
We use these properties to prove rules relating observational equivalence to proba-
bility in Section 3.1.
It can be shown that lifting preserves the reflexivity and symmetry of the lifted
relation, but proving that it preserves transitivity is not as straightforward. Ideally,
one would like to have for probability measures µ1 : D(A), µ2 : D(B), µ3 : D(C)
and relations Ψ ⊆ A×B, Φ ⊆ B × C
µ1 Ψ
# µ2 ∧ µ2 Φ
# µ3 =⇒ µ1 (Ψ ◦ Φ)
#
µ3
Proving this for arbitrary distributions requires proving Fubini’s theorem for prob-
ability measures, which allows to compute integrals with respect to a product mea-
sure in terms of iterated integrals with respect to the original measures. Since in
practice we consider distributions with a countable support, we do not need the full
generality of this result, and we prove it under the assumption that the distribution
µ2 has a countable support, i.e. there exist coefficients ci : [0, 1] and points bi : B
such that, for any f ,
µ2 f =
∞∑
i=0
cif(bi)
Lemma 2.3. Consider d1 : D(A), d2 : D(B), d3 : D(C) such that d2 has countable
support. Suppose there exist distributions µ12 : D(A×B) and µ23 : D(B × C) that
make µ1 Ψ
# µ2 and µ2 Φ
# µ3 hold. Then, the following distribution over A× C is
a witness for the existential in µ1 (Ψ ◦ Φ)
#
µ3:
µ13 f
def
= µ2
(
λb. µ12
(
λp.
(
1snd(p)=b/µ2 I{b}
)
µ23
(
λq.
(
1fst(q)=b/µ2 I{b}
)
f(fst p, snd q)
)))
Proof. The difficult part of the proof is to show that the projections of this distri-
bution coincide with µ1 and µ2. For this, we use the fact that µ2 is discrete to prove
that iterative integration with respect to µ2 and another measure commutes. This
is the case because we can write integration with respect to µ2 as a summation and
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we only consider measures that are continue and linear. For instance, to see that
the first projection of µ13 coincides with µ1:
π1(µ13) f =
∞∑
i=0
ci µ12
(
λp.
(
1snd(p)=bi/ci
)
µ23
(
λq.
(
1fst(q)=bi/ci
)
f(fst p)
))
= µ12
(
λp.
∞∑
i=0
1snd(p)=bi µ23
(
λq.
(
1fst(q)=bi/ci
)
f(fst p)
))
= µ12
(
λp. f(fst p)
∞∑
i=0
1snd(p)=bi
)
= µ12 (λp. f(fst p))
= µ1 f
⊓⊔
2.2 The pWhile Language
We describe games as programs in the pWhile language, a probabilistic extension
of an imperative language with procedure calls. This language can be regarded as
a mild generalization of the language proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [2006], in
that our language allows while loops whereas theirs only allow bounded for loops.
The formalization of pWhile is carefully crafted to exploit key features of Coq:
it uses modules to support an extensible expression language that can be adapted
according to the verification goal, dependent types to ensure that programs are well-
typed and have a total semantics, and monads to give semantics to probabilistic
programs and capture the cost of executing them.
We formalize programs in a deep-embedding style, i.e. the syntax of the lan-
guage is encoded within the proof assistant. Deep embeddings offer one tremendous
advantage over shallow embeddings, in which the language used to represent pro-
grams is the same as the underlying language of the proof assistant. Namely, a
deep embedding allows to manipulate programs as syntactic objects. This permits
to achieve a high level of automation in reasoning about programs through cer-
tified tactics that implement syntactic program transformations. Additionally, a
deep embedding allows to formalize complexity issues neatly and to reason about
programs by induction on the structure of their code.
The semantics of programs is given by an interpretation function that takes a
program p—an element of the type of programs—and an initial state s, and returns
the result of executing p starting from s. In a deterministic case, both s and the
result of executing p starting from s would be deterministic states, i.e. memories
mapping variables to values. In the case of pWhile programs, the denotation
of a program is instead a function mapping an initial state to a (sub)-probability
measure over final states. We use the measure monad described in 2.1 to define the
denotation of programs.
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2.2.1 Syntax
Given a set V of variable identifiers, a set P of procedure identifiers, a set E of
deterministic expressions, and a set DE of distribution expressions, the instructions
I and commands C of the language can be defined inductively by the clauses:
I ::= V ← E deterministic assignment
| V $← DE probabilistic assignment
| if E then C else C conditional
| while E do C while loop
| V ← P(E , . . . , E) procedure call
C ::= skip nop
| I; C sequence
The inductive definition of the language suffices to understand the rest of the pre-
sentation and the reader may prefer to retain it for further reference. In practice,
however, variable and procedure identifiers are annotated with their types, and the
syntax of programs is dependently-typed. Thus, x ← e is well-formed only if the
types of x and e coincide, and if e then c1 else c2 is well-formed only if e is a Boolean
expression and c1 and c2 are themselves well-formed. An immediate benefit of using
dependent types is that the type system of Coq ensures for free the well-typedness
of expressions and commands.
In the remainder of this section we describe in detail the formalization of the
syntax and semantics of the language. Most readers, particularly those not familiar
with Coq, can skim through this section without hindering the understanding of
the rest of the dissertation.
Background on the Coq proof assistant
We built our framework on top of Coq, a general purpose proof assistant that has
been used for over two decades to formalize results in mathematics and computer
science [The Coq development team 2009]. Coq provides an expressive specifi-
cation language based on the Calculus of Inductive Constructions, a higher-order
dependently-typed λ-calculus in which mathematical notions can be formalized con-
veniently. The Coq logic distinguishes between types, of type Type, which represent
sets, and propositions, of type Prop, which represent formulae: thus, a : A is inter-
preted as “a is an element of type A” if A is a set, and as “a is a proof of A” if A
is a proposition. In the latter case, we say that a is a proof object. Types can ei-
ther be introduced by standard constructions, e.g. (generalized) function space and
products, or by inductive definitions. Most common inductive types are predefined,
including the type N of natural numbers, the type B of Boolean values, and sum
and product types. We will also use the inductively defined types of homogeneous
and heterogeneous lists. Homogeneous lists are composed of elements of the same
type. The polymorphic inductive type of homogeneous lists is defined as follows:
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Inductive list A : Type :=
| nil : nil
| cons : A→ list A→ list A
The list constructor cons is usually represented using an infix notation as the oper-
ator “ ::”. Thus, the list composed of the natural numbers 1, 2 and 3, in that order,
has type list N and could be represented as (1 :: 2 :: 3 :: nil). Heterogeneous lists
are composed of elements whose type may depend on a value. Given a type A and
a type-valued function P : A → Type, the inductive type of heterogeneous lists is
defined as follows:
Inductive hlist A (P : A→ Type) : list A→ Type :=
| dnil : hlist nil
| dcons : ∀a l, P a→ hlist l → hlist (a :: l)
We will use A⋆ to denote the type of A-lists (i.e. list A), and P ⋆l to denote the type
of heterogeneous P -lists over a list of values l (i.e. hlist P l).
Types
We formalize a dependently-typed syntax, and use the underlying type system of
Coq to ensure for free that expressions and commands are well-formed. In our
experience, the typed syntax provides particularly useful feedback when debugging
proofs and makes proofs easier by restricting reasoning about programs to reasoning
about their meaningful behaviors.
The types and expressions of the language are defined on top of a module that
contains the declaration of user-defined types and operators. Formally, the set T
of types is defined as:
Inductive T : Type :=
| User : Tuser → T
| Nat : T
| Bool : T
| List : T → T
| Pair : T → T → T
| Sum : T → T → T
| Option : T → T
where Tuser denotes the set of user-defined types. This set can be given different
definitions according to the cryptographic system under verification.
The interpretation of types—and of programs in general—depends on a security
parameter η (a natural number),
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Definition interp (η : N) (t : T ) :=
match t with
| User ut ⇒ interpuser η ut
| Nat ⇒ N
| Bool ⇒ B
| List t ⇒ list (interp η t)
| Pair t1 t2 ⇒ (interp η t1)× (interp η t2)
| Sum t1 t2 ⇒ (interp η t1) + (interp η t2)
end
For instance, to introduce a type of bitstrings of a certain length ℓ(η) depending
on the security parameter, one would define Tuser as follows,
Inductive Tuser : Type :=
| Bitstring : Tuser
and let the interpretation of Bistring for a value η of the security parameter be
some representation of the set {0, 1}ℓ(η) in Coq (the type of bitvectors defined in
the standard library of Coq provides a convenient representation).
Expressions
Expressions are built from a set of T -indexed variable names V , using operators
from the core language, such as constructors for pairs and lists, and user-defined
operators. All operators are declared with typing information, as specified by the
functions targs and tres, that return for each operator the list of types of its argu-
ments, and the type of its result, respectively. The T -indexed family E of expres-
sions is then defined as:
Inductive E : T → Type :=
| Enat :> N→ ENat
| Ebool :> B→ EBool
| Evar :> ∀t, Vt → Et
| Eop : ∀op, E⋆(targs op) → E(tres op)
| Eforall : ∀t, Vt → EBool → E(List t) → EBool
| Eexists : ∀t, Vt → EBool → E(List t) → EBool
| Efind : ∀t, Vt → EBool → E(List t) → Et
The first three clauses declare constructors as coercions; thanks to this mechanism
it is possible to view an element of their domain as an element of their codomain,
e.g. a natural number as an expression of type Nat and a variable of type t as
an expression of type t. The fourth clause corresponds to the standard rule for
operators; the rule requires that the types of the arguments be compatible with the
declaration of the operator, as enforced by the type E⋆(targs op) of heterogeneous lists
of expressions. In this clause, op is universally quantified over an inductive type
that contains a fixed set of operators for base types and user-defined operators.
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The last three clauses introduce operations on lists that are commonly used in
cryptographic proofs: they take as parameters a variable x of type t, a Boolean
valued expression e that may depend on x, and an expression l of type List t, and
respectively
(Eforall x e l) checks whether every element a in l verifies e when substituting a
for x. We note it as (∀x ∈ l. e);
(Eexists x e l) checks whether some element a in l verifies e when substituting a
for x. We note it as (∃x ∈ l. e);
(Efind x e l) evaluates to the first element a in the list l that verifies e when
substituting a for x, or to a designated default element of type t
if no such element is found. We usually do not write this operator
explicitly, instead we assume that an expression (∃x ∈ l, e) implicitly
assigns to the variable x the value of (Efind x e l).
It is worth noting that dependent types allow for rich specifications of operators.
For instance, one can define a type for bitstrings of fixed length {0, 1}k, and a
concatenation operator that keeps track of bitstring lengths with type
∀m n, {0, 1}m → {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m+n
In addition to the set of deterministic expressions defined above, to encode
random assignments we use a set of type-indexed distribution expressions DE . An
element of DEt denotes some discrete distribution over values of type t. The core
language includes expressions denoting the uniform distribution on natural intervals
of the form [0..n], and on Boolean values. Again, the set of distribution expressions
of the core language can be extended by the user,
Inductive DE : T → Type :=
| Dnat : ENat → DENat
| Dbool : DEBool
| Duser : ∀t, DEuser t→ DE t
Programs
Commands are built from a set of procedure names P indexed by the type of their
arguments and return value. Formally, the sets I of instructions and C of commands
are defined as follows:
Inductive I : Type :=
| Assign : ∀t, Vt → Et → I
| Rand : ∀t, Vt → DE t → I
| Cond : EBool → C → C → I
| While : EBool → C → I
| Call : ∀l t, P(l,t) → Vt → E
⋆
l → I
where C := I⋆
2.2. The pWhile Language 25
For instance, b $← {0, 1} (a shorthand for Rand b Dbool) is an instruction that
samples a random bit with uniform probability and assigns it to variable b. Note
that the above syntax lacks a construct for sequential composition; instead, we use
lists to represent sequences of instructions.
Definition 2.4 (Program). A program is a pair consisting of a command c ∈ C
and an environment E : ∀l t, P(l,t) → decl(l,t), which maps procedure identifiers to
their declaration. The declaration of a procedure p ∈ P(l,t) consists of its formal
parameters, its body, and a return expression,
Record decl(l,t)
def
= {args : Vl
∗; body : C; re : Et}
An environment specifies the type of the parameters and the return expression of
procedures, so that procedure calls are always well-typed. In a typical formalization,
the environment will map procedures to closed commands, with the exception of
adversaries whose code is unknown, and thus modeled by variables of type C. This
is a standard trick to deal with uninterpreted functions in a deep embedding.
We frequently make no distinction between a game G = (c, E) and its main
command c when the environment either has no relevance or is clear from the
context. In the remainder, we revert to a more natural notation to specify games:
we rely on standard notation as in [Barthe et al. 2009a,c]. In particular, we write
procedures that might have multiple exit points and use explicit return instructions
instead of specifying a single return expression.
2.2.2 Semantics
The semantics of commands and expressions depends on a natural number repre-
senting the security parameter. As we have seen, the interpretation of types and
operators may depend on this parameter, but for the sake of readability we omit
it most of the time. The denotation of a command is defined relative to an initial
memory, mapping variables to values of their respective types. Since variables are
partitioned into local and global variables, we will sometimes represent a memorym
as a pair of mappings (m.loc,m.glob) for local and global variables, respectively. We
let M denote the type of memories and ∅ denote a mapping associating variables
to default values of their corresponding types.
Expressions are deterministic; their semantics is standard and given by a func-
tion
Je : EtKE :M→ interp t
that evaluates an expression in a given memory and returns a value of the right
type. The semantics of distribution expressions is given by a function a
Jd : DE tKDE :M→D(interp t)
that given a distribution expression d of type t and a memory m, returns a measure
over values of type t. For instance, in Section 1.4.2 we have used {0, 1}ℓ to denote
the uniform distribution on bitstrings of a certain length ℓ; formally, we have
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J{0, 1}ℓKDE m : D
(
{0, 1}ℓ
)
def
= λf.
∑
x∈{0,1}ℓ
2−ℓf(x)
Observe that distribution expressions are not restricted to constant distributions.
Indeed, for any expression of type e ∈ ENat, the semantics of the uniform distribution
on the natural interval [0..e] depends on the evaluation of e,
J [0..e] KDE m : D(N)
def
= λf.
n∑
i=0
1
n+ 1
f(i) where n = JeKE m
Thanks to dependent types, the semantics of expressions and distribution expres-
sions is total. In the following, and whenever there is no confusion, we will drop
the subscripts in J·KE and J·KDE .
The (small-step) semantics of commands relates an initial deterministic state to
a sub-probability distribution over final deterministic states. It uses a frame stack
to deal with procedure calls. Formally, a deterministic state is a triple consisting
of the current command c : C, a memory m :M, and a frame stack F : frame⋆. We
let S denote the set of deterministic states,
S def= C ×M× frame
⋆
One step execution J·K1 : S → D(S) is defined by the rules of Figure 2.1; in the
figure, we use a b as a notation for JaK1 = b.
We briefly comment on the transition rules for calling a procedure (5th rule)
and returning from a call (2nd rule). Upon a call, a new frame is appended to
the stack, containing the destination variable, the return expression of the called
procedure, the continuation to the call, and the local memory of the caller. The
state resulting from the call contains the body of the called procedure, the global
part of the memory, a local memory initialized to map the formal parameters to
the value of the actual parameters just before the call, and the updated stack.
When returning from a call with a non-empty stack, the top frame is popped, the
return expression is evaluated and the resulting value is assigned to the destination
variable after previously restoring the local memory of the caller; the continuation
taken from the frame becomes the current command. If the stack is empty when
returning from a call, the execution of the program terminates and the final state
is embedded into the monad using the unit operator.
We then define an n-step execution function J·Kn as follows:
JsK0 def= unit s
JsKn+1 def= bind JsKn J·K1
Finally, the denotation of a command c in an initial memory m is defined to be the
(limit) distribution of reachable final memories:
JcK m : D(M) def= λf. sup {J(c,m, nil)Kn f|final | n ∈ N}
where f|final is a function that when applied to a state (c,m, F ) equals f(m) if the
state is a final state and 0 otherwise, i.e.
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(skip, m,nil)  unit (skip,m,nil)
(skip,m, (x, e, c, l) :: F )  unit (c, (l,m.glob){JeKE m/x}, F )
(x← e; c,m, F )  unit (c,m{JeKE m/x}, F )
(x $← d; c,m, F )  bind (JdKDE m) (λv. unit (c,m{v/x}, F ))
(x← p(e); c,m, F )  
unit (p.body, (∅{JeKE m/p.args},m.glob),
(x, p.re, c,m.loc) :: F )
(if e then c1 else c2; c,m, F )  
{
unit (c1; c,m, F ) if JeKE m = true
unit (c2; c,m, F ) if JeKE m = false
(while e do c; c′,m, F )  
{
unit (c;while e do c; c′,m, F ) if JeKE m = true
unit (c′,m, F ) if JeKE m = false
Fig. 2.1. Probabilistic one-step semantics of pWhile programs.
f|final (c,m, F ) : S → [0, 1]
f|final (c,m, F )
def
=
{
f(m) if c = skip ∧ F = nil
0 otherwise
The set of final states grows monotonically as the number of execution steps in-
creases, which implies that the sequence J(c,m, nil)Kn f|final is increasing because f
is non-negative. Because, in addition, this sequence is upper bounded by 1, the
least upper bound in the definition of the denotation of a command always exists
and corresponds to the limit of the sequence.
Figure 2.2 summarizes the denotational semantics of commands as equations
following from the above limit construction. The denotation of a program relates an
initial memory to a (sub-)probability distribution over memories using the measure
monad presented in the previous section:
JcK :M→D(M)
Note that the function J·K maps M to D(M), but it is trivial—although less
convenient—to define a semantic function J·K# from D(M) to D(M) using the
bind operator of the monad:
JcK# : D(M)→ D(M)
JcK# def= λµ. bind µ JcK
We have shown that the semantics of programs maps memories to discrete dis-
tributions, provided expressions in DE evaluate to distributions with countable
support. We use this together with Lemma 2.3 to prove the soundness of some
relational Hoare logic rules (namely, [Comp] and [Trans]) in Section 3.1.
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JskipK m = unit m
Ji; cK m = bind (JiK m) JcK
Jx← eK m = unit m{JeKE m/x}
Jx $← dK m = bind (JdKDE m) (λv. unit m{v/x})
Jx← p(e)K m = bind (Jp.bodyK (∅{JeKE m/p.args},m.glob))
(λm′. unit (m.loc,m′.glob){Jp.reKE m
′/x})
Jif e then c1 else c2K m =
{
Jc1K m if JeKE m = true
Jc2K m if JeKE m = false
Jwhile e do cK m = λf. sup (λn. J[while e do c]nK m f)
where
[while e do c]0 = skip
[while e do c]
n+1 = if e then c; [while e do c]n
Fig. 2.2. Denotational semantics of pWhile programs.
Computing probabilities
The advantage of using this monadic semantics is that, if we use an arbitrary
function as a continuation to the denotation of a program, what we get (for free) as
a result is its expected value w.r.t. the distribution of final memories. In particular,
we can compute the probability of an event A (represented as a function inM→ B)
in the distribution obtained after executing a command c in an initial memory m
by measuring its characteristic function 1A:
Pr [c,m : A] def= JcK m 1A
For instance, one can verify that the denotation of x $← {0, 1}; y $← {0, 1} in an
initial memory m is
λf.
1
4
(f(m{0, 0/x, y}) + f(m{0, 1/x, y}) + f(m{1, 0/x, y}) + f(m{1, 1/x, y}))
and conclude that the probability of the event (x⇒ y) after executing the command
above is 3/4.
In what follows, when writing probabilities we sometimes omit the initial mem-
ory m; in that case one may safely assume that the memory is initially ∅, which
maps variables to default values of the right type.
2.3 Probabilistic Polynomial-Time Programs
In general, cryptographic proofs reason about effective adversaries, consuming
polynomially bounded resources. The complexity notion that captures this in-
tuition, and which is pervasive in cryptographic proofs, is that of strict probabilis-
tic polynomial-time [Goldreich 2001]. Concretely, a program is said to be strict
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probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) whenever there exists a polynomial bound (in
some security parameter η) on the cost of each possible execution, regardless of
the outcome of its random choices. Said otherwise, a probabilistic program is PPT
whenever the same program seen as a non-deterministic program terminates and
the cost of each possible run is bounded by a polynomial.
Termination and efficiency are orthogonal. Consider, for instance, the following
two programs:
c1
def
= b← true; while b do b $← {0, 1}
c2
def
= b $← {0, 1}; if b then while true do skip
The former terminates with probability 1 (it terminates within n iterations with
probability 1 − 2−n), but may take an arbitrarily large number of iterations to
terminate. The latter terminates with probability 1/2, but when it does, it takes
only a constant time. We deal with termination and efficiency separately.
Definition 2.5 (Termination). The probability that a program c terminates
starting from an initial memory m is Pr [c,m : true] = JcK m 1. We say that a
program c is absolutely terminating, and note it lossless(c), iff it terminates with
probability 1 in any initial memory,
lossless(c) def= ∀m. Pr [c,m : true] = 1
To deal with efficiency, we non-intrusively instrument the semantics of our language
to compute the cost of running a program. The instrumented semantics ranges over
D(M×N) instead of D(M). We recall that our semantics is implicitly parametrized
by a security parameter η, on which we base our notion of complexity. Our charac-
terization of PPT programs relies on an axiomatization of the execution time and
memory usage of expressions:
• We postulate the execution time of each operator, in the form of a function
that depends on the inputs of the operator—which corresponds to the so-called
functional time model;
• We postulate for each datatype a size measure, in the form of a function that
assigns to each value its memory footprint.
We stress that making complexity assumptions on operators is perfectly legitimate.
It is a well-known feature of dependent type theories (as is the case of the calculus
of Coq) that they cannot express the cost of the computations they purport with-
out using computational reflection, i.e. formalizing an execution model, such as
probabilistic Turing machines, within the theory itself and proving that functions
in type theory denote machines that execute in polynomial time. In our opinion,
such a step is overkill. A simpler solution to the problem is to restrict in as much
as possible the set of primitive operators, so as to minimize the set of assumptions
upon which the complexity proofs rely.
Definition 2.6 (Polynomially bounded distribution). We say that a family
of distributions {µη : D(M×N)} is (p, q)-bounded, where p and q are polynomials,
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whenever for every value of the security parameter η and any pair (m,n) occurring
with non-zero probability in µη, the size of values in m is bounded by p(η) and the
cost n is bounded by q(η). This notion can be formally defined by means of the
range predicate introduced in Section 2.1.3:
bounded(p, q, µ) def= ∀η. range (λ(m,n). ∀x ∈ V . |m(x)| ≤ p(η) ∧ n ≤ q(η)) µη
Definition 2.7 (Strict probabilistic polynomial-time program).We say that
a program c is strict probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) iff it terminates absolutely,
and there exist polynomial transformers F,G such that for every (p, q)-bounded
distribution family µη, (bind µη JcK) is (F (p), q +G(p))-bounded.
We can recover some intuition by taking µ = unit (m, 0) in the above definition.
In this case, we may paraphrase the condition as follows: if the size of values in m is
bounded by some polynomial p, and an execution of the program in m terminates
with non-zero probability in memorym′, then the size of values in m′ is bounded by
the polynomial F (p), and the cost of the execution is bounded by the polynomial
G(p). It is in this latter polynomial that bounds the cost of executing the program
that we are ultimately interested. The increased complexity in the definition is
needed for proving compositionality results, such as the fact that PPT programs
are closed under sequential composition.
Although our formalization of termination and efficiency relies on semantic def-
initions, it is not necessary for users to reason directly about the semantics of a
program to prove it meets those definitions. CertiCrypt implements a certified al-
gorithm showing that every program without loops and recursive calls terminates
absolutely.1 We also provide another algorithm that, together with the first, es-
tablishes that a program is PPT provided that, additionally, the program does not
contain expressions that might generate values of super-polynomial size or take a
super-polynomial time when evaluated in a polynomially bounded memory.
Exact bounds on execution time
Extracting an exact security result from a reductionist game-based proof requires
to lower bound the success probability of the reduction and to upper bound the
overhead incurred in execution time. Computing a bound on the success probability
is what takes most of the effort since it requires examining the whole sequence of
games and a careful bookkeeping of the probability of events. On the other hand,
bounding the overhead of a reduction only requires examining the last game in
the sequence. While we have put a great effort in automating the computation of
probability bounds and we developed an automated method to obtain asymptotic
polynomial bounds on the execution time of reductions, we did not bother to provide
a method to compute exact time bounds. To do so, we would need an alternative
1 It is of course a weak result in terms of termination of probabilistic programs, but nev-
ertheless sufficient as regards cryptographic applications. Extending our formalization
to a certified termination analysis for loops is interesting, but orthogonal to our main
goals.
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cost-instrumented semantics that does not take into account the time spent in
evaluating calls to oracles, but instead just records the number of queries that have
been made. Assume that an adversary A executes within time t (without taking
into account oracle calls) and makes at most qOi queries to oracle Oi. Suppose we
have a reduction where an adversary B uses A as a sub-procedure; assume wlog
that B only calls A once and does not make any additional oracle calls. Then, we
can argue that if B executes within time t′ without taking into account the cost of
evaluating calls to A (this could easily be computed by considering A as an oracle
for B), then B executes within time
t+ t′ +
∑
i
qOi tOi
where tOi upper bounds the cost one query to oracle Oi.
2.4 Adversaries
In order to reason about games in the presence of unknown adversaries, we must
specify an interface for adversaries and construct proofs under the assumption that
adversaries are well-formed against their specification. Assuming that adversaries
respect their interface provides us with an induction principle to reason over all
(well-formed) adversaries. We make an extensive use of this induction principle:
each time a proof system is introduced, the principle allows us to establish proof
rules for adversaries. Likewise, each time we implement a program transformation,
the induction principle allows us to prove the correctness of the transformation for
programs that contain procedure calls to adversaries.
Formally, the interface of an adversary consists of a triple (O,RW ,R), where O
is the set of procedures that the adversary may call, RW the set of variables that it
may read and write, andR the set of variables that it may only read. We say that an
adversaryA with interface (O,RW ,R) is well-formed if the judgment ⊢wf A can be
derived from the rules in Figure 2.3. Note that the rules are generic, only making
sure that the adversary makes a correct use of variables and procedures. These
rules guarantee that a well-formed adversary always initializes local variables before
using them, only writes global variables in RW , and only reads global variables in
RW ∪R. For convenience, we allow adversaries to call procedures outside O, but
these procedures must themselves respect the same interface.
Additional constraints may be imposed on adversaries. For example, exact
security proofs usually impose an upper bound to the number of calls adversaries
can make to a given oracle, while some properties, such as IND-CCA2 (see §2.5.2
below), restrict the parameters with which oracles may be called at different stages
in an experiment. Likewise, some proofs impose extra conditions such as forbidding
repeated or malformed queries. These kinds of properties can be formalized using
global variables that record calls to oracles and verifying as post-condition that all
calls were legitimate.
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I ⊢ skip :I
I ⊢ i :I ′ I ′ ⊢ c :O
I ⊢ i; c :O
writable(x) fv(e) ⊆ I
I ⊢ x← e :I ∪ {x}
writable(x) fv(d) ⊆ I
I ⊢ x $← d :I ∪ {x}
fv(e) ⊆ I I ⊢ c1 :O1 I ⊢ c2 :O2
I ⊢ if e then c1 else c2 :O1 ∩O2
fv(e) ⊆ I I ⊢ c :I
I ⊢ while e do c :I
fv(e) ⊆ I writable(x) p ∈ O
I ⊢ x← p(e) :I ∪ {x}
fv(e) ⊆ I writable(x) ⊢wf B
I ⊢ x← B(e) :I ∪ {x}
RW ∪R∪A.args ⊢ A.body :O fv(A.re) ⊆ O
⊢wf A
writable(x) def= local(x) ∨ x ∈ RW
Fig. 2.3. Rules for well-formedness of an adversary against interface (O,RW ,R). A
judgment of the form I ⊢ c : O can be interpreted as follows: assuming variables in I
may be read, the adversarial code fragment c respects the interface and after its execution
variables in O may be read. Thus, if I ⊢ c :O, then I ⊆ O.
2.5 Making Security Properties Precise
Before going any further in the formalization of cryptographic proofs, we need to
be sure that the results that we prove are meaningful. Security definitions in cryp-
tography have so many subtleties that it is not clear that the whole cryptographic
community agrees even on the most fundamental of these definitions. To illustrate
this point, let us analyze in detail two pervasive definitions that we use in subse-
quent chapters: the security of a signature scheme against existential forgery under
adaptive chosen-message attacks (EF-CMA security), and the indistinguishability
under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA2 security) of an encryption
scheme.
2.5.1 EF-CMA Security
We start by recalling the definition of digital signature schemes.
Definition 2.8 (Digital signature scheme). A digital signature scheme is com-
posed of a triple of algorithms:
Key generation: Given a security parameter η, the key generation algorithm KG(η)
returns a public/secret key pair (pk, sk);
Signing: Given a secret key sk and a message m, the signing algorithm
Sign(sk,m) produces a signature of m under sk;
Verification: Given a public key pk, a message m, and a purported signature σ
for m, the verification algorithm Verify(pk,m, σ) returns a Boolean
value indicating whether the signature is valid or not.
Key generation and signing may be probabilistic, while the verification algorithm is
deterministic. We require that verification always succeeds for authentic signatures:
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for every pair of keys (pk, sk) that can be output by the key generation algorithm,
and every message m, it must be the case that Verify(pk,m, Sign(sk,m)) = true.
We informally describe the way in which EF-CMA security is typically defined.
The experiment begins by choosing a public verification key pk and a secret signing
key sk, using the key-generation algorithm of the signature scheme. The public
key is given to the forger, who can ask for the signature of messages of its choice
to a signing oracle and eventually halts and outputs a message m together with a
purported signature σ. The forger wins when the signature σ verifies. We say that
the scheme is secure when the winning probability of any probabilistic polynomial-
time forger is negligible. Since the forger could trivially win by asking for the
signature ofm, the forger is not allowed to querym to the signing oracle. Figure 2.4
depicts this experiment as a game.
Game GAEF :
S ← nil;
(pk,sk)← KG(η);
(m,σ)← A(pk)
Oracle SignA(m) :
S ← m :: S;
σ ← Sign(sk,m);
return σ
Fig. 2.4. The EF-CMA experiment; the signing oracle is instrumented to record the queries
made by the forger.
The above definition seems unambiguous at first sight. There are however two
ways of forbidding the adversary from querying m to the signing oracle. The first
is simply to reject adversaries that may query m with non-zero probability; this
amounts to restrict the quantification over adversaries—instead of considering all
efficient forgers one considers only those forgers that do not query the message
they output to the signing oracle. The second way is to test a posteriori whether
the adversary queried m to its oracle, and to declare that it lost in this case.
Following [Bellare et al. 2009], we call the former definitional style the exclusion
(“E”) style and the latter the penalty (“P”) style. Both styles are common and
used interchangeably in the literature; for instance [Bellare and Rogaway 1996;
Katz and Wang 2003] use the penalty style while [Bellare and Rogaway 1993] uses
the exclusion style. The question is whether the two styles result in equivalent
definitions or not.
It should be clear that security in the penalty style implies security in the
exclusion style. To see this, consider any efficient forger A valid in the exclusion
style definition. The forger is also valid in the penalty style definition and it achieves
the same success probability. Since the probability of A ever querying the message
m whose signature it forges is 0, we have
Pr
[
GAEF : Verify(pk,m, σ)
]
= Pr
[
GAEF : Verify(pk,m, σ) ∧m /∈ S
]
Implication in the other direction (i.e., that security in the exclusion style implies
security in the penalty style definition) is not as evident. Given an adversary A
34 Chapter 2. A Language for Describing Games
that forges a signature for a fresh message m with non-negligible probability, but
that may ask the signature of the message m to the signing oracle with non-zero
probability, can we construct an adversary that never queries m to the signing
oracle and achieves comparable success in forging a signature? The theorem we
present next proves that we can and, what is more, without any probability loss.
Theorem 2.9. If a signature scheme is EF-CMA secure according to the exclusion
style definition, then it is secure according to the penalty style definition.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the EF-CMA security of the scheme in the
penalty style definition. We exhibit an adversary B that is valid in the exclusion
style definition and outputs a successful forgery with at least the same probability
as A:
Adversary B(pk) :
S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
if m ∈ S then m $← {0, 1}k\S
return (m,σ)
Oracle SignA(m) :
S ← m :: S;
σ ← SignB(m);
return σ
The forger B uses A as a subroutine; it intercepts the signing queries that A makes
and answers them using oracle SignA. This oracle just records the message queried
and forwards it to the original signing oracle. When A outputs a purported forgery
(m,σ), B checks if m ever appeared in a signing query and if it is the case, replaces
m with a fresh message. We have that m /∈ S and S = S are post-conditions of
game GBEF, which implies that B is a valid adversary according to the exclusion style
definition. In addition,
Pr
[
GAEF : Verify(pk,m, σ) ∧m /∈ S
]
≤ Pr
[
GBEF : Verify(pk,m, σ)
]
⊓⊔
For a matter of taste and definitional clarity, we define EF-CMA security using
the penalty style.
Definition 2.10 (EF-CMA security). A signature scheme (KG, Sign,Verify) is
secure against existential forgeries under chosen-message attacks if the probability
Pr
[
GAEF : Verify(pk,m, σ) ∧m /∈ S
]
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A.
The penalty and exclusion style definitions of EF-CMA security turned out to be
perfectly equivalent. Indeed, this equivalence can be regarded as folklore. This may
lead us to think that there is no point in analyzing this kind of subtle differences
in security definitions. But such a way of thinking is perilous. We have been lucky
that both formulations of EF-CMA security are equivalent. We will see in the next
section that being sloppy can sometimes lead to consider as equivalent definitions
that in reality are not.
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2.5.2 IND-CCA2 Security
The notion of IND-CCA2 security for an encryption scheme is defined relative to a
two-phase experiment where the adversary has access to a decryption oracle. The
experiment begins by generating a pair of keys (pk, sk) and giving the public key
pk to the adversary. In the first phase the adversary chooses two messages m0 and
m1. The challenger then tosses a fair coin b, encrypts mb under pk and gives the
resulting ciphertext cˆ back to the adversary. The adversary ends the second phase
by outputting a guess b˜ for the hidden bit b. Figure 2.5 depicts this experiment as
a game. We say that the scheme is IND-CCA2 secure if no probabilistic polynomial-
time adversary A guesses b correctly with a probability non-negligibly greater than
1/2.
Game GINDCCA :
LD ← nil;
(pk, sk)← KG(η);
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
cˆ← E(pk,mb);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle DA(c) :
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD;
m← D(sk, c);
return m
Fig. 2.5. The IND-CCA2 experiment; the decryption oracle is instrumented to record the
queries made in each phase.
Observe that the adversary could trivially win by asking the decryption oracle to
decrypt cˆ. Consequently, the definition forbids the adversary from querying cˆ to the
decryption oracle. As in the definition of EF-CMA security in the previous section,
there are two ways of enforcing this restriction, in a penalty style or in an exclusion
style. In addition, we now face another dilemma: should we allow the adversary
to query cˆ to its oracle in the first phase of the experiment or should we forbid
such type of queries altogether? These two dimensions give rise to four different
ways of formally defining IND-CCA2 security. Namely, in a penalty style, restricting
the oracle queries only in the second phase of the experiment (IND-CCA2-SP) or in
both (IND-CCA2-BP), and in an exclusion style, restricting the queries only in the
second phase (IND-CCA2-SE) or in both phases (IND-CCA2-BE). There are some
obvious relations between these definitions. As in the case of EF-CMA security,
security in a penalty style definition implies security in the corresponding exclusion
style definition. In a similar manner, security in the version of the definitions where
the adversary is forbidden to query the challenge ciphertext cˆ just in the second
phase implies security when this prohibition is extended to the first phase of the
experiment. Figure 2.6 summarizes these and the remaining non-trivial relations
between the different formulations of IND-CCA2 security.
Surprisingly, neither of the “B” style definitions implies security in the corre-
sponding “S” variant. What is more, the penalty and the exclusion style definitions
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IND-CCA2-SP IND-CCA2-BP
IND-CCA2-SE IND-CCA2-BE6
6

Fig. 2.6. Relations between the different formulations of IND-CCA2 security. An impli-
cation X→ Y means that security according to definition X implies security according to
Y. A negated implication is a separation result.
are not equivalent if the adversary is forbidden from querying cˆ to its oracle in
both phases of the IND-CCA2 experiment. We will give a proof of the implication
IND-CCA2-SE → IND-CCA2-SP and a rough idea of how to construct pathologi-
cal schemes that justify the separation results IND-CCA2-BP9 IND-CCA2-SP and
IND-CCA2-BE 9 IND-CCA2-BP; the separation of IND-CCA2-SE and IND-CCA2-BE
follows from the diagram. For further details the reader may refer to [Bellare et al.
2009], where these results were first reported.
Theorem 2.11. If an encryption scheme (KG, E ,D) is IND-CCA2-SE secure, then
it is IND-CCA2-SP secure as well.
Proof. We show that for any adversary A = (A1,A2) against the IND-CCA2-SP
security of the scheme, there exists an IND-CCA2-SE adversary B that guesses the
hidden bit b with at least the same probability and does not query the challenge
ciphertext in the second phase of the experiment.
In the first phase, B behaves exactly as A. When B gets the challenge ciphertext
cˆ, it calls A2(cˆ) in a simulated environment where it replaces the decryption oracle
with an oracle of its own; B2 returns whatever A2 returns. When A2 makes a
decryption query c, if c 6= cˆ, the simulated oracle responds by forwarding the query
to the original oracle, otherwise it returns some fixed message ⊥. It is easy to see
that B2 never queries the challenge cˆ to the decryption oracle. Moreover, we have
Pr
[
GAIND−CCA : b˜ = b ∧ (true, cˆ) /∈ LD
]
= Pr
[
GBIND−CCA : b˜ = b ∧ (true, cˆ) /∈ LD
]
≤ Pr
[
GBIND−CCA : b˜ = b
]
which concludes the proof. ⊓⊔
Theorem 2.12. The three separation results from Figure 2.6 hold.
Proof.
IND-CCA2-BP 9 IND-CCA2-SP :
Let (KGf , f, f−1) be a family of trapdoor one-way permutations and (KG, E ,D) an
IND-CCA2-BP secure encryption scheme. We show how to construct an encryption
scheme (KG, E ,D) which is IND-CCA2-BP secure but not IND-CCA2-SP secure.
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KG(η) :
(pk, sk)← KG(η);
(pkf , skf )← KGf (η);
xˆ $← {0, 1}k;
yˆ ← f(pkf , xˆ);
pk ← (pk, pkf , yˆ);
sk ← (sk, xˆ);
return (pk, sk)
E((pk, pkf , yˆ),m) :
if f(pkf ,m) = yˆ then
return 1 ‖ 1k
else
c← E(pk,m);
return 0 ‖ c
D((sk, xˆ), s ‖ c) :
if s = 0 then
return D(sk, c)
else
if c = 1k then
return xˆ
else return ⊥
The above scheme is devised in such a way that the ability of an adversary to query
the challenge ciphertext in the first phase leads to an attack, but this attack is
no longer possible if such a query is disallowed. The intuition is to introduce a
weak message xˆ with a single ciphertext (1 ‖ 1k). This message should be hard to
compute without the secret key of the scheme, but it can be trivially obtained by
asking for the decryption of (1 ‖ 1k). In the other hand, the encryption algorithm
of the scheme should be able to efficiently test if a given message equals the weak
message xˆ. We include the message xˆ in plain as part of the secret key of the
scheme, but conceal its value in the public key using a one-way permutation.
To show that the above scheme is not IND-CCA2-SP secure, consider the follow-
ing adversary (A1,A2):
Adversary A1(pk) :
m0 ← D(1 ‖ 1k);
m1 $← {0, 1}k \ {m0};
return (m0,m1)
Adversary A2(c) :
if c = 1 ‖ 1k then return 0
else return 1
This adversary guesses the hidden bit in the IND-CCA2 experiment with probabil-
ity 1. However, it queries the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle with
probability 1/2 during its first phase, and therefore this adversary does not do any
better than a random guess according to the winning condition of the IND-CCA2-BP
variant.
To see why the scheme is IND-CCA2-BP secure, observe that the only way to
guess the hidden bit b with probability significantly greater than 1/2 is to either
break the security of the original encryption scheme, or to somehow obtain the
value of the weak message xˆ. Indeed, given an adversary B that breaks the IND-
CCA2-BP security of the scheme with non-negligible probability, one can construct
an adversary A against the IND-CCA2-BP security of the original scheme and an
inverter I for the one-way trapdoor permutation such that at least one of them
succeeds with non-negligible probability [Bellare et al. 2009,Theorem 3.1].
IND-CCA2-BE 9 IND-CCA2-BP :
Let (KG, E ,D) be an encryption scheme IND-CCA2-BE secure. Again, using a
trapdoor one-way permutation (KGf , f, f−1) we construct an encryption scheme
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(KG, E ,D) which is IND-CCA2-BE secure but not IND-CCA2-BP secure.
KG(η) :
(pk, sk)← KG(η);
(pkf , skf )← KGf (η);
xˆ $← {0, 1}k;
yˆ ← f(pkf , xˆ);
pk ← (pk, pkf , yˆ);
sk ← (sk, xˆ);
return (pk, sk)
E((pk, pkf , yˆ),m) :
if f(pkf ,m) = yˆ then
w $← {0, 1}k;
return 1 ‖ w
else
c← E(pk,m);
return 0 ‖ c
D((sk, xˆ), s ‖ c) :
if s = 0 then
return D(sk, c)
else
if |c| = k then
return xˆ
else return ⊥
To show that the above scheme is not IND-CCA2-BP secure, consider the following
adversary (A1,A2):
Adversary A1(pk) :
m0 ← D(1 ‖ 1k);
m1 $← {0, 1}k \ {m0};
return (m0,m1)
Adversary A2(s ‖ c) :
if s = 1 then return 0
else return 1
This adversary guesses the hidden bit in the IND-CCA2 game with probability 1
and queries the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle only with probability
2−k/2. Therefore, its winning probability according to IND-CCA2-BP is 1− 2−k/2.
Observe, however, that this adversary is not valid according to the IND-CCA2-BE
variant because it queries the challenge ciphertext to the decryption oracle with
non-zero probability.
To see why the scheme is IND-CCA2-BE secure, observe that the only way to
guess the hidden bit b with probability significantly greater than 1/2 is to either
break the IND-CCA2-BP security of the original encryption scheme, or to somehow
obtain the value of the weak message xˆ. But a valid adversary cannot obtain the
value xˆ from the decryption oracle because any ciphertext of the form (1 ‖ c) might
be the challenge ciphertext with probability 2−k/2. Therefore, xˆ is concealed by
the one-way permutation and any adversary that succeeds in obtaining it can be
used to invert the permutation with non-negligible probability.
IND-CCA2-BE 9 IND-CCA2-SE :
Follows from the above separation results and the diagram in the figure. ⊓⊔
In the remainder whenever we talk about IND-CCA2 security we will be referring
to the IND-CCA2-SE variant of the definition, which is together with IND-CCA2-SP
the strongest variant according to the taxonomy in Figure 2.6.
Definition 2.13 (IND-CCA2 security). An encryption scheme (KG, E ,D) is
IND-CCA2 secure if the advantage
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∣∣∣∣Pr [GAINDCCA : b˜ = b]− 12
∣∣∣∣
is negligible for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A that does not query
the decryption oracle with the challenge ciphertext during the second phase of the
IND-CCA2 experiment.
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3
Reasoning about Games
A
ccording to Shoup [2004], steps in game-based cryptographic proofs can be
classified into three broad categories:
1. Transitions based on indistinguishability, which are typically justified by ap-
pealing to a decisional assumption (e.g. the DDH assumption);
2. Transitions based on failure events, where it is argued that two games behave
identically unless a failure event occurs;
3. Bridging steps, which correspond to refactoring the code of games in a way that
is not observable by adversaries. This is in general done to prepare the ground
for applying a lossy transition of one of the above two classes.
A bridging step from a game G1 to a gameG2 typically replaces a program fragment
c1 by an observationally equivalent fragment c2. In general, however, c1 and c2 are
observationally equivalent only in the particular context where the substitution is
done. We justify such transitions through a relational Hoare logic that generalizes
observational equivalence through pre- and post-conditions that characterize the
context where the substitution is valid. This relational Hoare logic may as well be
used to establish (in)equalities between the probability of events in two games (as
shown by the rules [PrEq] and [PrLe] below) and to establish program invariants
that serve to justify other program transformations or more complex probabilistic
reasoning.
3.1 Probabilistic Relational Hoare Logic (pRHL)
The relational Hoare logic that we propose elaborates on and extends to probabilis-
tic programs Benton’s 2004 relational Hoare logic. Benton’s logic uses judgments
of the form ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ, that relate two programs, c1 and c2, w.r.t. a
pre-condition Ψ and a post-condition Φ, both defined as relations on deterministic
states. Such a judgment states that for every pair of initial memories m1,m2 sat-
isfying the pre-condition Ψ , if the evaluations of c1 in m1 and c2 in m2 terminate
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with final memories m′1 and m
′
2 respectively, then m
′
1 Φ m
′
2 holds. In a proba-
bilistic setting, the evaluation of a program in an initial memory yields instead a
(sub-)probability distribution over program memories. In order to give a meaning
to a judgment like the above one, we therefore need to lift relations over memories
to relations over distributions.1 We use the mechanism presented in Section 2.1.
Definition 3.1 (pRHL judgment). We say that two programs c1 and c2 are
equivalent with respect to pre-condition Ψ and post-condition Φ iff
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
def
= ∀m1 m2. m1 Ψ m2 =⇒ (Jc1K m1) Φ# (Jc2K m2)
Definition 3.2 (Semantic equivalence). We say that two programs c1 and c2
are semantically equivalent, and note it as ⊢ c1 ≡ c2, if they are equivalent w.r.t
equality on memories as pre- and post-condition.
Rather than defining the rules for pRHL and proving them sound in terms of
the meaning of judgments, we place ourselves in a semantic setting and derive the
rules as lemmas. This allows to easily extend the system by deriving extra rules, or
even to resort to the semantic definition if the system turns out to be insufficient.
Figure 3.1 gathers some representative derived rules. To improve readability, we
define for a Boolean expression e the relations
e〈1〉 def= λm1 m2. JeK m1 = true e〈2〉
def
= λm1 m2. JeK m2 = true
As pRHL allows for arbitrary relations, we freely use higher-order logic; in partic-
ular, PER and SYM are predicates over relations that stand for partial equivalence
relation and symmetric relation respectively.
Most rules admit, in addition to their symmetrical version of Figure 3.1, one-
sided (left and right) variants, e.g. for assignments
m1 Ψ m2 = (m1{Je1Km1/x1}) Φ m2
⊢ x1 ← e1 ∼ skip : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Assn1]
The rule [Case] allows to reason by case analysis on the evaluation of an arbitrary
relation in the initial memories. Together with simple rules in the spirit of
⊢ c1 ∼ c : Ψ ∧ e〈1〉 ⇒ Φ
⊢ if e then c1 else c2 ∼ c : Ψ ∧ e〈1〉 ⇒ Φ
[Cond1T]
it subsumes [Cond] and allows to prove judgments that otherwise would not be
derivable, such as the semantic equivalence of the programs (if e then c1 else c2)
and (if ¬e then c2 else c1):
1 An alternative would be to develop a logic in which Ψ and Φ are relations over distri-
butions. However, we do not believe such a logic would allow a similar level of proof
automation.
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⊢ skip ∼ skip : Φ⇒ Φ [Skip]
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Θ ⊢ c
′
1 ∼ c
′
2 : Θ ⇒ Φ
⊢ c1; c
′
1 ∼ c2; c
′
2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Seq]
m1 Ψ m2 = (m1{Je1Km1/x1}) Φ (m2{Je2Km2/x2})
⊢ x1 ← e1 ∼ x2 ← e2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Assn]
m1 Ψ m2 =⇒ (Jd1K m1) Θ
# (Jd2K m2)
where v1 Θ v2 = (m1{v1/x1}) Φ (m2{v2/x2})
⊢ x1 $← d1 ∼ x2 $← d2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Rnd]
m1 Ψ m2 =⇒ Je1K m1 = Je2K m2
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ∧ e1〈1〉 ⇒ Φ ⊢ c
′
1 ∼ c
′
2 : Ψ ∧ ¬e1〈1〉 ⇒ Φ
⊢ if e1 then c1 else c
′
1 ∼ if e2 then c2 else c
′
2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Cond]
m1 Φ m2 =⇒ Je1K m1 = Je2K m2 ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Φ ∧ e1〈1〉 ⇒ Φ
⊢ while e1 do c1 ∼ while e2 do c2 : Φ⇒ Φ ∧ ¬e1〈1〉
[While]
Ψ ⊆ Ψ ′ ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ
′ ⇒ Φ′ Φ′ ⊆ Φ
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Sub]
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ SYM(Ψ) SYM(Φ)
⊢ c2 ∼ c1 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Sym]
⊢ c ≡ c [Refl]
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ ⊢ c2 ∼ c3 : Ψ ⇒ Φ PER(Ψ) PER(Φ)
⊢ c1 ∼ c3 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Trans]
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ∧ Ψ
′ ⇒ Φ ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ∧ ¬Ψ
′ ⇒ Φ
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Case]
Fig. 3.1. Selection of derived rules of pRHL.
⊢ c1 ∼ c1 : = ∧¬¬e〈2〉 ⇒ =
[Sub,Refl]
⊢ c1 ∼ if ¬e then c2 else c1 : = ∧¬¬e〈2〉 ⇒ =
[Cond2F]
⊢ c1 ∼ if ¬e then c2 else c1 : = ∧ e〈1〉 ⇒ =
[Sub]
⊢ if e then c1 else c2 ∼ if ¬e then c2 else c1 : = ∧ e〈1〉 ⇒ =
[Cond1T] · · ·
⊢ if e then c1 else c2 ≡ if ¬e then c2 else c1
[Case]
We use [Case] as well to justify the correctness of dataflow analyses that exploit
the information provided by entering branches.
The rule [Sym] can be generalized by taking the inverse of the relations instead
of requiring that pre- and post-condition be symmetric:
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
⊢ c2 ∼ c1 : Ψ−1 ⇒ Φ−1
[Inv]
The rule [Trans], although appealing, is of limited practical use. Consider, for
instance, “independent” pre- and post-conditions of the form
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m1 Ψ m2
def
= Ψ1 m1 ∧ Ψ2 m2 m1 Φ m2
def
= Φ1 m1 ∧ Φ2 m2
In order to apply the rule [Trans], we are essentially forced to have
Ψ1 = Ψ2 and Φ1 = Φ2
and we must also choose the same pre- and post-condition for the intermediate
game c2. This constraints make the rule [Trans] impractical in some cases; we use
instead the rule [Comp] to introduce intermediate games in those cases:
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ ⊢ c2 ∼ c3 : Ψ ′ ⇒ Φ′
⊢ c1 ∼ c3 : Ψ ◦ Ψ ′ ⇒ Φ ◦ Φ′
[Comp]
The soundness of this rule relies on Lemma 2.3 and on the fact that the denotation
of a programmaps an initial memory to a distribution with countable support. This
is true if we only allow values to be sampled from distributions with countable sup-
port, a reasonable restriction that does not affect our application to cryptographic
proofs.
We can specialize rule [Rnd] when the distributions from where random values
are sampled have countable support. In this case, there is a simpler condition that
makes the hypothesis of the rule hold. We say that two distributions µ1 : D(A) and
µ2 : D(B) with countable support are equivalent modulo a relation R ⊆ A × B,
and note it µ1 ≃R µ2, when there exists a bijection f : support(µ1) → support(µ2)
such that
∀a ∈ support(µ1). µ1 I{a} = µ2 I{f(a)} ∧ R(a, f(a))
We can then prove that the following rule is sound:
m1 Ψ m2 =⇒ Jd1Km1 ≃Θ Jd2Km2 v1 Θ v2 = (m1{v1/x1}) Φ (m2{v2/x2})
⊢ x1 $← d1 ∼ x2 $← d2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Perm]
If d1 and d2 are both interpreted as uniform distributions over some set of values,
the premise of the rule boils down to exhibiting a bijection f between the supports
of (Jd1Km1) and (Jd2Km2) such that Θ(v, f(v)) holds for any v in the support of
Jd1Km1. To see that the rule is sound, note that µ1 ≃R µ2 implies µ1 R# µ2; it
suffices to take the following distribution as a witness for the existential:
µ def= bind µ1 (λv. unit(v, f(v)))
Hence, the soundness of the above rule is immediate from the soundness of rule
[Rnd]. Section 3.2.2 shows that rule [Perm] is enough to prove several program
equivalences appearing in cryptographic proofs. However, observe that rule [Perm]
is far from being complete as shown by the following program equivalence that
cannot be derived using just this rule:
⊢ a $← [0..1] ∼ b $← [0..3]; a← b mod 2 : true⇒ ={a}
One cannot use the above rule to prove such an equivalence because the supports
of the distributions from where random values are sampled in the programs do not
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have the same size and hence it is not possible to find a bijection relating them. We
can further generalize the rule to prove the above equivalence by requiring instead
the existence of a bijection between the support of one distribution and a partition
of the support of the other, as in the following rule:
m1 Ψ m2 =⇒ let S1 = support(Jd1K m1), S2 = support(Jd2K m2) in
∃f : S1 → P(S2).
⋃
v∈S1
f(v) = S2 ∧ (∀v1 6= v2 ∈ S1. f(v1) ∩ f(v2) = ∅) ∧(
∀v ∈ S1. µ1 I{v} = µ2 If(v) ∧ ∀w ∈ f(v). (m1{v/x1}) Φ (m2{w/x2})
)
⊢ x1 $← d1 ∼ x2 $← d2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
The following two rules allow to fall back from the world of pRHL into the world
of probabilities, in which security statements are expressed:
m1 Ψ m2 ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ Φ =⇒ (A〈1〉 ⇐⇒ B〈2〉)
Pr [c1,m1 : A] = Pr [c2,m2 : B]
[PrEq]
and analogously,
m1 Ψ m2 ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ Φ =⇒ (A〈1〉 =⇒ B〈2〉)
Pr [c1,m1 : A] ≤ Pr [c2,m2 : B]
[PrLe]
By taking A = B = true we can observe that observational equivalence enjoys some
form of termination sensitivity:
(⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ) ∧m1 Ψ m2 =⇒ Jc1K m1 1 = Jc2K m2 1
We conclude with an example that nicely illustrates some of the intricacies of
pRHL. Let c = b $← {0, 1} and Φ = (b〈1〉 = b〈2〉). We have for any pair of initial
memories (JcK m1) Φ
# (JcK m2). Indeed, the following distribution is a witness for
the existential of the lifting:
µ f =
1
2
f(m1{0/b},m2{0/b}) +
1
2
f(m1{1/b},m2{1/b})
Perhaps more surprisingly, we also have (JcK m1) ¬Φ
# (JcK m2), for which it suffices
to take the following distribution as a witness for the existential:
µ′ f =
1
2
f(m1{0/b},m2{1/b}) +
1
2
f(m1{1/b},m2{0/b})
Thus, we have at the same time ⊢ c ∼ c : true ⇒ Φ and ⊢ c ∼ c : true ⇒ ¬Φ (but
of course not ⊢ c ∼ c : true⇒ false) and as a consequence the “obvious” rule
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
′
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ ∧ Φ′
is unsound. While this example may seem unintuitive or even inconsistent if one
reasons in terms of deterministic states, its intuitive significance in a probabilistic
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setting is that observing either Φ or ¬Φ is not enough to tell apart the distributions
resulting from two executions of c. This example shows why lifting a relation
to distributions involves an existential quantification, and why it is not possible
to always use the product distribution as a witness (one cannot establish neither
of the above judgments using the product distribution). This interpretation of
pRHL judgments is strongly connected to the relation between relational logics
and information flow [Amtoft et al. 2006; Benton 2004]—formally characterized for
instance by Benton’s embedding of a type system for secure information flow into
RHL.
As an additional example, observe that we have
⊢ x $← {0, 1}; y $← {0, 1} ∼ x $← {0, 1}; y ← x : true⇒ ={x}
⊢ x $← {0, 1}; y $← {0, 1} ∼ x $← {0, 1}; y ← x : true⇒ ={y}
but clearly the following judgment does not hold
⊢ x $← {0, 1}; y $← {0, 1} ∼ x $← {0, 1}; y ← x : true⇒ ={x,y}
since after executing the program on the right-hand side the values of x and y
always coincide while this happens only with probability 1/2 for the program on
the left-hand side.
3.1.1 Observational Equivalence
Observational equivalence is derived as an instance of relational Hoare judgments
in which pre- and post-conditions are restricted to equality over a subset of pro-
gram variables. Observational equivalence of programs c1, c2 w.r.t. an input set of
variables I and an output set of variables O is defined as
⊢ c1 ≃
I
O c2
def
= ⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : =I ⇒ =O
The rules of pRHL can be specialized to the case of observational equivalence. For
example, for conditional statements we have
m1 =I m2 =⇒ Je1K m1 = Je2K m2 ⊢ c1 ≃IO c2 ⊢ c
′
1 ≃
I
O c
′
2
⊢ if e1 then c1 else c
′
1 ≃
I
O if e2 then c2 else c
′
2
It follows that observational equivalence is symmetric and transitive, although it is
not reflexive. Indeed, observational equivalence can be seen as a generalization of
probabilistic non-interference: if we take I = O = L, the set of low variables, then
c is non-interferent iff ⊢ c ≃LL c.
Observational equivalence is more amenable to mechanization than full-fledged
pRHL. To support automation, CertiCrypt implements a calculus of variable de-
pendencies and provides a function eqobs_in, that given a program c and a set
of output variables O, computes a set of input variables I such that ⊢ c ≃IO c.
Analogously, it provides a function eqobs_out, that given a set of input variables
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I, computes a set of output variables O such that ⊢ c ≃IO c. This suggests a simple
procedure to establish a self-equivalence of the form ⊢ c ≃IO c: just compute a set
I ′ such that ⊢ c ≃I
′
O c using eqobs_in and check whether I
′ ⊆ I, or equivalently,
compute a set O′ such that ⊢ c ≃IO′ c using eqobs_out and check whether O ⊆ O
′.
CertiCrypt provides as well a (sound, but incomplete) relational weakest pre-
condition calculus that can be used to automate proofs of program invariants; it
deals with judgments of the form
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ =O ∧ Φ
and requires that the programs have (almost) the same control-flow structure.
3.2 Bridging Steps
CertiCrypt provides a powerful set of tactics and algebraic equivalences to automate
bridging steps in proofs. Most tactics rely on an implementation of a certified
optimizer for pWhile. Algebraic equivalences are provided as lemmas that follow
from algebraic properties of the interpretation of language constructs.
3.2.1 Certified Program Transformations
We automate several transformations that consist in applying compiler optimiza-
tions. More precisely, we provide support for a rich set of transformations based
on dependency and dataflow analyses, and for inlining procedure calls in programs.
Each transformation is implemented as a function in CertiCrypt that performs the
transformation itself, together with a rule that proves its correctness and a tactic
that applies the rule backwards.
Transformations based on dependencies
The functions eqobs_in and eqobs_out and the relational Hoare logic presented in
Section 3.1 provide the foundations to support transformations such as dead code
elimination and code reordering.
We write and prove the correctness of a function context that strips off two
programs c1 and c2 their maximal common context relative to sets I and O of input
and output variables. The correctness of context is expressed by the following rule
context(I, c1, c2, O) = (I
′, c′1, c
′
2, O
′) ⊢ c′1 ≃
I′
O′ c
′
2
⊢ c1 ≃IO c2
The tactic eqobs_ctxt applies this rule backwards. Using the same idea, we im-
plement tactics that strip off two programs only their common prefix (eqobs_hd)
or suffix (eqobs_tl).
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We provide a tactic (swap) that given two programs tries to hoist their common
instructions to obtain a maximal common prefix2, which can then be eliminated
using the above tactics. Its correctness is based on the rule
⊢ c1 ≃
I1
O1
c1 ⊢ c2 ≃
I2
O2
c2 modifies(c1, O1) modifies(c2, O2)
O1 ∩O2 = ∅ I1 ∩O2 = ∅ I2 ∩O1 = ∅
⊢ c1; c2 ≡ c2; c1
wheremodifies(c,X) is a semantic predicate expressing that program c only modifies
variables in X . This is formally expressed by
∀m. range (λm′. m =V\X m
′) (JcK m)
which ensures that reachable final memories coincide with the initial memory except
maybe on variables inX . The tactic swap uses an algorithm that over-approximates
the set of modified variables to decide whether two instructions can be swapped.
We provide a tactic (deadcode) that performs dead code elimination relative
to a set O of output variables. The corresponding transformation behaves more
like an aggressive slicing algorithm: it removes portions of code that do not affect
variables in O and performs at the same time branch prediction (substituting c1
for if true then c1 else c2), branch coalescing (substituting c for if e then c else c),
and self-assignment elimination. Its correctness relies on the rule
modifies(c,X) lossless(c) fv(Φ) ∩X = ∅
⊢ c ∼ skip : Φ⇒ Φ
Optimizations based on dataflow analyses
CertiCrypt has built-in, generic, support for such optimizations: given an abstract
domain D (a semi-lattice) for the analysis, transfer functions for assignment and
branching instructions, and an operator that optimizes expressions in the language,
we construct a certified optimization function optimize : C → D → C ×D. When
given a command c and an element δ ∈ D, this function transforms c into its op-
timized version c′ assuming the validity of δ. In addition, it returns an abstract
post-condition δ′ ∈ D, valid after executing c (or c′). We use these abstract post-
conditions to state the correctness of the optimization and to apply it recursively.
The correctness of optimize is proved using a mixture of the techniques of [Benton
2004] and [Bertot et al. 2006; Leroy 2006]: we express the validity of the informa-
tion contained in the analysis domain using a predicate valid(δ,m) that states the
agreement between the compile time abstract values in δ and the run time memory
m. Correctness is expressed in terms of a pRHL judgment:
let (c′, δ′) := optimize(c, δ) in ⊢ c ∼ c′ : ≍δ ⇒ ≍δ′
2 One could also provide a complementary tactic that hoists instructions to obtain a
maximal common suffix.
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where m1 ≍δ m2
def
= m1 = m2 ∧ valid(δ,m1). The following useful rule is derived
using [Comp]:
m1 Ψ m2 =⇒ valid(δ,m1) optimize(c1, δ) = (c′1, δ
′) ⊢ c′1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
⊢ c1 ∼ c2 : Ψ ⇒ Φ
[Opt]
Our case studies extensively use instantiations of [Opt] to perform expression prop-
agation (tactic ep). In contrast, we found that common subexpression elimination
is seldom used.
3.2.2 Algebraic Equivalences
Bridging steps frequently make use of algebraic properties of language constructs.
The proof of semantic security of ElGamal uses the fact that in a cyclic multiplicative
group, multiplication by a uniformly sampled element acts as a one-time pad:
⊢ x $← Zq; α← g
x × β ≃{α} y $← Zq; α← g
y
In the proof of IND-CCA2 security of OAEP described in Section 6.1 we use the
equivalences
⊢ x $← {0, 1}k; y ← x⊕ z ≃
{z}
{x,y,z} y
$← {0, 1}k; x← y ⊕ z
and (for a permutation f):
⊢ x $← {0, 1}k−ρ; y $← {0, 1}ρ; z ← f(x‖y) ≃{z} z $← {0, 1}
k
We show the usefulness of rule [Perm] by proving the first of these two equivalences,
known as optimistic sampling, that we also used in §1.4.2. Define
Ψ def= z〈1〉 = z〈2〉
Φ def= x〈1〉 = x〈2〉 ∧ y〈1〉 = y〈2〉 ∧ z〈1〉 = z〈2〉
Θ def= m1{x〈1〉 ⊕ z〈1〉/y} Φ m2{y〈2〉 ⊕ z〈2〉/x}
= x〈1〉 = y〈2〉 ⊕ z〈2〉 ∧ z〈1〉 = z〈2〉
By rule [Assn] we have
⊢ y ← x⊕ z ∼ x← y ⊕ z : Θ ⇒ Φ (3.1)
We apply rule [Perm] to prove
⊢ x $← {0, 1}k ∼ y $← {0, 1}k : Ψ ⇒ Θ (3.2)
For doing so we must show that for any pair of memories m1,m2 that coincide on
z there exists a permutation f on {0, 1}k such that
∀v ∈ {0, 1}k. v = f(v)⊕m2(z) ∧m1(z) = m2(z)
Take f(v) def= v ⊕m2(z) to be such a permutation. Conclude from (3.1) and (3.2)
by a final application of rule [Seq].
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3.2.3 Inter-procedural Code Motion
Game-based proofs commonly include bridging steps consisting in a semantics-
preserving reordering of instructions. When the reordering is intra-procedural, the
tactic swap presented in the previous section generally suffices to justify the trans-
formation. However, proofs in the random oracle model (see §1.4.2 for an example
of a random oracle) often include transformations where random values used inside
oracles are sampled beforehand, or conversely, where sampling a random value at
some point in a game is deferred to a later point, possibly in a different procedure.
The former type of transformation, called eager sampling, is useful for moving
random choices upfront: a systematic application of eager sampling transforms a
probabilistic game G that samples a fixed number of values into a semantically
equivalent game S;G′, where S samples the values that might be needed in G, and
G′ is a completely deterministic program to the exception of adversaries that may
still make their own random choices.3 The dual transformation, called lazy sam-
pling, can be used to postpone sampling random values until they are actually used
for the first time—thus, one readily knows the exact distribution of these values
by reasoning locally, without the need to maintain and reason about probabilistic
invariants. In this section, we present a general method to prove the correctness
of inter-procedural code motion. The method is based on a logic for swapping
statements that generalizes the earlier lemma reported in [Barthe et al. 2009c].
A logic for swapping statements
The primary tool for performing eager/lazy sampling is an extension of the rela-
tional Hoare logic with rules for swapping statements. As the goal is to move code
across procedures, it is essential that the logic considers two potentially different
environments E and E′. The logic deals with judgments of the form
⊢ E, (c;S) ∼ E′, (S; c′) : Ψ ⇒ Φ
In most cases, the logic will be applied with S being a sequence of (guarded)
sampling statements; however, we do not constrain S and merely require that it
satisfies three basic properties for some sets of variables X and I:
modifies(E, S,X) modifies(E′, S,X) ⊢ E, S ≃I∪XX E
′, S
Some rules of the logic are given in Figure 3.2; for the sake of readability all rules
are specialized to ≡, although we formalized more general versions of the rules, e.g.
for conditional statements,
⊢ E, (c1;S) ∼ E′, (S; c′1) : P ∧ e〈1〉 ⇒ Q P =⇒ e〈1〉 = e
′〈2〉
⊢ E, (c2;S) ∼ E′, (S; c′2) : P ∧ ¬e〈1〉 ⇒ Q fv(e
′) ∩X = ∅
⊢ E, (if e then c1 else c2;S) ∼ E
′, (S; if e′ then c′1 else c
′
2) : P ⇒ Q
[S-Cond]
3 Making adversaries deterministic is the goal of the coin fixing technique, as described
by Bellare and Rogaway [2006].
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x 6∈ I ∪X fv(e) ∩X = ∅
⊢ E, (x← e;S) ≡ E′, (S;x← e)
[S-Assn]
x 6∈ I ∪X fv(d) ∩X = ∅
⊢ E, (x $← d;S) ≡ E′, (S;x $← d)
[S-Rnd]
⊢ E, (c1;S) ≡ E
′, (S; c′1) ⊢ E, (c2;S) ≡ E
′, (S; c′2)
⊢ E, (c1; c2;S) ≡ E
′, (S; c′1; c
′
2)
[S-Seq]
⊢ E, (c1;S) ≡ E
′, (S; c′1) ⊢ E, (c2;S) ≡ E
′, (S; c′2) fv(e) ∩X = ∅
⊢ E, (if e then c1 else c2;S) ≡ E
′, (S; if e then c′1 else c
′
2)
[S-Cond]
⊢ E, (c;S) ≡ E′, (S; c′) fv(e) ∩X = ∅
⊢ E, (while e do c;S) ≡ E′, (S;while e do c′)
[S-While]
⊢ E, (f.body;S) ≡ E′, (S; f.body) E(f).args = E′(f).args E(f).re = E′(f).re
fv(E(f).re) ∩X = ∅ x 6∈ I ∪X fv(e) ∩X = ∅
⊢ E, (x← f(e);S) ≡ E′, (S;x← f(e))
[S-Call]
⊢wf A X ∩ (RW ∪R) = ∅ I ∩RW = ∅ ∀f 6∈ O. E(f) = E
′(f)
∀f ∈ O. E(f).args = E′(f).args ∧E(f).re = E′(f).re ∧
⊢ E, (f.body;S) ≡ E′, (S; f.body)
⊢ E, (x← A(e);S) ≡ E′, (S;x← A(e))
[S-Adv]
Fig. 3.2. Selected rules of a logic for swapping statements.
An application
Consider the games Glazy and Geager in Figure 3.3. Both games define an oracle
Game Glazy :
L← nil; b← A()
Oracle Olazy(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
y $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← (x, y) :: L
else y ← L[x]
return y
Game Geager :
L← nil; yˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ; b← A()
Oracle Oeager(x) :
if x /∈ dom(L) then
if x = 0k then y ← yˆ else y $← {0, 1}ℓ;
L← (x, y) :: L
else y ← L[x]
return y
Fig. 3.3. An example of eager sampling justified by inter-procedural code motion.
O : {0, 1}k → {0, 1}ℓ. While in game Glazy the oracle is implemented as a typical
random oracle that chooses its answers on demand, in Geager we use a fresh variable
yˆ to fix in advance the response to a query of the form 0k. We can prove that
both games are perfectly indistinguishable from the point of view of an adversary
A (who cannot write L). Define
c def= b← A() S
def
= if 0k 6∈ dom(L) then yˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ else yˆ ← L[0k]
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and take I = {L}, X = {yˆ}. We introduce an intermediate game using rule [Trans],
⊢ Glazy ≃V{b} Elazy, (L← nil; c;S) ⊢ Elazy, (L← nil; c;S) ≃
V
{b} Geager
⊢ Glazy ≃V{b} Geager
[Trans]
We prove the premise on the left by eliminating S as dead code, since it does not
modify variable b. To prove the other premise, we introduce an intermediate game
(Eeager, (L← nil;S; c)). Its equivalence to Geager is direct by propagating the initial
assignment to L to the condition in S and then simplifying the conditional to its
first branch. Its equivalence to (Elazy, (L ← nil; c;S)) is justified by appealing to
rule [S-Adv],
⊢ L← nil ≡ L← nil
[Refl]
⊢ Elazy, (Olazy;S) ≡ Eeager, (S;Oeager)
⊢ Elazy, (c;S) ≡ Eeager, (S; c)
[S-Adv]
⊢ Elazy, (L← nil; c;S) ≃V{b} Eeager, (L← nil;S; c)
[Seq]
We are thus left to show
⊢ Elazy, (Olazy.body;S) ≡ Eeager, (S;Oeager.body)
The proof of this latter judgment starts by an application of the generalized rule
for conditionals of the logic for swapping statements. Let
e = e′ = x /∈ dom(L)
c1 = y $← {0, 1}
ℓ; L← (x, y) :: L
c′1 = (if x = 0
k then y ← yˆ else y $← {0, 1}ℓ); L← (x, y) :: L
c2 = c
′
2 = y ← L[x]
There are two non-trivial proof obligations:
1. ⊢ c2;S ∼ S; c′2 : =V ∧ (x ∈ dom(L))〈1〉 ⇒ =V
This corresponds to showing that the code in the else branch in the conditional
of each implementation of O commutes with S, and follows from [S-Assn];
2. ⊢ c1;S ∼ S; c′1 : =V ∧ (x /∈ dom(L))〈1〉 ⇒ =V
By case analysis on x = 0k:
a) If x = 0k, we can invoke certified program transformations—using the pre-
condition that x /∈ dom(L)—to simplify the goal to the following easily
provable form:
⊢ y $← {0, 1}ℓ;L← (x, y) :: L; yˆ ← y ≡ yˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ; y ← yˆ;L← (x, y) :: L
b) Otherwise, we do a further case analysis on 0k ∈ dom(L)
i. If 0k∈ dom(L), we have to prove that ⊢ c1; yˆ ← L[0k] ≡ yˆ ← L[0k]; c1
which is trivial;
ii. Otherwise, the goal simplifies to ⊢ c1; yˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ ≡ yˆ $← {0, 1}ℓ; c1
which is also trivial. ⊓⊔
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3.3 Reasoning about Failure Events
One common technique to justify a lossy transformation G,A → G′, A, where
Pr [G : A] 6= Pr [G′ : A] is based on what cryptographers call failure events. This
technique relies on a fundamental lemma that allows to bound the difference in
the probability of an event in two games: one identifies a failure event and argues
that both games behave identically until failure occurs. One can then bound the
difference in probability of another event by the probability of failure in either game.
Consider for example the following two program snippets and their instrumented
versions:
s def= if e then c1; c else c2 sbad
def
= if e then c1; bad← true; c else c2
s′ def= if e then c1; c
′ else c2 s
′
bad
def
= if e then c1; bad← true; c′ else c2
If we ignore variable bad, s and sbad, and s
′ and s′
bad
, respectively, are observa-
tionally equivalent. Moreover, sbad and s
′
bad
behave identically unless bad is set.
Thus, the difference of the probability of an event A in a game G containing the
program fragment s and a game G′ containing instead s′ can be bounded by the
probability of bad being set in either G or G′.
Lemma 3.3 (Fundamental Lemma). Let G1, G2 be two games and let A,B,
and F be events. If Pr [G1 : A ∧ ¬F ] = Pr [G2 : B ∧ ¬F ], then
|Pr [G1 : A]− Pr [G2 : B] | ≤ max(Pr [G1 : F ] ,Pr [G2 : F ])
Proof.
|Pr [G1 : A]− Pr [G2 : B] |
= |Pr [G1 : A ∧ F ] + Pr [G1 : A ∧ ¬F ]− Pr [G2 : B ∧ F ]− Pr [G2 : B ∧ ¬F ] |
= |Pr [G1 : A ∧ F ]− Pr [G2 : B ∧ F ] |
≤ max(Pr [G1 : A ∧ F ] ,Pr [G2 : B ∧ F ])
≤ max(Pr [G1 : F ] ,Pr [G2 : F ])
⊓⊔
To apply this lemma, we developed a syntactic criterion to discharge its hypothesis
for the case where A = B and F = bad. The hypothesis can be automatically
established by inspecting the code of both games: it holds if their code differs
only after program points setting the flag bad to true and bad is never reset to
false afterwards. Note also that if both games terminate with probability 1, then
Pr [G1 : bad] = Pr [G2 : bad], and that if, for instance, only game G2 terminates
with probability 1, it must be the case that Pr [G1 : bad] ≤ Pr [G2 : bad].
3.3.1 A Logic for Bounding the Probability of Events
Many steps in game-based proofs require to provide an upper bound for the measure
of some function g after the execution of a command c (throughout this section,
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we assume a fixed environment E that we omit from the presentation). This is
typically the case when applying the Fundamental Lemma presented in the previous
section: we need to bound the probability of the failure event bad (equivalently,
the expected value of its characteristic function 1bad). A function f is an upper
bound of (λm. JcK m g) when
 JcKg  f def= ∀m. JcK m g ≤ f m
Figure 3.4 gathers some rules for proving the validity of such triples. The rule
for adversary calls assumes that f depends only on variables that the adversary
cannot modify directly (but may modify indirectly through oracle calls, of course).
The correctness of this rule is proved using the induction principle for well-formed
adversaries together with the rest of the rules of the logic.
⊢ JskipKf  f
f = λm. g(m{JeK m/x})
⊢ Jx← eKg  f
f = λm. JdK m (λv. g(m{v/x}))
⊢ Jx $← dKg  f
⊢ Jc1Kg  f Jc2Kh  g
⊢ Jc1; c2Kh  f
⊢ Jc1Kg  f Jc2Kg  f
⊢ Jif e then c1 else c2Kg  f
⊢ JcKf  f
⊢ Jwhile e do cKf  f
⊢ g ≤ g′ JcKg′  f ′ f ′ ≤ f
⊢ JcKg  f
⊢ Jp.bodyKg  f f =X f g =Y g x 6∈ (X ∪ Y )
⊢ Jx← p(e)Kg  f
⊢wf A ∀p ∈ O. ⊢ Jp.bodyKf  f f =X f X ∩ ({x} ∪ RW) = ∅
⊢ Jx← A(e)Kf  f
f =I f ⊢ c ≃
I
O c
′ g =O g ⊢ Jc
′Kg  f
⊢ JcKg  f
Fig. 3.4. Selected rules of a logic for bounding the probability of events.
The rules bear some similarity with the rules of (standard) Hoare logic. How-
ever, there are some subtle differences. For example, the premises of the rules for
branching statements do not consider guards. The rule
⊢ Jc1Kg  f|e ⊢ Jc2Kg  f|¬e
⊢ Jif e then c1 else c2Kg  f
where f|e is defined as (λm. if JeKm then f(m) else 0) can be derived from the rule
for conditionals in the figure by two simple applications of the “rule of consequence”.
Moreover, the rule for conditional statements (and its variant above) is incomplete:
consider a statement of the form Jif true then c1 else c2Kg  f such that Jc1Kg  f
is valid, but not Jc2Kg  f ; the triple Jif true then c1 else c2Kg  f is valid, but to
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derive it one needs to resort to observational equivalence. More general rules exist,
but we have not formalized them since we did not need them in our proofs.4
Digression
The differences between the above triples and those of Hoare logic are inherent to
their definition, which is tailored to establish upper bounds for the probability of
events. Nevertheless, the validity of a Hoare triple {P} c {Q} (in which pre- and
post-conditions are Boolean-valued predicates) is equivalent to the validity of the
triple JcK1¬Q  1¬P . We can consider dual triples of the form JcKg  f whose
validity is defined as:
 JcKg  f def= ∀m. JcK m g ≥ f m
This allows to express termination of a program as JcK1  1 and admits an em-
bedding of Hoare triples, mapping {P} c {Q} to JcK1Q  1P . However, this
embedding does not preserve validity for non-terminating programs under the par-
tial correctness interpretation. Consider a program c that never terminates: we
have {true} c {false}, but clearly not JcK1false  1.
3.3.2 Automation
In most applications of Lemma 3.3, failure can only be triggered by oracle calls.
Typically, the flag bad that signals failure is set in the code of an oracle for which
an upper bound for the number of queries made by the adversary is known. The
following lemma provides a general method for bounding the probability of failure
under such circumstances.
Lemma 3.4 (Failure Event Lemma). Consider an event F and a game G that
gives adversaries access to an oracle O. Let cntr : ENat, h : N → [0, 1] be such that
cntr and F do not depend on variables that can be written outside O, and for any
initial memory m,
¬F (m) =⇒ Pr [O.body,m : F ] ≤ h(JcntrK m)
and
range (JO.bodyK m) (λm′. JcntrK m < JcntrK m′) ∨
range (JO.bodyK m) (λm′. JcntrK m = JcntrK m′ ∧ F m′ = F m)
Then, for any initial memory m satisfying ¬F (m) and JcntrK m = 0,
Pr [G,m : F ∧ cntr ≤ q] ≤
q−1∑
i=0
h(i)
4 More generally, it seems possible to make the logic complete, at the cost of considering
more complex statements with pre-conditions on memories.
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Proof. Define f :M→ [0, 1] as follows
f(m) def=


0 if JcntrK m > q
1F (m) + 1¬F (m)
q−1∑
i=JcntrKm
h(i) if JcntrK m ≤ q
We show JGKf  f by structural induction on the code of G using the rules of the
logic presented in the previous section. We first prove that O satisfies the triple
JO.bodyKf  f . We must show that for every m, JO.bodyK m f ≤ f(m). This is
trivial when cntr is not incremented, because we have
JO.bodyK m f = f(m) (JO.bodyK m 1) ≤ f(m)
When cntr is incremented and JcntrK m ≥ q, this is trivial too, because the left
hand side becomes 0. We are left with the case where O.body increments cntr and
JcntrK m < q. If F (m), the right hand side is equal to 1 and the inequality holds.
Otherwise, we have from the hypotheses that
JO.bodyK m f ≤ JO.bodyK m

λm′.1F (m′) + 1¬F (m′) q−1∑
i=JcntrKm′
h(i)


≤ Pr [O.body,m : F ] + Pr [O.body,m : ¬F ]
q−1∑
i=JcntrKm+1
h(i)
≤ h(JcntrK m) +
q−1∑
i=JcntrKm+1
h(i)
=
q−1∑
i=JcntrKm
h(i) = f(m)
Using the rules in Figure 3.4, we can then extend this result to adversary calls and
to the rest of the game, showing that JGKf  f .
Finally, let m be a memory such that ¬F (m) and JcntrK m = 0. It follows
immediately from JGKf  f that
Pr [G,m : F ∧ cntr ≤ q] ≤ JGK m f ≤ f(m) =
q−1∑
i=0
h(i) ⊓⊔
When failure is defined as the probability of a flag bad being set by an oracle
and the number of queries the adversary makes to this oracle is upper bounded
by q, the above lemma can be used to bound the probability of failure by taking
F = bad and defining h suitably. In most practical applications the probability
of an oracle call raising failure is history-independent and hence h is a constant
function. The proof of Lemma 4.3 given in Section 4.3.2 is an exception for which
the full generality of the lemma is needed.
4
The PRP/PRF Switching Lemma
C
ryptographic systems are generally built incrementally by combining basic
primitives with the goal of achieving a higher level security goal. Rather than
designing a system for a particular choice of a primitive, one designs the system
assuming a generic and simplified model of the primitive. The security of the whole
system is then analyzed under the assumption that this model behaves in an ideal
way. Since in practice the construction that implements the primitive will definitely
deviate from this ideal behavior, the actual security of the system depends on how
wide the gap between the idealized and the actual behavior is. Pseudorandom func-
tions (PRF) and pseudorandom permutations (PRP) are two idealized primitives
that are used to model blockciphers and thus play a central role in the design of
symmetric-key systems. Although the most natural assumption to make about a
blockcipher is that it behaves as a pseudorandom permutation, most commonly the
security of a system based on a blockcipher is analyzed by replacing the blockci-
pher with a perfectly random function. The PRP/PRF switching lemma is used
to fill the gap: given a bound for the security of a blockcipher as a pseudorandom
permutation, it gives a bound for its security as a pseudorandom function.
In this Chapter we will formally define the notions of pseudorandom function
and pseudorandom permutation and their security, and we will overview two differ-
ent game-based proofs of the PRP/PRF switching lemma. Both use the Fundamen-
tal Lemma of game-playing (Lemma 3.3) to bound the advantage of an adversary
by the probability of a failure event, but each proof bounds the probability of fail-
ure using a different technique. We first present a proof that uses the principle of
eager sampling so that all random choices are done up front and the probability is
directly computable. We then present a significantly more compact proof that uses
Lemma 3.4 (see §3.3.2) to bound the probability of failure.
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4.1 Pseudorandom Functions
A pseudorandom function is a key-indexed family of functions {fk | k ∈ K} with
the property that an instance selected at random according to some distribution on
K is computationally indistinguishable from a perfectly random function. Unless
otherwise said we will consider that the distribution on K that makes this property
hold is the uniform distribution.
Consider an adversary who has only blackbox access to an oracle and is put in
either of two scenarios: one where the oracle is a random instance of a function
drawn from a family of pseudorandom functions, and other where the oracle is a
perfectly random function. This adversary should only be able to tell apart both
scenarios with a small probability. We can define this formally using games.
Definition 4.1 (PRF-advantage). Let {fk : A→ B | k ∈ K} be a pseudorandom
function family, and A an adversary with blackbox access to an oracle O as in the
following two games:
Game GPRF :
k $← K; b← A()
Oracle O(x) :
return fk(x)
Game GRF :
L← nil; b← A()
Oracle O(x) :
if x 6∈ dom(L) then
y $← B;
L← (x, y) :: L
return L[x]
The PRF-advantage of A against f is defined as
AdvAPRFf
def
= |Pr [GPRF : b = 1]− Pr [GRF : b = 1]|
The concept of pseudorandom function was first introduced by Goldreich, Gold-
wasser, and Micali [1986]. Rather than considering a single family of key-indexed
functions, they consider a collection of families parametrized by a security parame-
ter η. In this asymptotic setting, a pseudorandom function is secure if all adversaries
that execute in polynomial-time on η have a negligible PRF-advantage (as a func-
tion of η). In contrast, in the setting of exact security there is no absolute notion
of security for pseudorandom functions. The above definition only associates to
each adversary A a real number, its PRF-advantage. In practice one considers all
adversaries consuming no more than a certain amount of computational resources,
and gives an upper bound for their PRF-advantage.
4.2 Pseudorandom Permutations
A pseudorandom permutation is key-indexed family of permutations {fk | k ∈ K}
on A such that a permutation randomly drawn from the family is computationally
indistinguishable from a permutation drawn uniformly from the set of all permuta-
tions on A. Again, we define this notion formally using games.
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Definition 4.2 (PRP-advantage). Let {fk : A→ A | k ∈ K} be a pseudorandom
permutation family, and A an adversary with blackbox access to an oracle O as in
the following two games:
Game GPRP :
k $← K; b← A()
Oracle O(x) :
return fk(x)
Game GRP :
L← nil; b← A()
Oracle O(x) :
if x 6∈ dom(L) then
y $← A \ ran(L);
L← (x, y) :: L
return L[x]
where the instruction y $← A\ ran(L) samples uniformly an element of A that is not
in the range of the association list L, thus ensuring that oracle O in GRP implements
an injective—and therefore bijective—function. The PRP-advantage of A against
f is defined as
AdvAPRPf
def
= |Pr [GPRP : b = 1]− Pr [GRP : b = 1]|
The notion of pseudorandom permutation is due to Luby and Rackoff [1988], who
also observe that the notions of pseudorandom function and permutation are no
different in an asymptotic setting, and show how to construct a pseudorandom
permutation from a pseudorandom function.
4.3 The PRP/PRF Switching Lemma
We already observed that every pseudorandom permutation family is also a pseudo-
random function family. But how well does a pseudorandom permutation perform
as a pseudorandom function? Let us first consider the simpler problem of compar-
ing a perfectly random function to a random permutation. Suppose you give to
an adversary blackbox access to an oracle implementing either a random function
or a random permutation, and you ask it to tell you which is the case. For the
sake of concreteness let us assume the domain of the permutation (and the domain
and range of the function) is {0, 1}ℓ. Due to the birthday problem, no matter the
strategy the adversary follows, after roughly 2ℓ/2 queries to the oracle it will be
able to tell in which scenario it is with a high probability. If the oracle is a random
function, a collision is almost sure to occur, whereas it could not occur when the
oracle is a random permutation. The birthday problem gives us a lower bound for
the advantage of an adversary in distinguishing a random function from a random
permutation. The following lemma gives an upper bound.
Lemma 4.3 (PRP/PRF switching lemma). Let A be an adversary with black-
box access to an oracle O implementing either a random permutation on {0, 1}ℓ as
in game GRP or a random function from {0, 1}ℓ to {0, 1}ℓ as in game GRF. Suppose,
in addition, that A makes at most q > 0 queries to oracle O. Then,
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|Pr [GRP : b = 1]− Pr [GRF : b = 1]| ≤
q(q − 1)
2ℓ+1
(4.1)
We overview two different machine-checked proofs of the PRP/PRF switching
lemma that exploit the code-based techniques presented in earlier sections. Both
proofs use the Fundamental Lemma to bound the advantage of the adversary by
the probability of a failure event. The first proof uses the eager sampling technique
of Section 3.2.3 to bound the probability of failure, whereas the second one relies
on Lemma 3.4 of Section 3.3.2. We begin by introducing in Figure 4.1 annotated
versions GbadRP and G
bad
RF of the games GRP and GRF. These annotated games set a
flag bad whenever the oracle corresponding to a random function would return a
value colliding with a response to a previous query, but are otherwise semantically
equivalent to the original games. The annotated games are syntactically identical
until the point where bad is set, so we can appeal to Lemma 3.3 to bound the
difference in the probability of b being equal to 1 in the original games:
|Pr [GRP : b = 1]− Pr [GRF : b = 1]| ≤ Pr
[
GbadRF : bad
]
Game GbadRP :
L← nil; b← A()
Oracle O(x) :
if x 6∈ dom(L) then
y $← {0, 1}ℓ;
if y ∈ ran(L) then
bad← true;
y $← {0, 1}ℓ \ ran(L)
L← (x, y) :: L
return L[x]
Game GbadRF :
L← nil; b← A()
Oracle O(x) :
if x 6∈ dom(L) then
y $← {0, 1}ℓ;
if y ∈ ran(L) then
bad← true
L← (x, y) :: L
return L[x]
Game G
eager
RF :
L← nil; S; b← A()
Oracle O(x) :
if x 6∈ dom(L) then
if 0 < |Y | then
y ← hd(Y );
Y ← tl(Y )
else y $← {0, 1}ℓ
L← (x, y) :: L
return L[x]
S def= Y ← nil; while |Y | < q do
(
y $← {0, 1}ℓ; Y ← y :: Y
)
Fig. 4.1. Games used in the proofs of the PRP/PRF Switching Lemma.
4.3.1 A Proof Based on Eager Sampling
We make a first remark: the probability of bad being set in game GbadRF is bounded
by the probability of having a collision in ran(L) at the end of the game. Let us
write this latter event as col(L),
col(L) def= ∃x1, x2 ∈ dom(L). x1 6= x2 ∧ L[x1] = L[x2]
We prove that
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⊢ GbadRF ∼ GRF : true⇒ bad〈1〉 =⇒ col(L)〈2〉
Thus,
Pr
[
GbadRF : bad
]
≤ Pr [GRF : col(L)] (4.2)
Using the logic for swapping statements, we then modify the oracle in GRF so that
the responses to the first q queries are instead chosen at the beginning of the game
and stored in a list Y , thus obtaining the equivalent eager version GeagerRF shown in
Figure 4.1; each time a query is made, the oracle pops a value from list Y and gives
it back to the adversary as the response. Since the initialization code S terminates
and does not modify L, we can conclude that
Pr [GRF : col(L)] = Pr [GRF;S : col(L)] = Pr [G
eager
RF : col(L)]
We prove using the relational Hoare logic that having a collision in the range of L
at the end of this last game is bounded by the probability of having a collision in
Y immediately after executing S. We conclude that the bound in (4.1) holds by
analyzing the loop in S.
Observe that if there are no collisions in Y in a memory m, we can prove by
induction on (q − |Y |) that the probability of sampling a colliding value in the
remaining loop iterations is
Pr [S,m : ∃i, j ∈ N. i < j < q ∧ Y [i] = Y [j]] =
q−1∑
i=|Y |
i
2ℓ
We thus have,
Pr [GeagerRF : col(L)] ≤ Pr [S,m{nil/Y } : ∃i, j ∈ N. i < j < q ∧ Y [i] = Y [j]]
=
q(q − 1)
2ℓ+1
⊓⊔
4.3.2 A Proof Based on the Failure Event Lemma
The bound in (4.1) follows from a direct application of Lemma 3.4. It suffices to
take F = bad, h(i) = i 2−ℓ, and cntr = |L|. If bad is initially set to false in memory
m, we have
Pr
[
GbadRF ,m : bad
]
= Pr [b← A(),m{nil/L} : bad ∧ |L| ≤ q] ≤
q−1∑
i=0
h(i) =
q(q − 1)
2ℓ+1
The first equation holds because A does not make more than q queries to O. The
inequality is obtained from Lemma 3.4; we use the logic of Section 3.3.1 to bound
the probability of bad being set in one call to the oracle by h(cntr).
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4.3.3 Comparison of Both Proofs
The proof of the PRP/PRF switching lemma that bounds the probability of failure
using Lemma 3.4 presented in Section 4.3.2 is considerably shorter compared to the
one presented in Section 4.3.1, that uses the principle of eager sampling to reduce
the problem of bounding the probability of failure to local reasoning about a loop.
The former proof takes just about 100 lines of Coq, compared to the 400 lines that
takes the latter. Both proofs are significantly more compact than the 900-lines
proof reported in Barthe et al. [2009c]. That proof used an earlier mechanization
of the eager sampling technique that only allowed to fix the value of one response
of the oracle at a time. Thus, in order to fix in advance the response to all the q
queries that could be made by the adversary, an induction argument was necessary.
4.4 Pseudorandom Permutations as Pseudorandom
Functions
In view of Lemma 4.3, we can now answer our original question: how well does a
pseudorandom permutation perform as a pseudorandom function?
Let {fk | k ∈ K} be a pseudorandom permutation family on {0, 1}ℓ and let A be
an adversary that makes at most q > 0 queries to its oracle. The PRF-advantage
of A is
AdvAPRFf = |Pr [GPRF : b = 1]−Pr [GRF : b = 1]|
= |Pr [GPRP : b = 1]−Pr [GRP : b = 1] + Pr [GRP : b = 1]−Pr [GRF : b = 1]|
≤ |Pr [GPRP : b = 1]−Pr [GRP : b = 1]|+ |Pr [GRP : b = 1]−Pr [GRF : b = 1]|
≤ AdvAPRPf +
q(q − 1)
2ℓ+1
Consider this bound in an asymptotic setting, and assume ℓ is linearly pro-
portional to the security parameter η. Every polynomial-time adversary can make
only a polynomial number of queries to its oracle, so q is polynomial on the se-
curity parameter, and the term on the right hand side of the last inequality is
negligible on η if f is secure as a pseudorandom permutation. Hence, f is secure as
a pseudorandom function whenever f is secure as a pseudorandom permutation.
We already observed that the construction of Luby and Rackoff [1988] provides
a means to build a pseudorandom permutation from a pseudorandom function;
many other authors have studied variations of this construction. In contrast, the
reverse direction has been historically much less studied. Although it follows from
the PRP/PRF switching lemma that in a complexity-theoretical setting, a pseu-
dorandom permutation is a pseudorandom function, there are constructions that
achieve better security at a low efficiency cost [Hall et al. 1998].
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4.5 Discussion
Despite the apparent simplicity of the PRP/PRF switching lemma, some purported
proofs in the literature contain a subtle error in reasoning about conditional prob-
abilities (cf. Impagliazzo and Rudich [1989]). Let us briefly report the argument in
those proofs.
Intuitive proof.
Let collision be the event that adversary A gets the same answer to two different
queries when interacting with a random function. Since a random permutation
behaves the same as a random function when no collisions are observed, we have
that
Pr [GRP : b = 1] = Pr [GRF : b = 1 | ¬collision] (4.3)
Let x = Pr [GRF : b = 1 | ¬collision], y = Pr [GRF : b = 1 | collision]. Then,
|Pr [GRP : b = 1]− Pr [GRF : b = 1] |
= |x− (x Pr [GRF : ¬collision] + y Pr [GRF : collision])|
= |x (1− Pr [GRF : ¬collision])− y Pr [GRF : collision])|
= |x− y| Pr [GRF : collision]
Since 0 ≤ x, y ≤ 1,
|Pr [GRP : b = 1]− Pr [GRF : b = 1] | ≤ Pr [GRF : collision]
Since the adversary makes at most q queries to the oracle,
Pr [GRF : collision] ≤
q(q − 1)
2ℓ+1
and the bound (4.1) follows. ⊓⊔
The reader may be wondering where is the error in the above argument. The
problem is that equation (4.3) might not hold, no matter how appealing the intuitive
justification we gave can look. We can actually illustrate this with a counterexample
for ℓ = 1, by showing a particular adversary for which the equation does not hold:
Adversary A1() :
y ← O(0);
if y = 0 then return 1
else
y ← O(1);
if y = 1 then return 1 else return 0
Let us analyze how this adversary fares in each game with respect to equation
(4.3). We can better depict the behavior of the adversary using a tree. The values
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in leaves represent the bit b the adversary returns in each case whereas the label
on the left of a node indicates the probability of reaching it.
GRF O(0)?
1
2 1
0
O(1)?
1
1
4 0
0
1
4 1
1
GRP O(0)?
1
2 1
0
O(1)?
1
1
2 0
0
0 1
1
It follows that
1
2
= Pr [GRP : b = 1] 6= Pr [GRF : b = 1 | ¬collision] =
2
3
(4.4)
The reason of the discrepancy is that the number of queries made by the adversary
varies depending on the answer it receives from its first query.
The same would happen if the number of queries depended on the internal
random choices of A. For instance, the following adversary makes either zero or
two queries depending on the result of sampling a fair coin and achieves the same
probabilities in equation (4.4) as the adversary we showed previously:
Adversary A2() :
a $← {0, 1};
if a = 0 then return 1
else
y0 ← O(0); y1 ← O(1);
if y0 ∧ y1 then return 1 else return 0
GRF
1
2 1
a = 0
O(0),O(1)?
a = 1
1
8 0
0, 0
1
8 0
0, 1
1
8 0
1, 0
1
8 1
1, 1
GRP
1
2 1
a = 0
O(0),O(1)?
a = 1
0 0
0, 0
1
4 0
0, 1
1
4 0
1, 0
0 1
1, 1
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Obviously, the result we proved in the previous section holds for both of the
above adversaries. We can compute the actual advantage they achieve and check
that the bound in Equation (4.1) holds:
∣∣∣Pr [GA1RP : b = 1]− Pr [GA1RF : b = 1]∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣12 − 34
∣∣∣∣ = 14 ≤ q(q − 1)2ℓ+1 = 12∣∣∣Pr [GA2RP : b = 1]− Pr [GA2RF : b = 1]∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣12 − 58
∣∣∣∣ = 18 ≤ q(q − 1)2ℓ+1 = 12
Indeed, both adversaries make at most q = 2 queries and the bound holds. The
following adversaryA3 mounting a birthday attack with q = 2 achieves the maximal
value of 1/2:
Adversary A3() :
y1 ← O(0);
y2 ← O(1);
if y1 6= y2 then return 1 else return 0∣∣∣Pr [GA3RP : b = 1]− Pr [GA3RF : b = 1]∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣1− 12
∣∣∣∣ = 12
4.6 Related Work
The standard proof of the PRP/PRF switching lemma is due to Impagliazzo and
Rudich [1989,Theorem 5.1]. The above observation about the error in the reasoning
in the standard proof of the lemma and the first counterexample we showed are due
to Bellare and Rogaway [2006].
Bellare and Rogaway [2006,Lemma 1] give a game-based proof of the PRP/PRF
switching lemma. Their proof is similar to ours, but they make the additional
assumption that the adversary never asks an oracle query twice. Just as in the
proof we presented, they use the Fundamental Lemma of game-playing to bound
the difference in the probability of the adversary outputting 1 when interacting with
either a random permutation or a random function. However, the justification of
the bound on the probability of the bad flag being set when the adversary interacts
with a random function remains informal. The same authors give also a proof of the
PRP/PRF switching lemma that does not use games, under the assumption that
the adversary is deterministic and makes exactly q different queries to its oracle.
We note that the assumption of the adversary being deterministic is without loss of
generality only if it is computationally unbounded, and therefore the argument does
not hold in an asymptotic setting where the adversary must execute in polynomial-
time.
Shoup [2004,Section 5.1] gives a game-based proof of the PRP/PRF switching
lemma under the assumption that the adversary makes exactly q distinct queries to
its oracle. In the games he considers, the challenger acts as intermediary between
the oracle and the adversary. Rather than the adversary calling the oracle at its
66 Chapter 4. The PRP/PRF Switching Lemma
discretion, it is the challenger that calls the adversary to get the next query; it then
asks the query itself to the oracle and gives the response back the adversary in the
next call. There is probably nothing wrong with this formulation, but we feel that
it imposes unnecessary restrictions on the form of the adversary that do not help
to make the proof more clear.
Affeldt, Tanaka, and Marti [2007] present a formalization of a game-based proof
of the PRP/PRF switching lemma in the Coq proof assistant. What they prove
in reality is a simplified variant that only holds for non-adaptive and deterministic
adversaries. They formalize adversaries as purely deterministic mathematical func-
tions that take a natural number and return an element in the domain of its oracle
(a query). This implies that the queries the adversary makes do not depend on
the responses to previous queries or on any random choices. For instance, the two
adversaries we gave in the previous section as counterexamples to the probabilistic
reasoning in the original proof of the PRP/PRF switching lemma are ruled out by
this formulation.
5
Unforgeability of Full-Domain Hash
Signatures
I
n this chapter we will go through the formalization in CertiCrypt of two different
proofs of security of the Full-Domain Hash (FDH) signature scheme. The FDH
scheme was first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [1996] as an efficient RSA-based
signature scheme, but is in fact an instance of an earlier construction described
by the same authors in 1993. Here, we will consider this latter, more general
construction, which is based on a family of one-way trapdoor permutations f on a
cyclic group G, and a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G whose range is the full domain
of f . The RSA-based scheme is obtained by instantiating f with the RSA function,
and the hash function with some cryptographic hash function, such as SHA-1 with
the length of its output extended to match that of the RSA modulus.
Definition 5.1 (Trapdoor permutation). A family of trapdoor permutations
is a triple of algorithms (KG, f, f−1). For a given value of the security parame-
ter η, the key generator KG(η) randomly selects a pair of keys (pk, sk) such that
f(pk, ·) is a permutation on its domain and f−1(sk, ·) is its inverse. We say that a
family of trapdoor permutations is one-way if it cannot be inverted in probabilistic
polyonomial-time on a uniformly distributed element in its domain.
Definition 5.2 (Full-Domain Hash signature scheme). Let (KGf , f, f−1) be
a family of trapdoor permutations on cyclic groups Gη and let H be family of hash
functions from bitstrings of arbitrary length onto the domain of the permutations.
The Full-Domain Hash digital signature scheme is composed of the following triple
of algorithms:
KG(η) def= (pk, sk)← KGf (η); return (pk, sk)
Sign(sk,m) def= return f−1(sk,H(m))
Verify(pk,m, σ) def= return (f(pk, σ) = H(m))
The key generation algorithm just runs the key generation algorithm of the underly-
ing trapdoor permutation obtaining a public key pk, that is used as the verification
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key of the scheme, and a secret key (trapdoor) sk used to compute signatures. The
signature of a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ is simply f−1(sk,H(m)), the preimage under f
of its digest. To verify a purported signature σ on a message m, it suffices to check
whether H(m) and f(pk, σ) coincide.
The FDH scheme can be proved secure in the random oracle model against
existential forgery under adaptive chosen-message attacks (see Definition 2.10 in
§2.5). This means that if we regard the hash function H as a truly random function,
then any computationally feasible adversary with access to the public key and that
can ask for the signature of messages of its choice, succeeds in forging a signature
for a fresh message only with a negligible probability. This asymptotic security
statement is desirable, but of limited practical utility because it does not give
any hint as to how to choose the scheme parameters to attain a certain degree of
security. A much more useful result would be an exact security statement, a bound
that quantifies the gap between the security of the scheme and the intractability of
inverting the trapdoor permutation.
Consider an adversary against the existential unforgeability of FDH that makes
at most qH(η) and qS(η) queries to the hash and signing oracles, respectively. In a
code-based setting, such an adversary is regarded as a black-box procedure A run
in the context of the following attack game:
Game GEF :
(pk, sk)← KG();
L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m)
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← G; L← (m,h) :: L
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S; h← H(m);
return f−1(sk, h)
This adversary succeeds in forging a FDH signature for a fresh message with prob-
ability
Pr [GEF : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S]
Note that in the above game the signing oracle makes a hash query each time the
adversary asks for the signature of a message, and an additional hash query is made
at the end as part of the verification of the signature returned by the adversary.
Thus the number of effective hash queries made during the whole game is at most
qH + qS + 1. All this is captured by the following post-condition of GEF,
Ψ def= |L| ≤ qH + qS + 1 ∧ |S| ≤ qS
This implies in particular that Pr [GEF : A] = Pr [GEF : A ∧ Ψ ] for any event A.
In the remainder of this chapter we will show two different ways of constructing
an inverter I that uses the forger A to invert f . These constructions effectively
reduce the security of the signature scheme to the intractability of inverting the
underlying trapdoor permutation.
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5.1 The Original Proof
We first present a game-based proof of the original result by Bellare and Rogaway
[1993], which provides a security bound that depends on the number of queries the
adversary makes to both, the hash and the signing oracle.
Theorem 5.3 (Original bound). Let A be an adversary mounting a chosen-
message existential forgery attack against FDH that makes at most qH queries to
the hash oracle H and at most qS queries to the signing oracle Sign. Suppose A
succeeds in forging a signature for a fresh message within time t with probability ǫ.
Then, there exists an inverter I that finds the preimage of an element uniformly
drawn from the range of f with probability ǫ′ within time t′, where
ǫ′ ≥ (qH + qS + 1)
−1 ǫ (5.1)
t′ ≤ t+ (qH + qS) O(tf ) (5.2)
and tf is an upper bound for the time needed to compute the image of a group
element under the permutation f .
Proof. The inverter I shown in the context of game GOW in Figure 5.1 achieves the
probability and time bounds in the statement. It simulates an environment for A
where it replaces the hash and signing oracles with versions of its own.
Game GOW :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
y $← G;
x← I(pk, y)
Adversary I(pk, y) :
pˆk← pk;
yˆ ← y;
j $← {0, . . . , q};
P ,L← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
return σ
Oracle H(m) :
if m /∈ dom(L) then
if |L| = j then h← yˆ
else r $← G; h← f(pˆk, r)
P ← (m, r) :: P ;
L← (m,h) :: L;
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
h← H(m);
return P [m]
Fig. 5.1. The inverter I in the context of the one-wayness game for the family of trapdoor
permutations (KGf , f, f
−1).
In order to stand a chance of forging a signature for a fresh message m, the
adversary A must ask for the hash value of m by querying oracle H . Otherwise,
the hash of m would be completely random an independent of the adversary’s
output, and thus the purported signature σ would only be valid with a negligible
probability. The inverter I tries to guess the query where the hash value of m is
asked for the first time. Let q def= qS + qH. The inverter first randomly chooses
an index j in {0, . . . , q} and then runs the forger intercepting its oracle queries.
The inverter answers to the j-th hash query (we index the queries from 0) with its
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own challenge y, and to the remaining hash queries with a random element in the
range of f with a known preimage; it stores this preimage in a list P . When the
adversary makes a signing query, the inverter first makes the corresponding hash
query itself and then obtains the preimage of the hash value under f from the list
P . The simulation is perfect provided the forger never asks the signature of the
message corresponding to the j-th hash query, because in this case its preimage
will not be in the list P . A sufficient condition for the simulation to be correct is
that the guess j be correct (i.e. m = M [j]), because m cannot appear in a signing
query (it must be fresh).
We can readily analyze the extra time the inverter spends in simulating the
environment for A in GOW. The only significant overhead is in the simulation of
the hash oracle H . For all but one hash query, the simulated oracle computes the
image under f of some element. The time bound (5.2) follows because the adversary
makes (either directly or indirectly, through the signing oracle) at most qH+qS hash
queries.
To prove that the probability bound in equation (5.1) holds, we will exhibit a
sequence of games relating the probability
ǫ′ = Pr
[
GOW : x = f
−1(sk, y)
]
of I successfully inverting f on a random challenge y, to the probability
ǫ = Pr [GEF : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S]
of adversary A forging a signature for a fresh message. For each game, the main
experiment is shown alongside the code of procedures in the environment; code
pieces that change with respect to the previous game in the sequence appear on a
gray background.
We start from the game GEF that encodes the existential forgery attack. In
this initial game, the hash oracle H is implemented as a random oracle whereas
the signing oracle is implemented as specified by the scheme. In order to be able
to encode the freshness condition on the message whose signature is forged, the
signing oracle is instrumented to record the queries it gets.
Game GEF :
(pk, sk)← KG();
L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m)
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← G; L← (m,h) :: L
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S; h← H(m);
return f−1(sk, h)
In game G1 we instrument the hash oracle to keep track of the indices of queries.
We use for this purpose a list M where we store the messages queried to the
hash oracle so far. Note that this is not really necessary because the value of M
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can be recovered at any given moment from the value of L. We only make this
instrumentation for convenience and to make the proof cleaner. We also introduce
the guess j that will be used later by the inverter. We sample j uniformly at
the end of the game so that its independence from the output of the adversary is
evident.
Game G1 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
M ← nil;
L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m);
j $← {0, . . . , q}
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← G;L← (m,h) :: L;
M ← m :: M
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S;h← H(m);
return f−1(sk, h)
Consider the predicate
Φ1
def
= |L| = |M | ∧ (∀m ∈ dom(L). ∃i < |M |. m = M [i])
We prove that
⊢ GEF ∼ G1 : true⇒ ={L,S,pk,m,σ,h} ∧Φ1〈2〉 (5.3)
Using the tactics wp and eqobs_in we construct the relational procedure informa-
tion for the oracles in the environment of both games. We then extend it auto-
matically to the adversary A to obtain the information ι that we need to prove the
equivalence. The script we use to prove (5.3) is just
deadcode ι; eqobs_ctxt ι; wp; ...
The tactic deadcode removes the random assignment to j in G1, while eqobs_ctxt
removes the common prefix and suffix in both games except for the instruction
L← nil because it affects the invariant Φ1〈2〉. The intermediate goal after applying
these first two tactics is
⊢ L← nil ∼M ,L← nil : ={pk,sk} ⇒ ={L} ∧Φ1〈2〉
The tactic wp is then used to compute the weakest relational pre-condition of ={L}
∧Φ1〈2〉 with respect to the two resulting program fragments; the ellipsis stands for
a straightforward script to prove that this weakest pre-condition holds. Games GEF
and G1 are thus equivalent on h, pk, σ, m, and S, which implies
Pr [GEF : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S] = Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S] (5.4)
Games GEF and G1 are also equivalent on all the variables appearing free in Ψ , so
that Ψ is a post-condition of G1 as well. Furthermore, since the game makes a last
hash call for m, m ∈ dom(L) is a post-condition of G1. We have that
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Ψ ∧ Φ1 ∧m ∈ dom(L) =⇒ ∃i ≤ q. m =M [i]
This means that there exists at least one index i in {0, . . . , q} such that m = M [i].
(In fact, there exists exactly one, but we do not need to prove this.) The probability
of j being one of such indices is at least (q + 1)−1 and is obviously independent of
the success of the forgery, thus
Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S]
q + 1
≤ Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m=M [j]] (5.5)
We apply now a semantics preserving transformation. Game G2 eagerly samples
the value yˆ that is given as answer to the j-th hash query, and that will later become
the challenge to the inverter.
Game G2 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
yˆ $← G;
j $← {0, . . . , q};
M ,L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m)
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
if |L| = j then h← yˆ
else h $← G;
L← (m,h) :: L;
M ← m :: M
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S;h← H(m);
return f−1(sk, h)
We obtain
⊢ G1 ≃
∅
{j,M ,L,S,pk,m,σ,h} G2
Therefore,
Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m =M [j]]
= Pr [G2 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m = M [j]]
(5.6)
In the next game we modify the way hash queries are computed. For all but
the j-th query we return the image under f of a uniformly sampled element in its
domain, and we store this element in a list P . This is a local change that does not
modify the distribution of the answers. Indeed, since f is a permutation we have
⊢ h $← G ≃∅{h} r
$← G;h← f(pk, r)
In preparation for the next transformation, we also introduce a flag bad to signal
whether the simulation failed, i.e. whether the adversary asked for the signature of
M [j].
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Game G3 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
yˆ $← G;
j $← {0, . . . , q};
P ← nil;
M ,L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m)
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
if |L| = j then h← yˆ
else r $← G; h← f(pk, r)
P ← (m, r) :: P ;
L← (m,h) :: L;
M ← m :: M
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S;h← H(m);
if m = M [j] then
bad← true;
return f−1(sk, h)
else return f−1(sk, h)
We prove the equivalence
⊢ G2 ∼ G3 : true⇒ ={j,M,L,S,pk,m,σ,h} ∧ (M [j] /∈ S =⇒ ¬bad)〈2〉
Hence
Pr [G2 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m =M [j]]
= Pr [G3 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m = M [j]]
(5.7)
In game G4 we modify the signing oracle so that if the signature of the message
M [j] is ever asked, instead of actually computing the preimage of its digest using
sk, the signing oracle simply returns the corresponding P -entry. This entry will
be undefined, but this poses no problem because as long as the guess j is correct
this piece of code is unreachable.
Game G4 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
yˆ $← G;
j $← {0, . . . , q};
P ← nil;
M ,L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m)
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
if |L| = j then h← yˆ
else r $← G; h← f(pk, r)
P ← (m, r) :: P ;
L← (m,h) :: L;
M ← m :: M
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S;h← H(m);
if m = M [j] then
bad← true;
return P [m]
else return f−1(sk, h)
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Games G3 and G4 differ only in a portion of code that appears after bad is set,
therefore they are syntactically equal up to the failure event bad. The Fundamental
Lemma gives us
Pr [G3 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m =M [j] ∧ ¬bad]
= Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m = M [j] ∧ ¬bad]
Since M [j] /∈ S =⇒ ¬bad is a post-condition of G3, it does not change anything
if we remove the last term ¬bad from the event under consideration,
Pr [G3 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m =M [j]]
= Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m = M [j] ∧ ¬bad]
≤ Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m = M [j]]
(5.8)
When answering a signing query for a message m 6= M [j], we may obtain the
preimage of its hash value from P rather than using f−1, as in game G5.
Game G5 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
yˆ $← G;
j $← {0, . . . , q};
P ,L← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
y ← yˆ;
x← σ
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
if |L| = j then h← yˆ
else r $← G; h← f(pk, r)
P ← (m, r) :: P ;
L← (m,h) :: L
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
h← H(m);
return P [m]
Define Φ4 as
∀m ∈ dom(L). m 6= M [j] =⇒ P [m] = f−1(sk,L[m]) ∧
(j ≤ |M | =⇒ L[M [j]] = yˆ)
We use Φ4 to prove that the signing oracles in games G4 and G5 are equivalent. To
this end we show that
⊢ G4 ∼ G5 : true⇒ ={yˆ,j,L,m,σ,h} ∧Φ4〈1〉
If m = M [j], then certainly j ≤ |M | when the game finishes. In this case, post-
condition Φ4 implies that h = L[M [j]] = yˆ, which in turn gives
Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S ∧m = M [j]] ≤ Pr
[
G5 : f
−1(sk, y) = x
]
(5.9)
We finally prove that ⊢ G5 ≃
∅
{sk,x,y} GOW. We need to inline the call to the inverter
I in GOW and use y instead of yˆ in G5. The proof script is straightforward,
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alloc_l yˆ y; sinline_r ι I.
eqobs_tl ι; deadcode; eqobs_in.
Using the above equivalence we derive
Pr
[
G5 : f
−1(sk, y) = x
]
= Pr
[
GOW : f
−1(sk, y) = x
]
(5.10)
Putting all the above results together, we conclude
Pr [GEF : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S]
q + 1
≤ Pr
[
GOW : f
−1(sk, y) = x
]
(5.11)
⊓⊔
A complete proof of asymptotic security follows trivially. Since f is a one-way
permutation family, Pr
[
GOW : f
−1(sk, y) = x
]
is negligible in the security parame-
ter provided I runs in PPT. This is indeed the case, and is proved automatically
in CertiCrypt. The number of queries q made by the forger to the hash and signing
oracles must necessarily be polynomial on the security parameter η. Since the prod-
uct of a negligible function and a polynomial is still a negligible function, it follows
from (5.11) that the probability of a successful existential forgery is negligible.
5.2 Improved Bound
A tighter security bound for FDH appears in [Coron 2000]; this bound is indepen-
dent of the number of hash queries. This is of much practical significance since
the number of hash values a real-world forger can compute is only limited by the
time and computational resources it invests, whereas the number of signatures it
gets could be limited by the owner of the private key. Once the owner of a key has
used it to sign a certain quantity of messages, he could simply discard that key and
generate a new one.
Theorem 5.4 (Improved bound). Assume the underlying trapdoor permutation
(KGf , f, f
−1) is homomorphic with respect to the group operation in its domain,
i.e. for every (pk, sk) that might be output by KGf , and every x, y, f(pk, x× y) =
f(pk, x) × f(pk, y). Let A be an adversary against the existential unforgeability
of FDH that makes at most qH and qS queries to the hash and signing oracles
respectively. Suppose A succeeds in forging a signature for a fresh message within
time t with probability ǫ during experiment GEF. Then, there exists an inverter I
that finds the preimage of an element uniformly drawn from the range of f with
probability ǫ′ within time t′ during experiment GOW, where
ǫ′ ≥
1
qS + 1
(
1−
1
qS + 1
)qS
ǫ (5.12)
t′ ≤ t+ (qH + qS) O(tf ) (5.13)
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These bounds hold for the inverter shown in Figure 5.2. The inverter first samples
q + 1 bits at random, choosing true with probability p and false with probability
(1− p), and stores them in a list T . It answers to the i-th hash query as follows: it
picks uniformly a value r from the domain of f and stores it in a list P , then replies
according to the i-th entry in T : if it is true, answers with y × f(pk,r) where y is
its challenge, if it is false answers with simply f(pk, r). In both cases the answers
are indistinguishable from those of a random function. When the adversary asks
for the signature of a message m, the inverter makes the corresponding hash query
itself and then answers with the m entry in the list P . The simulation is correct
provided the entries in T corresponding to messages appearing in signing queries
are false, because in this case the corresponding entries in P coincide with the
preimage of their hash value. The aim of the inverter is to inject its challenge in as
many hash queries as possible, while at the same time maximizing the probability of
the simulation being correct. The parameter p is left unspecified through the proof
and will be chosen later to find the best compromise between these two competing
goals.
Game GOW :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
y $← G;
x← I(pk, y)
Adversary I(pk, y) :
pk← pk;
yˆ ← y;
i← 0;
T ,P ,L← nil;
while |T | ≤ q do
b $← true⊕p false;
T ← b :: T
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m);
return σ × P [m]−1
Oracle H(m) :
if m /∈ dom(L) then
r $← G;
if T [i] = true then
h← yˆ × f(pk, r)
else h← f(pk, r)
P ← (m, r) :: P ;
L← (m,h) :: L;
i← i+ 1
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
h← H(m);
return P [m]
Fig. 5.2. The inverter I in the context of the one-wayness game for the family of trapdoor
permutations (KGf , f, f
−1). We use (true⊕p false) to denote a Bernoulli distribution with
success probability p, i.e. the discrete distribution that takes value true with probability
p and false with probability (1− p).
The success of the inverter is not guaranteed by the sole success of the forger.
It depends on two additional conditions: that the simulation is consistent, so that
the forger behaves as expected, and that the forgery can be used to compute the
preimage of the challenge y.
Let us analyze first the probability of the simulation being consistent. The forger
A must not be able to distinguish the simulation from the experiment in GEF. The
forger’s view, and in particular the distribution of the answers it gets from the hash
and signing oracles must be the same as in the original experiment. The responses
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of the simulated hash oracle are uniformly distributed, as in the original oracle.
However, the inverter might not be able to answer with consistent signatures to
every signing query made by the forger. The reason is that the inverter knows the
preimage of a message hash only if the hash was computed as f(pk, r) for a random
r, which occurs only if the corresponding entry in the list T has been chosen as
false. Note that we did not have this problem in the previous proof, because the
mere fact that the guess of the inverter is correct implied that all signing queries
could be consistently answered.
The forgery (m,σ) that A outputs can be used by the inverter to compute the
preimage of its challenge only if the hash of message m has been computed as
yˆ × f(pk, r) for a random r, which occurs only if the T -entry corresponding to
m has been chosen beforehand as true. Indeed, if that is the case and the forged
signature is correct, we have
f−1(sk, y) = f−1(sk,H(m))× r−1 = σ × r−1
We begin our sequence of games by bounding the probability of the above two
conditions. To this end, in game G1 we instrument the hash oracle to keep track of
the indices of queries. We add the initialization of list T at the end of the game,
so that it becomes part of the probability space and its independence from the rest
of the game is obvious.
G′1
InitT
Game G1 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
i← 0; I ← nil;
L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m);
T ← nil;
while |T | ≤ q do
b $← true⊕p false;
T ← b :: T
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
h $← G;L← (m,h) :: L;
I ← (m, i) :: I;
i← i+ 1
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S;h← H(m);
return f−1(sk, h)
We require that the forged signature σ verifies, but in addition that the entry in T
corresponding to m be true and that the entries corresponding to signing queries
be false,
success
def
= T [I[m]] ∧ ∀m′ ∈ S. ¬T [I[m′]] (5.14)
Observe that this condition alone implies the freshness of message m, we do not
need to state it explicitly. We would like to compute now a lower bound for
Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success] in terms of Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S]. This
would be a relatively easy task if the event success were independent of h = f(pk, σ),
but this is not the case. However, we have for any initial memory µ,
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Pr [G1, µ : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success]
= JG1K µ 1(h=f(pk,σ)∧success)
= JG′1K µ (λµ
′. JInitT K µ
′ (λµ′′. 1h=f(pk,σ) µ
′′ × 1success µ′′))
= JG′1K µ (λµ
′. 1(h=f(pk,σ)∧m/∈S) µ
′ × Pr [InitT , µ′ : success]))
(5.15)
Thus, computing the original probability is equivalent to measuring a function that
can be expressed as a product of two factors, one of which is the probability of
event success after initializing T in the intermediate memory µ′. The advantage of
doing this is that the second factor in the product is upper bounded by a constant
under some conditions on µ′ that we can prove to hold. Namely, we can show that
the following is a post-condition of the piece of code G′1
|L| ≤ q + 1 ∧ |S| ≤ qS ∧ ran(I) = [|L| − 1 .. 0] (5.16)
Furthermore, we can assume that m is not in S in memory µ′ because otherwise
the measured function would be null. Under this conditions, we will show that
p(1− p)qS ≤ Pr [InitT , µ
′ : success]
Consider the loop that initializes T ,
c def= while |T | ≤ q do (b $← true⊕p false; T ← b :: T )
and define
Fµ(i, n)
def
= if n < i then JT [i − n]K µ else p
Gµ(l, n)
def
=
∏
i∈l
if n < i then J¬T [i− n]K µ else 1− p
This may seem abstruse at first sight, but intuitively, Fµ(i, q − k) equals the prob-
ability of T [i] being true after executing InitT in a memory µ where |T | = k, while
Gµ(i, q − k) is a lower bound on the probability of ∀i ∈ l. ¬T [i]. We prove the
following invariant about the while loop c: for every index i and list of indices l
such that i /∈ l,
Fµ(i, q − |JT K µ|) Gµ(l, q − |JT K µ|) ≤ Pr [c, µ : T [i] ∧ ∀i ∈ l. ¬T [i]] (5.17)
For any memory µ satisfying (5.16) and where m /∈ S, if we take i = I[m] and
l = I[S], we obtain
p (1− p)qS ≤ Fµ(i, q) Gµ(l, q)
≤ Pr [InitT , µ : T [i] ∧ ∀i ∈ l. ¬T [i]]
= Pr [InitT , µ : success]
Since any intermediate memory µ′ in (5.15) satisfies (5.16), it follows from the above
inequality that
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p (1− p)qS Pr [GEF : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S]
= p (1− p)qS Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S]
≤ Pr [G1 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success]
(5.18)
In the next game, G2, we modify the hash oracle to answer to the i-th query
according to the corresponding entry in list T : the oracle samples a random element
r in the group, stores it in list P , and responds yˆ × f(pk, r) if T [i] is true, and
simply f(pk, r) otherwise. In this latter case, the inverse image of the hash value
can be recovered from P .
Game G2 :
yˆ $← G;
T ← nil;
while |T | ≤ q do
b $← true⊕p false;
T ← b :: T
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
i← 0; I ← nil;
P ,L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m)
Oracle H(m) :
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
r $← G;
if T [i] then h← yˆ × f(pk, r)
else h← f(pk, r)
P ← (m, r) :: P ;
L← (m,h) :: L;
I ← (m, i) :: I;
i← i+ 1
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) : . . .
Observe that the transformation of G1 into G2 can be justified by locally reasoning
on the code of the hash oracle, without needing to apply the lazy sampling technique
(as we had to do in the previous proof), thanks to the fact that f is a permutation
and f(pk, r) acts as a one-time pad,
⊢ h $← G ≃∅{h} r
$← G; h← yˆ × f(pk, r)
We now modify the way the signing oracle answers to a query m when the
corresponding entry T [I[m]] is true: instead of answering with a proper signature,
it answers with just P [m]. By using the Fundamental Lemma we will see that this
change does not modify the probability of the event that interests us.
Game G3 G4 :
yˆ $← G;
T ← nil;
while |T | ≤ q do
b $← true⊕p false;
T ← b :: T
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
i← 0; I ← nil;
P ,L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m)
Oracle H(m) : . . .
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S;h← H(m);
if T [I[m]] then
bad← true;
return f−1(sk, h) P [m]
else return f−1(sk, h)
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Game G3 is semantically identical to G2 (ignoring bad) and differs from G4 only in
a portion of code appearing after flag bad is set. Thus,
Pr [G3 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success ∧ ¬bad] = Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success ∧ ¬bad]
But since success =⇒ ¬bad is a post-condition of G3, it does not change anything
if we remove the last term ¬bad from the event under consideration,
Pr [G3 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success] = Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success ∧ ¬bad]
≤ Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success] (5.19)
The signing oracle might as well respond with P [m] to every query, regardless of
the value of T [I[m]],
Game G5 :
yˆ $← G;
T ← nil;
while |T | ≤ q do
b $← true⊕p false;
T ← b :: T
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
i← 0; I ← nil;
P ,L,S ← nil;
(m,σ)← A(pk);
h← H(m);
y ← yˆ;
x← σ × P [m]−1
Oracle H(m) : . . .
if m 6∈ dom(L) then
r $← G;
if T [i] then h← yˆ × f(pk, r)
else h← f(pk, r)
P ← (m, r) :: P ;
L← (m,h) :: L;
I ← (m, i) :: I;
i← i+ 1
return L[m]
Oracle Sign(m) :
S ← m :: S;h← H(m);
return P [m]
We can guarantee that the response given is a proper signature when T [I[m]] is
false by proving the following post-condition of game G5:
∀(m,h) ∈ L. T [I[m]] =⇒ h = yˆ × f(pk,P [m]) ∧
¬T [I[m]] =⇒ h = f(pk,P [m])
This allows us to show that the signing oracles in G4 and G5 are equivalent and,
using the homomorphic property of f , to show
Pr [G4 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success] = Pr [G5 : h = f(pk, σ) ∧ success]
≤ Pr [G5 : y × f(pk,P [m]) = f(pk, σ)]
= Pr
[
GOW : f
−1(sk, y) = x
]
Therefore, we can conclude
p (1− p)qS Pr [GEF : h = f(pk, σ) ∧m /∈ S] ≤ Pr
[
GOW : f
−1(sk, y) = x
]
We get the bound in the statement of the theorem by choosing p = (qS + 1)
−1,
which maximizes the factor p (1−p)qS . For this value of p, the factor approximates
exp(−1) q−1S for large values of qS.
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5.3 Practical Interpretation
If one accepts that it is reasonable to draw practical conclusions from a security
proof in the random oracle model, then the results above may be used to choose the
scheme parameters based on an estimate of the time needed to invert the underlying
trapdoor permutation.
The best known method to invert the RSA function is to factor its modulus.
The General Number Field Sieve (GNFS) [Lenstra and Jr. 1993] is currently the
most efficient way of factoring large composite integers like RSA moduli; it has been
used to factor several RSA moduli from the RSA Factoring Challenge, including
the 512-bit RSA-155 number and the largest (non-special) integer factored with
a general-purpose algorithm, the 768-bit RSA-768 number [Kleinjung et al. 2010].
On heuristic grounds, an odd composite number N can be factored using GNFS in
time sub-exponential with respect to its size in bits. Concretely, let
LN [α, β]
def
= exp((β + o(1)) log(N)
α log(log(N))1−α) (5.20)
where the constant term that accompanies β tends towards zero as N increases. A
good implementation of GNFS takes about LN [1/3, 1.923] time to factor a number
N . This heuristic cannot be used directly to estimate the number of operations
required to factor a certain N [Lenstra and Verheul 2001]. However, experimental
data suggests that it can be used for limited range extrapolation. If one knows,
empirically, that factoring an RSA modulus N using GNFS takes time t, then
factoring an RSA modulus M > N will take approximately time
t×
LM [1/3, 1.923]
LN [1/3, 1.923]
(5.21)
(omitting the constant term o(1)). If M ≫ N , however, the effect of the constant
term can no longer be ignored and the extrapolation will overestimate the time
needed to factor M .
The computational effort involved in the factorization of the 512-bit number
RSA-155 has been estimated at around 8400 MIPS-years1, or slightly less than 258
operations [Cavallar et al. 2000]. In comparison, the computational effort involved
in the factorization of the 768-bit number RSA-768 has been estimated at around
267 operations [Kleinjung et al. 2010]. Extrapolating from this estimate using (5.21),
we can make a rough prediction of the computational effort that would take to break
larger RSA moduli (Figure 5.3).
GNFS could factor a 1024-bit number in around 277 operations, and a 2048-
bit number in around 2107 operations. Assume some safe bounds for qH and qS,
qH ≤ 260, qS ≤ 220. To ensure that no forger within these bounds could forge a
RSA-FDH signature within t = 280 operations, one should pick an RSA modulus
such that factoring it takes at least qS(t+ (qH + qS)O(tRSA)) operations, otherwise
1 One MIPS-year is the equivalent of a computation running during a full year at a
sustained rate of one million instructions per second. Consumer desktop PCs at the
time of this writing attain speeds of up to 80,000 MIPS.
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Fig. 5.3. Estimates for the computational effort required to factor large RSA-moduli.
one can iterate the construction in Theorem 5.4 about qS times to invert the RSA
function in less time than using the GNFS algorithm. For a modulus of size k,
tRSA = O(k
2) when the public exponent is small. A 1024-bit modulus would not be
enough, but a 2048-bit modulus would do. In contrast, if one were to choose the
modulus according to the original security bound, even a 2048-bit modulus would
not suffice.
The above guidelines for selecting key sizes by extrapolation should be taken
with care. One should not forget that besides the fact that the analysis is based on
heuristic ground, we are ignoring the o(1) factor from (5.20). Shamir and Tromer
[2003] said to this respect:
“To determine what key sizes are appropriate for a given application, one
needs concrete estimates for the cost of factoring integers of various sizes.
Predicting these costs has proved notoriously difficult, for two reasons.
First, the performance of modern factoring algorithms is not understood
very well: their complexity analysis is often asymptotic and heuristic, and
leaves large uncertainty factors. Second, even when the exact algorithmic
complexity is known, it is hard to estimate the concrete cost of a suitable
hypothetical large-scale computational effort using current technology; it’s
even harder to predict what this cost would be at the end of the key’s
planned lifetime, perhaps a decade or two into the future.”
Even leaving aside the possibility of a breakthrough in number theory or the dis-
covery of a new factorization method that drastically improves on GNFS, there are
a myriad of tweaks and hardware optimizations that can be readily—or at least
hypothetically—applied to cut down the cost of factoring an RSA modulus using
GNFS. It is conjectured that it could be possible to factor 1024-bit integers, and
hence to break 1024-bit RSA keys, in 1 year using a special hardware device that
could be built at a cost of US$10M [Lenstra et al. 2003; Shamir and Tromer 2003].
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An earlier example of a signature scheme that follows the same hash-then-decrypt
pattern as FDH is the PKCS #1 scheme proposed by RSA Labs [RSA Data Security,
Inc. 2002]. The latest version of PKCS #1 uses the following message encoding as
a hash function
ENCODE(m, len) def= 00 ‖ 01 ‖ FF · · ·FF ‖ 00 ‖ h(m)
Enough FF bytes are inserted to reach the intended length len of the encoded
message. The value h(m) is (an encoding of) the digest of the message computed
using one of MD2, MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384 or SHA-512. The problem
with the above padding is that it does not map messages to the entire domain of
the RSA function, but instead to a much smaller set of encoded messages. As a
consequence, the scheme is not known to admit a security reduction to the standard
RSA problem.
The generic Full-Domain Hash signature scheme based on a one-way trapdoor
permutation was first described in the seminal work of Bellare and Rogaway [1993]
to illustrate the applicability of the Random Oracle Model. In that work, the
authors give in an appendix a sketch of a proof of its security against adaptive
chosen-message attacks. A more detailed proof of the exact security of the RSA-
based variant of FDH is given in [Bellare and Rogaway 1996,Theorem 3.1]; the
bound corresponds to the one we showed in Section 5.1. The bound we proved
in Section 5.2 is due to Coron [2000]. Unfortunately, it is not possible to further
improve the security bound of FDH and prove that computing a forgery is as hard
as inverting RSA. There is no tighter reduction than the one in Theorem 5.4 as
showed by Coron [2002].
Bellare and Rogaway [1996] proposed the Probabilistic Signature Scheme (PSS)
as a replacement for FDH; it has since then been incorporated into the PKCS #1
standard as an alternative signing method. PSS is roughly as efficient as FDH but
admits a tight security reduction. The Probabilistic FDH scheme (PFDH) [Coron
2002] is a simple probabilistic variant of FDH that follows the same design prin-
ciples as PSS and also admits a tight reduction, but at the cost of slightly longer
signatures. As FDH, PFDH uses a hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → G and a trapdoor
permutation f . Formally, PFDH is parametrized by the length k0 of the random
“salt” it uses, and is composed of the following triple of algorithms:
KG def= (pk, sk)← KGf ; return (pk, sk)
Sign(sk,m) def= r $← {0, 1}k0; return (f−1(sk,H(m ‖ r)), r)
Verify(pk,m, (σ, r)) def= if f(pk, σ) = H(m ‖ r) then return true else return false
Observe that FDH is obtained as a special case of this scheme by setting k0 = 0.
We have the following result about the security of PFDH.
Theorem 5.5. Let A be an adversary mounting a chosen-message existential
forgery attack against PFDH that makes at most qH queries to the hash oracle
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and at most qS ≤ 2k0 queries to the signing oracle. Suppose the adversary succeeds
in forging a signature for a fresh message with probability ǫ within time t. Then,
there exists an inverter I that finds the preimage of an element uniformly drawn
from the range of f with probability ǫ′ within time t′, where
ǫ′ ≥
(
1−
1
qS
)qS
ǫ ≈ exp(−1) ǫ
t′ ≤ t+ (qH + qS) O(tf ) + qH qS O(k0)
This means that when k0 ≥ log2(qS), the security of PFDH is tightly related to the
problem of inverting the underlying trapdoor permutation. If a shorter salt is used,
PFDH remains provably secure, but a tight reduction is not possible.
Katz and Wang [2003] describe yet another signature scheme that achieves a
tight reduction using a single bit as random salt. The random salt can be remove
altogether by computing this bit in a deterministic (but secret) way. This scheme
uses the same key generation procedure as FDH and PSS; the signature and veri-
fication algorithms are as follows,
Sign(sk,m) def= if m ∈ S then return S[m]
else b $← {0, 1}; σ ← f−1(sk,H(b ‖ m)); S[m]← σ;
return σ
Verify(pk,m, σ) def= if f(pk, σ) = H(0 ‖ m) ∨ f(pk, σ) = H(1 ‖ m)
then return true else return false
The signature algorithm is stateful: it will compute a signature for a message
only once and return the same signature subsequently. To avoid maintaining state
and remove the randomness, the bit b could be computed deterministically but
in a secret way from message m. To avoid computing two hash values during
verification, the bit b could be appended to the signature. We have the following
result about the security of the above scheme,
Theorem 5.6. Let A be an adversary mounting a chosen-message existential
forgery attack against the Katz-Wang scheme that makes at most qH queries to
the hash oracle and at most qS queries to the signing oracle. Suppose the adversary
succeeds in forging a signature for a fresh message with probability ǫ within time t.
Then, there exists an inverter I that finds the preimage of an element uniformly
drawn from the range of f with probability ǫ′ within time t′, where
ǫ′ ≥
1
2
ǫ
t′ ≤ t+ (qH + qS + 1) O(tf )
Using just one random bit we have cut down the gap between the security of the
scheme and the problem of inverting f by a factor of qS !
The impossibility of finding a tight reduction from the security of a scheme
to a hard problem does not necessarily mean that we should deem the scheme as
insecure. It could be the case that the hard problem is not general enough, or
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maybe a slightly modified version of the scheme would admit a tight reduction. Or
perhaps the protocol is indeed secure for practical matters, even though a tight
reduction does not exist. The absence of a tight reduction for RSA-FDH does not
mean that its security is only loosely related to the RSA problem. The result about
the Katz-Wang scheme described above suggests exactly the contrary. In fact, it is
easy to see that the security of RSA-FDH is equivalent to the following problem:
You are given an RSA modulus N and its public exponent e, just as in the
standard RSA problem. You are also given a set {y1, . . . , yq} of q values
uniformly sampled from ZN . At any time you may chose a value yi and
get its e-th root modulo N , i.e. a solution xi to x
e
i ≡ yi(mod N); you may
chose up to qS of such values. Your goal is to compute the e-th root modulo
N of one of the remaining yi values.
It is hard to imagine how this problem could be any easier than solving the standard
RSA problem.
Using CryptoVerif [Blanchet 2006], Blanchet and Pointcheval [2006] gave an
alternative formal proof of the security of FDH against existential forgery under
adaptive chosen-message attacks. This work has stirred considerable interest and
shown the benefits of machine-checked verification. It also exposed one major
weakness of CryptoVerif: it deviates from the style that is natural to cryptographers
since it is difficult to recover a reductionist argument from the proof trace that the
prover outputs, and even if one manages to do so, most likely the reduction will not
be optimal. Indeed, only the original, suboptimal bound of Bellare and Rogaway
has been proved in CryptoVerif.
Our machine-checked proofs follow quite closely the pen-and-paper game-based
proofs of FDH (cf. [Pointcheval 2005]). There is however one important difference:
in order to justify local transformations, machine-checked proofs must make in-
variants explicit and establish formally their validity. Proving that invariants hold
constitutes a fair amount of work. More generally, machine-checked proofs must
justify all reasoning, including reasoning about side conditions and about elemen-
tary mathematics (groups, probabilities) in terms of basic definitions. In contrast
to game transformations, for which suitable tactics have been designed, this form
of reasoning is not always amenable to automation, and thus accounts for a sub-
stantial amount of the effort and of the size of the proofs. Indeed, we estimate that
about a third of the proof scripts are devoted to facts about probabilities. In spite
of this, the size of machine-checked proofs remains reasonable: the formalizations of
Bellare-Rogaway and Coron proofs are about 3,000 lines each. While the length of
our proofs might look prohibitive in comparison to published proofs, we expect that
machine-checked proofs will shrink substantially as CertiCrypt (and its underlying
libraries) mature.
It must be noted that much of the proof lies outside of the trusted base: in
order to trust the proofs of FDH, it is sufficient to trust our formalization of the
scheme and of the security statement, the formalization of probabilistic programs
provided by CertiCrypt, and the proof checker of Coq. In particular, trusting the
proofs of FDH does not require trusting the sequence of games, nor the proofs of
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transitions, nor the proofs of invariants. In this respect, CertiCrypt provides the
highest possible level of assurance for the security of a cryptographic scheme, and
breaks the symmetry between the effort of writing and checking a cryptographic
proof. Both usually require a lot of expertise in cryptography, a lot of time, and a
good understanding of the proof; in contrast, it is rather immediate and simple for
a third party to check a proof in CertiCrypt.
6
Ciphertext Indistinguishability of OAEP
W
hen we first discussed in Chapter 1 the definition of semantic security for
public-key encryption schemes we observed that in order to achieve this no-
tion of security an encryption scheme must be necessarily probabilistic. A deter-
ministic asymmetric encryption scheme cannot be semantically secure because an
adversary could trivially decide whether a given ciphertext is the encryption of a
plaintext by encrypting the plaintext and comparing the resulting ciphertext to the
one it was given. It is possible, however, to use a deterministic encryption scheme as
a building block to construct a semantically secure probabilistic encryption scheme.
The following definition gives a general way to construct a probabilistic encryption
scheme from any family of trapdoor permutations.
Definition 6.1 (Padding-based encryption scheme). Let µ, ρ, k : N → N be
three functions such that ∀η. µ(η) + ρ(η) ≤ k(η). Consider a family of mappings
πη : {0, 1}µ(η)+ρ(η) → {0, 1}k(η)
πˆη : {0, 1}k(η) → {0, 1}µ(η) ∪ {⊥}
such that πη is injective and the following consistency condition is satisfied
∀η. m ∈ {0, 1}µ(η), r ∈ {0, 1}ρ(η). πˆη(πη(m ‖ r)) = m
Then, given a family of trapdoor permutations (KGf , f, f−1) on {0, 1}k(η), one can
construct a probabilistic padding-based encryption scheme (KG, E ,D) as follows:
• Given η : N, the key generation algorithm KG(η) runs the key generation al-
gorithm KGf (η) of the family of trapdoor permutations and returns the pair of
keys (pk, sk) that it obtains as result. We assume that the description of (πη, πˆη)
is public, so there is no need to return it as part of the key generation process.
• Given a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}µ(η) the encryption algorithm
E(pk,m) chooses a uniformly random bitstring r ∈ {0, 1}ρ(η) and returns a
ciphertext computed as f(pk, πη(m ‖ r)) ∈ {0, 1}k(η).
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• Given a secret key sk and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}k(η), the decryption algorithm
D(sk, c) returns m = πˆη(f
−1(sk, c)), which is either a message in {0, 1}µ(η) or
the special symbol ⊥, meaning that the ciphertext is invalid.
Many public-key encryption schemes can be viewed as particular instances of the
above construction, including OAEP [Bellare and Rogaway 1994] and its variants
OAEP+ [Shoup 2001], SAEP, SAEP+ [Boneh 2001], and REACT [Okamoto and
Pointcheval 2001b]. In this chapter we will discuss the security of OAEP.
Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) [Bellare and Rogaway 1994]
is a prominent public-key encryption scheme based on trapdoor permutations, most
commonly used in combination with the RSA and Rabin functions. OAEP is widely
deployed; many variants of OAEP are recommended by several standards, including
IEEE P1363, PKCS, ISO 18033-2, ANSI X9, CRYPTREC and SET. Yet, the his-
tory of OAEP security is fraught with difficulties. The original paper of Bellare and
Rogaway [1994] proves that, under the hypothesis that the underlying trapdoor per-
mutation family is one-way, OAEP is semantically secure under chosen-ciphertext
attacks. Shoup [2001] discovered later that this proof only established the security of
OAEP against non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA), and not, as was
believed at that time, against the stronger version of ciphertext indistinguishability
that allows the adversary to adaptively obtain the decryption of ciphertexts of its
choice (IND-CCA2). In response, Shoup suggested a modified scheme, secure against
adaptive attacks under the one-wayness of the underlying permutation, and gave a
proof of the adaptive security of the original scheme when it is used in combination
with RSA with public exponent e = 3. Simultaneously, Fujisaki et al. [2004] proved
that OAEP in its original formulation is indeed secure against adaptive attacks, but
under the assumption that the underlying permutation family is partial-domain
one-way. Since for the particular case of RSA this latter assumption is no stronger
than (full-domain) one-wayness, this finally established the adaptive IND-CCA2 se-
curity of RSA-OAEP. Unfortunately, when one takes into account the additional
cost of reducing the problem of inverting RSA to the problem of partially-inverting
it, the security bound becomes less attractive. We note that there exist variants of
OAEP that admit more efficient reductions when used in combination with the RSA
and Rabin functions, notably SAEP, SAEP+ [Boneh 2001], and alternative schemes
with tighter generic reductions, e.g. REACT [Okamoto and Pointcheval 2001b].
Here we focus on a machine-checked proof of the IND-CPA security of OAEP
in the random oracle model, with a security bound that improves on the bound of
Bellare and Rogaway [2006] game-based proof. We report as well on a significantly
more challenging machine-checked proof of the IND-CCA2 security of OAEP in the
random oracle model.
OAEP uses as a padding scheme a two-round Feistel network based on two
hash functions G,H , and is commonly used together with the RSA and Rabin
permutations. Figure 6.1 shows the Feistel network representation of the padding
mappings (π, πˆ) used in OAEP for encryption and decryption.
During encryption, a message m ∈ {0, 1}µ is first padded with enough zeros
to obtain a bitstring of length k − ρ, which is then fed to the encryption Feistel
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Fig. 6.1. Feistel network representation of the padding scheme used in OAEP for encryp-
tion (left) and decryption (right).
network together with a random bitstring r ∈ {0, 1}ρ; the ciphertext is the image
under f of the resulting bitstring. To decrypt a ciphertext c, first compute its
preimage f−1(sk, c) to obtain a bitstring of length k, and then run it through the
reverse Feistel network to obtain a bitstring (m ‖ z) ∈ {0, 1}k−ρ. If z is not the all-
zero bitstring, the ciphertext is rejected as invalid, otherwise, m is returned as its
decryption. For concreteness, let us write down the definition of the OAEP scheme
for a generic trapdoor permutation.
Definition 6.2 (OAEP encryption scheme). Let (KGf , f, f
−1) be a family of
trapdoor permutations on {0, 1}k, and let
G : {0, 1}ρ → {0, 1}k−ρ H : {0, 1}k−ρ → {0, 1}ρ
be two hash functions, with ρ + µ < k. Let k1 = k − ρ − µ. The OAEP scheme is
composed of the following triple of algorithms:
KG(η) def= (pk, sk)← KGf (η); return (pk, sk)
E(pk,m) def= r $← {0, 1}ρ; s← G(r)⊕(m‖0k1); t← H(s)⊕ r; return f(pk, s‖ t)
D(sk, c) def= (s ‖ t)← f−1(sk, c); r ← t⊕H(s); m← s⊕G(r);
if [m]k1 = 0
k1 then return [m]µ else return ⊥
where [x]n (resp. [x]
n) denotes the n least (resp. most) significant bits of x.
The way padding is handled plays a crucial role in the proof of IND-CCA2
security of the scheme in the random oracle model that we describe in Section 6.2.
To prove that OAEP is IND-CCA2 secure, it is necessary to devise an efficient way
to simulate the decryption oracle without having the trapdoor to the underlying
permutation. It turns out that there is an efficient way to simulate the decryption
oracle from the history of queries that an adversary made to the hash oracles G
and H . Suppose the adversary queries the decryption oracle with a ciphertext
c = f(s ‖ t), then there are two possibilities:
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1. Either s has been queried to H and r = H(s)⊕ t has been queried to G. In that
case, the corresponding plaintext can be found by inspecting the list of queries
(r′, G(r′)), (s′, H(s′)) made to G and H respectively. For each pair of queries,
check whether c coincides with f(pk, s′ ‖ (H(s′)⊕ r′)) and the (k− ρ−µ) least
significant bits of G(r′) ⊕ s′ are all zeros. If one such pair of queries is found,
the µ most significant bits of G(r′)⊕ s′ form the corresponding plaintext;
2. Or else there is only a minute chance that the ciphertext be valid because it
depends on a uniformly random value (either one of G(r) and H(s), or both).
If the permutation is partial-domain one-way, the ciphertext may be safely
rejected as invalid.
6.1 Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attacks
Unsurprisingly, padding does not play any role in the proof of semantic security,
because there is no need to simulate the decryption oracle. Therefore, in the rest
of this section we assume without loss of generality that µ = k − ρ.
Theorem 6.3 (IND-CPA security of OAEP). Let A be an adversary against
the semantic security of OAEP under chosen-message attacks that makes at most qG
queries to the hash oracle G and at most qH queries to H. Suppose this adversary
succeeds in guessing the hidden bit b with probability ǫ within time t. Then, there
exists an inverter I that finds the preimage of an element uniformly drawn from
the domain of the permutation f with probability ǫ′ within time t′, where
ǫ′ ≥ ǫ−
(
1
2
+
qG
2ρ
)
(6.1)
t′ ≤ t+ qG qH O(tf ) (6.2)
and tf is an upper bound for the time needed to compute the image of a bitstring
under f .
Proof. We claim that the inverter I shown in the context of game GOW in Figure 6.2
achieves the probability and time bounds in (6.1) and (6.2). The inverter runs the
adversary A in a simulated environment. It intercepts queries to the hash oracles
G and H and answers exactly as a random oracle would do, but keeps record of the
queries and their responses. Instead of computing the challenge ciphertext to the
IND-CPA adversary as an LR-oracle would do in the real IND-CPA game, it replaces
the challenge ciphertext with its own challenge y. When adversary A halts, the
inverter I inspects the history of queries that were made to the hash oracles G
and H and tries to reconstruct a preimage of its challenge y under f . It turns out
that the probability that the inverter succeeds in reconstructing such a preimage is
closely related to the probability with which adversary A wins the IND-CPA game.
The upper bound on the execution time of the inverter can be justified by
examining just the game GOW. The only non-constant overhead incurred is in the
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Game GOW :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
y $← {0, 1}k;
x← I(pk, y)
Adversary I(pk, y) :
L,M ← nil;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b˜← A2(y);
if ∃r ∈ dom(L), (s, h) ∈M .
f(pk, s ‖ h⊕ r) = y
then return s ‖ (h⊕ r)
else return 0k
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) ::M
return M [s]
Fig. 6.2. The inverter I in the context of the one-wayness game for the family of trapdoor
permutations (KGf , f, f
−1).
reconstruction of the preimage of the challenge by inspecting the history of queries.
In the worst case, it amounts to qH computations of the permutation f for each of
the qG queries, from which (6.2) follows directly.
To prove that the inverter achieves the probability bound (6.1), we will exhibit
a sequence of games relating the probability
ǫ′ = Pr
[
GOW : x = f
−1(sk, y)
]
of I successfully inverting f on its challenge y, to the probability
ǫ = Pr
[
GINDCPA : b = b˜
]
of the adversary A correctly guessing the value of the hidden bit b in the IND-CPA
game. We start from the IND-CPA game where oracles G and H are implemented
as random oracles—this is justified by the random oracle model.
Game GINDCPA :
(pk, sk)← KG();
L,M ← nil;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
y ← E(pk,mb);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
The hypothesis on the bound on the number of queries the adversary makes to G
can be readily encoded as:
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Pr [GINDCPA : |L| ≤ qG] = 1
In the following game, we inline the key generation and the encryption ofmb, which
uses a random seed rˆ, and we eagerly sample the response that the random oracle
G gives back if rˆ is ever queried:
Game G1 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
gˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
g ← G(rˆ); s← g ⊕mb;
h← H(s); t← h⊕ r;
y ← f(pk, s ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
if r = rˆ then g ← gˆ
else g $← {0, 1}k−ρ
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
The resulting game G1 is semantically equivalent to the initial game, and thus we
have
Pr
[
GINDCPA : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G1 : b = b˜
]
(6.3)
Our objective is now to eliminate gˆ from the code of the oracle G, because if we
manage to do so, we will be able to make s completely random and remove the
dependency of y on b.
In the next game we modify the oracle G so that if rˆ is ever queried, a flag bad
is set to true and the answer is not recorded in the oracle memory.
Game G2 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
gˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
s← gˆ ⊕mb;
h← H(s); t← h⊕ rˆ;
y ← f(pk, s ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ then
bad← true; return gˆ
else
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
In order to justify this transformation, we define the following relational invariant:
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φ12
def
= (rˆ ∈ dom(L) =⇒ L[rˆ] = gˆ)〈1〉 ∧ (∀r. r 6= rˆ〈1〉 =⇒ L[r]〈1〉 = L[r]〈2〉)
The above invariant allows us to prove that oracle G answers queries in the same
way in games G1 and G2. We prove that this invariant is established after L is
initialized in G1 and G2, and that the implementations of G and H preserve it. We
know from the fact that A is well-formed that it cannot directly modify the global
variables L, rˆ, and gˆ. Therefore, the invariant φ12 is preserved through calls to the
adversary. We then inline the call to G in the body of game G1. At this point the
invariant holds and either the adversary A has already queried rˆ, in which case it
follows from the invariant that the answer to the call is gˆ, or it has never queried
rˆ, in which case the same follows directly by applying dead code elimination and
constant propagation. Hence,
Pr
[
G1 : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G2 : b = b˜
]
(6.4)
We will now use the Fundamental Lemma to remove gˆ altogether from the code
of oracle G. We define a game G3 syntactically identical up to bad to the previous
game.
Game G3 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
gˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
s← gˆ ⊕mb;
h← H(s); t← h⊕ rˆ;
y ← f(pk, s ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ then
bad← true;
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
else
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) : . . .
It follows from the Fundamental Lemma that∣∣∣Pr [G2 : b = b˜]− Pr [G3 : b = b˜]∣∣∣ ≤ Pr [G3 : bad] (6.5)
Since gˆ no longer appears in G, we can now sample it later in the game. We also
simplify the implementation of oracle G for the sake of readability by coalescing
the portion of code appearing in both branches of the conditional.
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Game G4 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
gˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
s← gˆ ⊕mb;
h← H(s); t← h⊕ rˆ;
y ← f(pk, s ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ then bad← true
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
We have
Pr
[
G3 : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G4 : b = b˜
]
(6.6)
Pr [G3 : bad] = Pr [G4 : bad] (6.7)
We make now a transformation that relies on algebraic properties of the exclu-
sive or operator: instead of sampling gˆ and defining s in terms of it, we can sample
s and define gˆ in terms of s. This is justified by the following program equivalence:
⊢ gˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ; s← gˆ ⊕mb ≃
{mb}
{gˆ,s,mb}
s $← {0, 1}k−ρ; gˆ ← s⊕mb
This transformation is sometimes called optimistic sampling and is a pattern that
appears recurrently in game-based proofs; we gave a proof using the relational
Hoare logic in Section 3.2.2.
We can now eliminate the assignment to gˆ as dead code, and sample s at the
beginning of the game. Since y no longer depends on the hidden bit b, we can
sample b at the end of the game. The resulting game G5 is:
Game G5 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
s $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
h← H(s); t← h⊕ rˆ;
y ← f(pk, s ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y);
b $← {0, 1}
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ then bad← true
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
We have Pr [G4 : bad] = Pr [G5 : bad]. It is obvious that, in the above game, b˜ and
b are independent and thus
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Pr
[
G4 : b = b˜
]
= Pr
[
G5 : b = b˜
]
=
1
2
(6.8)
The objective now is to bound the probability of bad being set. We no longer
care about b, so we remove the instruction sampling it. We reallocate s to a global
variable sˆ and we eagerly sample the value of H(sˆ).
Game G6 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
h← H(sˆ); t← h⊕ rˆ;
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ then bad← true
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
if s = sˆ then h← hˆ
else h $← {0, 1}ρ
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
We then modify oracle H so that it does not record the answer in its memory
if sˆ is ever queried, and we inline the call to H in the body of the game. To prove
that this modification to H is transparent to the adversary we prove the following
relational invariant between G6 and G7:
(sˆ ∈ dom(M ) =⇒ M [sˆ] = hˆ)〈1〉 ∧ (∀s. s 6= sˆ〈1〉 =⇒ M [s]〈1〉 = M [s]〈2〉)
Game G7 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
t← hˆ⊕ rˆ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ then bad← true
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s = sˆ then return hˆ
else if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
Thus
Pr [G5 : bad] = Pr [G6 : bad] = Pr [G7 : bad] (6.9)
We then revert to the previous implementation of oracle H , which stores the
answer to a query sˆ in its memory. This allows us to bound the probability of bad
being set by analyzing two different cases:
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1. either the adversary queried sˆ to H before bad is set, in which case we set a
flag bad1;
2. or it did not, in which case we set a flag bad2.
Game G8 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
t← hˆ⊕ rˆ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ then
if sˆ ∈ dom(M)
then bad1 ← true
else bad2 ← true
. . .
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
if s = sˆ then h← hˆ
else h $← {0, 1}ρ
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
We prove the following relational invariant between G7 and G8:
bad〈1〉 =⇒ (bad1 ∨ bad2)〈2〉
Hence we have by the union bound,
Pr [G7 : bad] ≤ Pr [G8 : bad1 ∨ bad2] ≤ Pr [G8 : bad1] + Pr [G8 : bad2] (6.10)
We split the sequence of games and bound bad1 and bad2 separately; we deal with
bad1 first.
We slice the assignment to bad2 off the code of G, we apply again the optimistic
sampling transformation to sample t instead of rˆ, and we reallocate t, y and pk to
global variables, obtaining:
Game P1 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
tˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
rˆ ← hˆ⊕ tˆ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ ∧ sˆ ∈ dom(M ) then
bad1 ← true
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
if s = sˆ then h← hˆ
else h $← {0, 1}ρ
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
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We now replace the condition under which bad1 is set to true by an equivalent one.
We prove that P1 satisfies the invariant
(∀(s, h) ∈M . s = sˆ =⇒ h = hˆ) ∧ (rˆ = hˆ⊕ tˆ ∧ y = f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ))
From this invariant we have that
r = rˆ ∧ sˆ ∈ dom(M ) ⇐⇒ ∃(s, h) ∈M . f(pk, s ‖ (h⊕ r)) = y
Therefore we can reformulate the condition under which bad1 is set in G, and
remove rˆ since it is no longer used.
Game P2 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
tˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if ∃(s, h) ∈M .
f(pk, s ‖ h⊕ r) = y then
bad1 ← true
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
if s = sˆ then h← hˆ
else h $← {0, 1}ρ
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
We have
Pr [G8 : bad1] = Pr [P1 : bad1] = Pr [P2 : bad1] (6.11)
Next, we revert H to the original random oracle implementation and we slice
away hˆ as dead code. In the resulting game sˆ and tˆ are used only to compute y =
f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ). Since sˆ and tˆ are uniformly sampled bitstrings, their concatenation
is uniformly distributed, and since f is a permutation, the value of y is uniformly
distributed. This reasoning is summarized in the following program equivalence
⊢ sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ; tˆ $← {0, 1}ρ; y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ) ≃
{pk}
{pk,y} y
$← {0, 1}k
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Game P3 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
y $← {0, 1}k;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if ∃(s, h) ∈M .
f(pk, s ‖ h⊕ r) = y then
bad1 ← true
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
We now revert G to its original implementation and prove the following relational
invariant between P3 and P4 which gives a necessary condition for bad1 to be set:
bad1〈1〉 =⇒ (∃r ∈ dom(L), (s, h) ∈M . f(pk, s ‖ (h⊕ r)) = y)〈2〉
Thus,
Pr [P3 : bad1] ≤ Pr [P4 : ∃r ∈ dom(L), (s, h) ∈M . f(pk, s ‖ (h⊕ r)) = y] (6.12)
Game P4 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
y $← {0, 1}k;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
We reallocate variables pk and y to local variables, and at the end of the game
compute x as the inverter in Figure 6.2 would do.
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Game P5 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
y $← {0, 1}k;
L,M ← nil;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b˜← A2(y);
if ∃r ∈ dom(L), (s, h) ∈M .
f(pk, s ‖ h⊕ r) = y
then x← s ‖ (h⊕ r)
else x← 0k
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
Compare this last game to game GOW in Figure 6.2: both games semantically
equivalent once the call to I in GOW is inlined. Furthermore,
Pr [P4 : ∃r ∈ dom(L), (s, h) ∈M . f(pk, s ‖ (h⊕ r)) = y]
≤ Pr
[
P5 : x = f
−1(sk, y)
]
= Pr
[
GOW : x = f
−1(sk, y)
] (6.13)
From (6.11)–(6.13) we get
Pr [G8 : bad1] ≤ Pr
[
GOW : x = f
−1(sk, y)
]
(6.14)
We are now left with the problem of bounding bad2 in game G8. Define the
game Q parametrized by two instructions c1 and c2 as follows
Game Q(c1, c2) :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
t← hˆ⊕ rˆ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ t);
b˜← A2(y)
Oracle G(r) :
if r = rˆ ∧ sˆ /∈ dom(M ) then
bad2 ← true
. . .
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
if s = sˆ ∧ bad2 then
bad2,bad3 ← true; c1
if s = sˆ ∧ ¬bad2 then
bad4 ← true; c2
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
Flag bad3 is set when sˆ is first queried to H and G(rˆ) has already been queried.
Flag bad4 is set when sˆ is first queried to H and G(rˆ) has not yet been queried.
Consider the games
Q1
def
= Q(h← hˆ , h← hˆ)
Q2
def
= Q(h $← {0, 1}ρ, h← hˆ)
Q3
def
= Q(h $← {0, 1}ρ, h $← {0, 1}ρ)
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Using the fundamental lemma together with appropriate progam invariants, we
obtain
Pr [G8 : bad2] = Pr [Q1 : bad2]
= Pr [Q2 : bad2] (FL, bad2)
= Pr [Q2 : bad2 ∧ bad4] + Pr [Q2 : bad2 ∧ ¬bad4]
= Pr [Q2 : bad2 ∧ bad4] + Pr [Q3 : bad2 ∧ ¬bad4] (FL, bad4)
= 0 + Pr [Q3 : bad2 ∧ ¬bad4] (bad4=⇒¬bad2)
= Pr [Q3 : bad2 ∧ bad4] + Pr [Q3 : bad2 ∧ ¬bad4] (bad4=⇒¬bad2)
= Pr [Q3 : bad2]
We use optimistic sampling and the fact that f is a permutation to prove the
following equivalence:
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
t← hˆ⊕ rˆ;
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ t)
≃∅{rˆ,y}
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
t $← {0, 1}ρ;
hˆ← t⊕ rˆ;
y ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ t)
≃∅{rˆ,y}
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
y $← {0, 1}k;
In the next game, we apply the above equivalence and we revert oracles G and H
to the original random oracles,
Game Q4 :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
L,M ← nil;
y $← {0, 1}k;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b˜← A2(y);
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(L) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
L← (r, g) :: L
return L[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(M) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
M ← (s, h) :: M
return M [s]
If bad2 is set to true in Q3 then rˆ must be in L, i.e. the following is a relational
invariant of Q3 and Q4,
bad2〈1〉 =⇒ (rˆ ∈ dom(L))〈2〉
and we can readily bound the probability of rˆ being in the domain of L in Q4
because we know that the adversary makes at most qG calls to G,
Pr [G8 : bad2] = Pr [Q3 : bad2] ≤ Pr [Q4 : rˆ ∈ dom(L)] ≤
qG
2ρ
(6.15)
Putting (6.10), (6.14) and (6.15) together,
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Pr [G7 : bad] ≤ Pr
[
GOW : x = f
−1(sk, y)
]
+
qG
2ρ
(6.16)
Finally from (6.3)–(6.9) and (6.16),∣∣∣∣Pr [GINDCPA : b = b˜]− 12
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Pr [GOW : x = f−1(sk, y)]+ qG2ρ (6.17)
From which follows the bound (6.1). ⊓⊔
6.2 Indistinguishability under Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
We use as a starting point the proof of Pointcheval [2005], which fills several gaps
in the reduction of Fujisaki et al. [2004], resulting in a weaker security bound.
Our proof unveils minor glitches in the proof of Pointcheval [2005] and marginally
improves on its exact security bound (reducing the coefficients) by performing an
aggressive analysis of oracle queries earlier in the sequence of games. The initial
and final games of the reduction appear in Figure 6.3; the proof in CertiCrypt is
about 10,000 lines long.
Theorem 6.4 (IND-CCA2 security of OAEP). Let A be an adversary against
the ciphertext indistinguishability of OAEP under an adaptive chosen-ciphertext
attack that makes at most qG and qH queries to the hash oracles G and H, respec-
tively, and at most qD queries to the decryption oracle D.1 Suppose A achieves an
advantage ǫ within time t during game GINDCCA. Then, there exists an inverter I
that finds a partial preimage (the k − ρ most significant bits of a preimage) of an
element uniformly drawn from the domain of f with probability ǫ′ within time t′
during experiment GPDOW, where
t′ ≤ t+ qG qH qD O(tf ) ǫ
′ ≥
1
qH
(
ǫ−
3qDqG + q
2
D + 4qD + qG
2ρ
−
2qD
2k1
)
6.2.1 Proof Outline
Figure 6.4 outlines the structure of the proof; the first step from GINDCCA to G1
and the final step from G5 to GPDOW are not displayed. The reduction successively
eliminates all situations in which the plaintext extractor used by the inverter to
simulate decryption may fail.
Starting from game GINDCCA, we use the logic of swapping statements to fix the
hash gˆ that G gives in response to the random seed of the challenge ciphertext; the
computation of the challenge ciphertext unfolds to:
1 The machine-checked proof slightly relaxes this condition; it requires that the length of
LG be at most qD+ qG, so that the adversary could trade queries to D for queries to G.
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Game GINDCCA :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk)← KG();
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
cˆ← E(mb);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
LG ← (r, g) :: LG
return LG[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(LH) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
LH ← (s, h) :: LH
return LH [s]
Oracle D(c) :
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD;
(s, t)← f−1(sk, c);
h← H(s);
r ← t⊕ h;
g ← G(r);
if [s⊕ g]k1 = 0
k1 then
return [s⊕ g]µ
else return ⊥
Game GPDOW :
(pk, sk)← KGf ();
s $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
t $← {0, 1}ρ;
s˜← I(pk, f(pk, s ‖ t))
Adversary I(pk, y) :
LG,LH ← nil;
pˆk ← pk;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b˜← A2(y);
s $← dom(LH);
return s
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
g $← {0, 1}k−ρ;
LG ← (r, g) :: LG
return LG[r]
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(LH) then
h $← {0, 1}ρ;
LH ← (s, h) :: LH
return LH [s]
Oracle D(c) :
if ∃(s, h) ∈ LH , (r, g) ∈ LG.
c = f(pˆk, s‖(r ⊕ h)) ∧
[s⊕ g]k1 = 0
k1
then return [s⊕ g]µ
else return ⊥
Fig. 6.3. Initial and final games in the reduction of the IND-CCA2 security of OAEP
to the problem of partially inverting the underlying permutation. We exclude cheating
adversaries who query the decryption oracle with the challenge ciphertext during the
second phase of the experiment by requiring (true, cˆ) /∈ LD to be a post-condition of the
initial game.
rˆ $← {0, 1}ρ;
sˆ← gˆ ⊕ (mb ‖ 0k1);
hˆ← H(sˆ);
tˆ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ)
where gˆ is sampled from {0, 1}k−ρ before the first call to A. We then make G
respond to an adversary query rˆ with a freshly sampled value instead of gˆ; this only
makes a difference if flag bad is set in game G1. Since at this point gˆ is uniformly
distributed and independent from the adversary’s view, the value sˆ computed as
gˆ⊕(mb ‖ 0k1) is as well uniformly distributed and independent from the adversary’s
view. This removes the dependence of the adversary output on the hidden bit b,
and thus the probability of a correct guess is exactly 1/2. Using the Fundamental
Lemma we obtain the bound:
Pr
[
GIND-CCA2 : b˜ = b
]
− Pr
[
G1 : b˜ = b
]
= Pr
[
GIND-CCA2 : b˜ = b
]
−
1
2
≤ Pr [G1 : bad] (6.18)
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Pr [G1 : bad] ≤ Pr [G2 : bad] +
q2
D
+ qDqG + qD
2ρ
+
qD
2k1
Inline G and case analysis on s ∈ dom(LH )
in D. Reject ciphertexts with a fresh g or h
Pr [G2 : bad] ≤ Pr [G3 : bad] +
qD
2k1
Eliminate assignments to LG in D
Update D to enforce new bound on LG
Game G1 :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk) ← KGf ();
rˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
(m0,m1) ← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
hˆ ← H(sˆ);
tˆ ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
if r = rˆ then
bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← g
else g ← LG[r]
return g
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(LH ) then
h $← {0, 1}
ρ;
LH [s] ← h
else h← LH [s]
return h
Oracle D(c) :
if (cˆdef ∧ cˆ = c) ∨ qD < |LD | ∨ qD + qG < |LG| then
return ⊥
else
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD ;
(s, t) ← f−1(sk, c);
r ← t⊕H(s);
g ← G(r);
if [s⊕g]k1 = 0
k1 then return [s⊕g]µ else return ⊥
Game G2 :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk) ← KGf ();
rˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
(m0,m1) ← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
hˆ ← H(sˆ);
tˆ ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
if r = rˆ then
bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← g
else g ← LG[r]
return g
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(LH ) then
h $← {0, 1}
ρ;
LH [s] ← h
else h← LH [s]
return h
Oracle D(c) :
if (cˆdef ∧ cˆ = c) ∨ qD < |LD | ∨ qD + qG < |LG| then
return ⊥
else
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD ;
(s, t) ← f−1(sk, c);
if s ∈ dom(LH) then
r ← t⊕H(s);
if r ∈ dom(LG) then
g ← LG[r];
if [s⊕g]k1 = 0
k1 then return [s⊕g]µ else return ⊥
else
if r = rˆ then bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ; LG[r]← g; return ⊥
else
r ← t⊕H(s);
if r /∈ dom(LG) then g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ; LG[r]← g
return ⊥
Game G3 :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk) ← KGf ();
rˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
(m0,m1) ← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
hˆ ← H(sˆ);
tˆ ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
if r = rˆ then
bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← g
else g ← LG[r]
return g
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(LH ) then
h $← {0, 1}
ρ;
LH [s] ← h
else h← LH [s]
return h
Oracle D(c) :
if (cˆdef ∧ cˆ = c) ∨ qD < |LD | ∨ qG < |LG| then
return ⊥
else
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD ;
(s, t) ← f−1(sk, c);
if s ∈ dom(LH) then
r ← t⊕H(s);
if r ∈ dom(LG) then
g ← LG[r];
if [s⊕g]k1 = 0
k1 then return [s⊕g]µ else return ⊥
else
if r = rˆ then bad← true;
return ⊥
else
r ← t⊕H(s); return ⊥
Fig. 6.4. Outline of the reduction showing the lossy transitions. Fragments of code that
change between games are highlighted on a gray background.
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Pr [G3 : bad] ≤ Pr [G4 : bad] +
qDqG + qD
2ρ
Inline calls to H in D
Eliminate assignments to LH in D
Pr [G4 : bad] ≤ Pr [G5 : badH ] +
qDqG + 2qD + qG
2ρ
Eagerly sample the value of hˆ
Introduce badH in H
Bound bad in terms of badH
Game G4 :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk) ← KGf ();
rˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
hˆ ← H(sˆ);
tˆ ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
if r = rˆ then
bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← g
else g ← LG[r]
return g
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(LH ) then
h $← {0, 1}
ρ;
LH [s] ← h
else h← LH [s]
return h
Oracle D(c) :
if (cˆdef ∧ cˆ = c) ∨ qD < |LD | ∨ qG < |LG| then
return ⊥
else
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD ;
(s, t) ← f−1(sk, c);
if s ∈ dom(LH) then
h← LH [s]; r ← t⊕ h;
if r ∈ dom(LG) then
g ← LG[r];
if [s⊕g]k1 = 0
k1 then return [s⊕g]µ else return ⊥
else
if r = rˆ then bad← true;
return ⊥
else return ⊥
Game G5 :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk) ← KGf ();
rˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
hˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
tˆ ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
if r = rˆ then
bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← g
else g ← LG[r]
return g
Oracle H(s) :
if s 6∈ dom(LH ) then
if s = sˆ then
badH ← true;
h $← {0, 1}
ρ;
LH [s] ← h
else h← LH [s]
return h
Oracle D(c) :
if (cˆdef ∧ cˆ = c) ∨ qD < |LD | ∨ qG < |LG| then
return ⊥
else
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD ;
(s, t) ← f−1(sk, c);
if s ∈ dom(LH) then
h← LH [s]; r ← t⊕ h;
if r ∈ dom(LG) then
g ← LG[r];
if [s⊕g]k1 = 0
k1 then return [s⊕g]µ else return ⊥
else return ⊥
else return ⊥
Fig. 6.4. Outline of the reduction showing the lossy transitions. Fragments of code that
change between games are highlighted on a gray background.
The transition from G1 to G2 modifies the decryption oracle successively by inlining
the call to G, and by applying the Fundamental and Failure Event lemmas to reject
the ciphertext when there is a negligible chance it matches the padding. Overall,
we prove:
Pr [G1 : bad] ≤ Pr [G2 : bad] +
q2D + qDqG + qD
2ρ
+
qD
2k1
(6.19)
Next, we eliminate fresh calls to G in the decryption oracle. These calls correspond
to the two assignments LG[r] ← g, since calls to G have been inlined previously.
We perform an aggressive elimination and remove both calls. As a result, in game
G3 the length of list LG (i.e. the number of calls to G) is bounded by qG rather
than qD + qG. This is the key to improve on the security bound of Pointcheval
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[2005], who only removes the second call. The proof relies on the logic of swapping
statements to show that values of discarded calls are “uniformly distributed and
independent from the adversary’s view”. Details appear below. Overall, we prove:
Pr [G2 : bad] ≤ Pr [G3 : bad] +
qD
2k1
(6.20)
Likewise, we eliminate calls to H in D, yielding a new game G4 in which the
decryption oracle does not add any new values to the memories of G and H . Using
the Fundamental and Failure Event lemmas, we obtain:
Pr [G3 : bad] ≤ Pr [G4 : bad] +
qDqG + qD
2ρ
(6.21)
We next fix the value hˆ that oracle H gives in response to sˆ, and then make H
return a freshly sampled value instead of hˆ. This allows us to bound the probability
of bad in terms of the probability of a newly introduced event badH . The proof
uses the hypothesis that A2 cannot query the decryption oracle with the challenge
ciphertext, and yields:
Pr [G4 : bad] ≤ Pr [G5 : badH ] +
qDqG + 2qD + qG
2ρ
(6.22)
Finally, we prove that the probability of badH in G5 is upper bounded by the
probability that the inverter I succeeds in partially inverting the permutation f .
The proof uses the (standard, non-relational) invariant on G5:
badH =⇒ sˆ ∈ dom(LH)
The inverter I that we build (shown in Figure 6.3) gives its own challenge y as the
challenge ciphertext to the IND-CCA2 adversary A and returns a random element
in the list of queries made to H . Thus,
Pr [G5 : badH ] ≤ Pr [G5 : sˆ ∈ dom(LH)] ≤
1
qH
Pr [GPDOW : s = s˜] (6.23)
Where the last inequality follows from the bound on the number of queries to oracle
H and an instance of the optimistic sampling equivalence:
⊢ hˆ $← {0, 1}ρ; tˆ← hˆ⊕ rˆ ≃
{rˆ}
{hˆ,tˆ,rˆ}
tˆ $← {0, 1}ρ; hˆ← tˆ⊕ rˆ
Putting together (6.18)–(6.23) concludes the proof of the statement in Theorem 6.4.
Detailed proof of the transition from G2 to G3
We use the five intermediate games shown in Figure 6.5. The first transition from G2
to G12 consists in adding a tag to queries in the memory of G indicating whether the
query has been made directly by the adversary or indirectly, through the decryption
oracle. The decryption oracle tests this tag when accessing the memory of G: if the
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Game G12 G
2
2 :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk) ← KGf ();
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
rˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
hˆ ← H(sˆ);
tˆ ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
if r = rˆ then
bad← true
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← (false, g)
else
(d, g) ← LG[r];
LG[r]← (false, g)
return g
Oracle H(s) :
if s /∈ dom(LH ) then
h $← {0, 1}
ρ;
LH [s] ← h
else h← LH [s]
return h
Oracle D(c) :
if (cˆdef ∧ cˆ = c) ∨ qD < |LD | ∨ qD + qG < |LG| then
return ⊥
else
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD ; (s, t) ← f
−1(sk, c);
if s ∈ dom(LH) then
r ← t⊕H(s);
if r ∈ dom(LG) then
(d, g) ← LG[r];
if d = true then
if [s⊕ g]k1 = 0
k1 then
bad1 ← true; return [s⊕ g]
µ return ⊥
else return ⊥
else
if [s⊕ g]k1 = 0
k1 then return [s⊕ g]µ
else return ⊥
else
if r = rˆ then bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ; LG[r]← (true, g); return ⊥
else
r ← t⊕H(s);
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ; LG[r]← (true, g);
return ⊥
Game G32 G
4
2 G
5
2 :
LG,LH ,LD ← nil;
(pk, sk) ← KGf ();
(m0,m1)← A1(pk);
b $← {0, 1};
rˆ $← {0, 1}
ρ;
sˆ $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
hˆ ← H(sˆ);
tˆ ← hˆ ⊕ rˆ;
cˆ ← f(pk, sˆ ‖ tˆ);
cˆdef ← true;
b˜← A2(cˆ)
L← LG;
while L 6= nil do
(r, (b, g)) ← hd(L);
if b = true then
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← (true, g)
L← tl(L)
Oracle G(r) :
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
if r = rˆ then
bad← true
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← (false, g)
else
(d, g) ← LG[r];
if d = true then
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ;
LG[r]← (false, g);
bad2 ← P (g, r)
return g
Oracle H(s) :
if s /∈ dom(LH ) then
h $← {0, 1}
ρ;
LH [s] ← h
else h← LH [s]
return h
Oracle D(c) :
if (cˆdef ∧ cˆ = c) ∨ qD < |LD | ∨ qD + qG < |LG| then
return ⊥
else
LD ← (cˆdef , c) :: LD ; (s, t) ← f
−1(sk, c);
if s ∈ dom(LH) then
r ← t⊕H(s);
if r ∈ dom(LG) then
(d, g) ← LG[r];
if d = true then return ⊥
else
if [s⊕ g]k1 = 0
k1 then return [s⊕ g]µ
else return ⊥
else
if r = rˆ then bad← true;
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ; LG[r]← (true, g); return ⊥
else
r ← t⊕H(s);
if r 6∈ dom(LG) then
g $← {0, 1}
k−ρ; LG[r]← (true, g);
return ⊥
P (g, r) def= ∃(d, c) ∈ LD. let (s, t) = f
−1(sk, c) in s ∈ dom(LH) ∧ r = t⊕ LH [s] ∧ [s⊕ g]k1 = 0
k1
Fig. 6.5. Games in the transition from G2 to G3. Fragments of code inside a box appear
only in the game whose name is surrounded by the matching box.
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ciphertext queried is valid and its random seed appeared in a previous decryption
query, but not yet in a direct query to G, the decryption oracle raises a flag bad1.
We show that this can happen with probability 2−k1 for any single query, since the
random seed is uniformly distributed and independent from the adversary’s view.
In this case, the decryption oracle can safely reject the ciphertext, as done in game
G22. The proof proceeds in two steps: We show that game G2 is observationally
equivalent to game G12 using the relational invariant
LG〈1〉 = (map (λ(r, (b, g)).(r, g)) LG)〈2〉
Therefore Pr [G2 : bad] = Pr
[
G12 : bad
]
. Game G22 is identical to G
1
2, except that
it rejects ciphertexts that raise the bad1 flag. Applying the Fundamental Lemma
(i.e. Lemma 3.3), we show that
Pr
[
G12 : bad
]
≤ Pr
[
G22 : bad
]
+ Pr
[
G22 : bad1
]
Our next goal is to show that answers to queries tagged as true can be resam-
pled. However, one cannot apply the logic of swapping statements at this stage to
resample these answers in G, because flag bad1 is set on D and depends on them.
The solution is to introduce a new game G32 that sets another flag bad2 in the code
of G instead of setting bad1 in the decryption oracle
2. Flag bad2 is raised when-
ever the adversary queries G with the random seed of a valid ciphertext previously
submitted to the decryption oracle. We prove that games G22 and G
3
2 satisfy the
relational invariant:
bad1〈1〉 =⇒ (bad2 ∨ φ)〈2〉
where
φ def= ∃(d, c) ∈ LD. let (s, t) = f−1(sk, c), r = t⊕LH [s] in
r ∈ dom(LG) ∧ s ∈ dom(LH) ∧ fst(LG[r]) = false ∧ [s⊕ snd(LG[r])]k1 = 0
k1
Therefore:
Pr
[
G22 : bad
]
+ Pr
[
G22 : bad1
]
≤ Pr
[
G32 : bad
]
+ Pr
[
G32 : bad2 ∨ φ
]
We now consider game G42 where oracle G resamples the answers to queries previ-
ously sampled in the decryption oracle. As such answers are uniformly distributed
and independent from the adversary’s view, the logic for swapping statements can
be used to establish that this transformation preserves semantics. Hence:
Pr
[
G32 : bad
]
+ Pr
[
G32 : bad2 ∨ φ
]
= Pr
[
G42 : bad
]
+ Pr
[
G42 : bad2 ∨ φ
]
Note that in order to prove semantic equivalence we need to resample the values in
LG associated to queries tagged as true—made by the D—at the end of the game.
Using Lemma 3.4, we upper bound the probability of bad2 ∨ φ in G
4
2:
2 As bad1 is not set anymore, we simplify the code of D by coalescing branches in the
innermost conditional.
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Pr
[
G42 : bad2 ∨ φ
]
≤
qD
2k1
We are now only interested in bounding bad, so we can remove as dead code the
fragment of code at the end of G42 that resamples values in LG, obtaining G
5
2, and
prove that
Pr
[
G42 : bad
]
= Pr
[
G52 : bad
]
We finally prove that game G52 is observationally equivalent to G3, in which the
code for the oracle G is reverted to its original form and the decryption oracle no
longer tampers with the memory of G. Thus,
Pr [G2 : bad] ≤ Pr
[
G52 : bad
]
+
qD
2k1
= Pr [G3 : bad] +
qD
2k1
⊓⊔
Comparison with the security bound of Pointcheval [2005]
Pointcheval obtains a slightly different bound:
ǫ′ ≥
1
qH
(
ǫ−
4qDqG + 2q
2
D + 4qD + 8qG
2ρ
−
3qD
2k1
)
We marginally improve on this bound by reducing the coefficients. As previously
mentioned, the improvement stems from the transition from G2 to G3, where we
eliminate both calls to G in the decryption oracle, whereas only one of them is
eliminated in [Pointcheval 2005]. In fact, eliminating both calls is not only needed
to give a better bound, but is essential for the correctness of the proof. Indeed,
the transition from G3 to G4 would not be possible if D modified the memory of
G. Concretely, the justification of Equation (27) in [Pointcheval 2005] contains
two minor glitches: firstly, the remark “which just cancels r′ from LG” oversees
the possibility of this removal having an impact on future queries. Secondly, “the
probability for r′ to be in LG is less than qG/2
ρ” oversees that the length of LG
is upper bounded by qG + qD rather than just qG, as the decryption oracle still
adds values to LG; a correct bound for this probability in [Pointcheval 2005] is
(qG + qD)/2
ρ.
6.2.2 Notes about the Proved Security Bound
We note that although we exhibit an explicit inverter that achieves the advantage in
the statement of Theorem 6.4, we do not prove formally that it executes within the
given time bound. We would be loath to say that the proof is incomplete, because
the time complexity of the inverter is evident from its formulation. Nonetheless,
we can prove that the inverter executes in probabilistic polynomial-time (under a
reasonable cost model for constructions in the language) and thus the asymptotic
security of OAEP under the hypothesis that the underlying permutation family is
partial-domain one-way. Formally, if the winning probability Pr [GPDOW : s = s˜] of
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any PPT inverter is negligible, we can prove that the advantage of any IND-CCA2
adversary is also negligible, provided k1 and η increase at least linearly with the
security parameter, i.e.,
∃α. ∃η0. ∀η ≥ η0. ρ ≥ α η ∧ k1 ≥ α η
Moreover, we observe that by using a standard time-space trade-off argument
(cf. [Pointcheval 2005]) one can reduce the factor qGqHqD in the time bound of
the inverter to qGqH.
6.3 About the Security of OAEP in the Standard Model
From a practical point of view, in reductionist arguments like the ones we studied
in this chapter, the tightness of the security bound makes a whole world of dif-
ference. The tighter the bound is, the closer the problem of breaking the security
of the scheme is to the problem of solving the computational hard problem under
consideration. Another aspect of practical importance is the model where the proof
is carried out. A proof in the random oracle model, like the proofs we presented,
only rules out generic attacks that do not exploit the implementation details of the
hash functions G and H . In contrast, a proof in the standard model of cryptogra-
phy considers the possibility that an adversary might be able to exploit weaknesses
in the actual implementation of the hash functions to attack the security of the
scheme.
Several authors have studied the possibility of proving OAEP IND-CCA2 secure
in the standard model, either when used in conjunction with the RSA function
or with a trapdoor permutation satisfying particular classes of properties. Shoup
[2001] showed the impossibility of finding a blackbox reduction from the IND-CCA2
security of OAEP to the one-wayness of the underlying trapdoor permutation, ei-
ther in the standard or random oracle model, but he exhibited a blackbox reduction
in the random oracle model to the problem of partially inverting the permutation.
Brown [2006] showed a pathological instantiation of the hash functions that would
render OAEP insecure, which means that a security proof should at least assume
some property about the hash functions. He ruled out as well the possibility of
proving the IND-CCA2 security of OAEP in the standard model using certain types
of reductions. Finally, Kiltz and Pietrzak [2009] prove a blackbox separation re-
sult: no padding-based encryption scheme can be proved IND-CCA2 secure in the
standard model, even assuming the underlying trapdoor permutation is ideal. This
means in particular, that is impossible to prove the IND-CCA2 security of OAEP in
the standard model under most standard assumptions about the trapdoor permu-
tation, including one-wayness, partial-domain one-wayness, or claw-freeness.
In contrast, Kiltz et al. [2010] recently proved the IND-CPA security of generic
OAEP in the standard model under non-interactive and non-interdependent as-
sumptions on the underlying trapdoor permutation and the hash functions. In
particular, they prove that RSA-OAEP is IND-CPA secure when instantiated us-
ing a t-wise independent hash function (for an appopriate t) provided RSA is a
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lossy trapdoor permutation. This latter condition can be proved under the phi-
hiding assumption, a number-theoretic assumption slightly stronger than the RSA
assumption.
Despite the above negative results, most people agree that a security proof of a
scheme in the random oracle model gives strong evidence about its practical secu-
rity, and that it is very unlikely that someone comes out with an attack exploiting
details of the concrete instantiations of random oracles.
7
Machine-Checked Formalization of
Zero-Knowledge Protocols
P
roofs of knowledge [Goldreich 2002; Goldwasser et al. 1989] are two-party
interactive protocols where one party, called the prover, convinces the other
one, called the verifier, that it knows something. Typically, both parties share a
common input x and something refers to a witness w of membership of the input
x to an NP language. Proofs of knowledge are useful to enforce honest behavior
of potentially malicious parties [Backes et al. 2009]: the knowledge witness acts as
an authentication token used to establish that the prover is a legitimate user of a
service provided by the verifier, or as evidence that a message sent by the prover
has been generated in accordance to the rules of a protocol. Proofs of knowledge
must be complete, so that a prover that has indeed knowledge of a witness can
convince a honest verifier, and sound, so that a dishonest prover has little chance
of being convincing. In addition, practical applications often require to preserve
secrecy or anonymity; in such cases the proof should not leak anything about the
witness. Zero-knowledge proofs are computationally convincing proofs of knowledge
that achieve this goal, i.e. they are convincing and yet the verifier does not learn
anything from interacting with the prover beyond the fact that the prover knows
a witness for their common input. This property has an elegant formulation: a
protocol is said to be zero-knowledge when transcripts of protocol runs between a
prover P and a (possibly dishonest) verifier V can be efficiently simulated without
ever interacting with the prover—but with access to the strategy of V . In particular,
this implies that proofs are not transferable; a conversation is convincing only for
the verifier interacting with the prover and cannot be replayed to convince a third
party.
In his PhD dissertation, Cramer [1996] introduced the concept of Σ-protocols , a
class of three-move interactive protocols that are suitable as a basis for the design of
many efficient and secure cryptographic services. Cramer described Σ-protocols as
abstract modules and showed that they are realizable when instantiated for most
111
112 Chapter 7. Machine-Checked Formalization of ZK Protocols
computational assumptions commonly considered in cryptography, including the
difficulty of computing discrete logarithms or factoring integers, or the existence of
some abstract function families (e.g. one-way group homomorphisms). In addition,
he gave an effective method to combine Σ-protocols to obtain zero-knowledge proofs
of any Boolean formula constructed using the AND and OR operators from formulæ
for which Σ-protocols exist. This means that Σ-protocols can be used in a practical
setting as building blocks to achieve various cryptographic goals. Applications of Σ-
protocols notably include secure multi-party computation, identification schemes,
secret-ballot electronic voting, and anonymous attestation credentials.
This chapter reports on a fully machine-checked formalization of a comprehen-
sive theory of Σ-protocols using CertiCrypt. The formalization consists of more
than 10,000 lines of Coq code, and covers the basics of Σ-protocols: definitions,
relations between different notions of security, general constructions and compos-
ability theorems. We show its applicability by formalizing several well-known pro-
tocols, including the Schnorr, Guillou-Quisquater, Okamoto, and Feige-Fiat-Shamir
protocols. The highlight of the formalization is a generic account of Σφ-protocols,
that prove knowledge of a preimage under a group homomorphism φ. We use the
module system of Coq to define and relate the classes of Σφ- and Σ-protocols.
Our formalization of Σφ-protocols provides sufficient conditions (the so-called spe-
cialness conditions) on the group homomorphism φ so that every Σφ-protocol can
be construed as a Σ-protocol. Moreover, we show that special homomorphisms
are closed under direct product, which yields a cheap way of AND-combining Σφ
proofs. We exploit the generality of our result to achieve short proofs of complete-
ness, special soundness, and (honest verifier) zero-knowledge for many protocols in
the literature.
7.1 Sigma-Protocols
A Σ-protocol is a 3-step interactive protocol where a prover P interacts with a
verifier V . Both parties have access to a common input x, and the goal of the
prover is to convince the verifier that it knows some value w suitably related to
x, without revealing anything beyond this assertion. The protocol begins with the
prover sending a commitment r to the verifier, who responds by sending back a
random challenge c; the prover then computes a response s to the challenge and
sends it to the verifier, who either accepts or rejects the conversation. Figure 7.1
shows a diagram of a run of a Σ-protocol.
Formally, a Σ-protocol is defined with respect to a knowledge relation R. This
terminology comes from interpreting the proof system as proving membership of
the common input to an NP language L. Each NP language admits an efficient
membership verification procedure via a polynomial-time recognizable relation RL
such that
L = {x | ∃w. RL(x,w)}
Proving that x belongs to the language amounts to proving knowledge of a witness
w related to x via RL. In CertiCrypt, the class of Σ-protocols is formalized as a
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Prover Verifier
knows (x,w) knows only x
computes r
chooses c
computes s accepts/rejects
r
c
s
Fig. 7.1. Characteristic 3-step interaction in a run of a Σ-protocol.
module type parametrized over a knowledge relation R , and a number of proce-
dures specifying the different phases of the prover and the verifier; the module type
specifies as well the properties that any given protocol instance must satisfy. In the
remainder of this section we describe in detail our formal definition of Σ-protocols
and comment on an alternative—but in some sense equivalent—specification of the
zero-knowledge property.
Definition 7.1 (Σ-protocol). A Σ-protocol for a knowledge relation R is a 3-step
protocol between a prover P and a verifier V , whose interaction is described by the
following parametrized program:
Protocol(x,w) :
(r, state)← P1(x,w);
c← V1(x, r);
s← P2(x,w, state, c);
b← V2(x, r, c, s)
In the above program specifying a Σ-protocol, the two phases of the prover are
described by the procedures P1 and P2, while the phases of the verifier are described
by V1 and V2. Note that the protocol explicitly passes state between the phases of the
participants; we could have used instead global variables shared between P1 and P2
on one hand, and V1 and V2 on the other, but that would unnecessarily complicate
the proofs because we would need to specify that the procedures representing one
party do not have access to the shared state of the other party. All the protocols
that we consider in the following are public-coin, meaning that a honest verifier
chooses the challenge uniformly from some predefined set C. A Σ-protocol must
satisfy the following three properties,
1. Completeness: Given a public input x together with a witness w such that
R(x,w), the prover is always able to convince the verifier:
∀m. R(m(x),m(w)) =⇒ Pr [Protocol,m : b = true] = 1
2. Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge (sHVZK): There exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time simulator S that given x ∈ dom(R) and a challenge c, computes
triples (r, c, s) with the same distribution as a valid conversation. The property
is formalized in terms of a version of the protocol where the challenge c is fixed
as a parameter,
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Protocol(x,w, c) :
(r, state)← P1(x,w);
s← P2(x,w, state, c);
b← V2(x, r, c, s)
≃{x,c}∧R(x,w){r,c,s} (r, s)← S(x, c)
3. Special Soundness: Given two accepting conversations (r, c1, s1), (r, c2, s2) for
an input x, with the same commitment r, but with different challenges, there ex-
ists a PPT knowledge extractor KE that computes a witness w such that R(x,w).
Formally, for any memory m,
m(c1) 6= m(c2)
Pr [b← V2(x, r, c1, s1),m : b = true] = 1
Pr [b← V2(x, r, c2, s2),m : b = true] = 1

 =⇒
Pr [w ← KE(x, r, c1, c2, s1, s2),m : R(x,w)] = 1
Special soundness might seem a relatively weak property at first sight. It can
be shown using a rewinding argument (although we did not formalize this result in
Coq) that thanks to special soundness, any public-coin Σ-protocol with challenge
set C can be seen as a proof of knowledge with soundness error |C|−1 [Damgård
and Pfitzmann 1998]. Informally, this means that any efficient prover (possibly
dishonest) that manages to convince a honest verifier for a public input x with
a probability greater than |C|−1 can be turned into an efficient procedure that
computes a witness for x.
7.1.1 Relation between sHVZK and HVZK
Some authors require that Σ-protocols satisfy a somewhat weaker property known
as honest verifier zero-knowledge rather than the special version of this property
mentioned above. The difference is that in the former the simulator is allowed to
choose the challenge while in the latter the challenge is fixed. In other words, plain
HVZK requires that there exists a PPT simulator S that given just x ∈ dom(R)
computes a triple (r, c, s) with the same distribution as the verifier’s view of a
conversation. The relation between the two notions has been studied by Cramer
[1996]. As an illustration of the use of CertiCrypt and the Σ-protocol framework,
the formalization of this relation is discussed below. Without loss of generality we
assume that the challenge set of the protocols we consider is {0, 1}k.
Theorem 7.2 (sHVZK implies HVZK). If a Σ-protocol satisfies sHVZK, it also
satisfies HVZK.
Proof. A HVZK simulator S′ can be built from the sHVZK simulator S:
Simulator S′(x) : c $← {0, 1}k; (r, s)← S(x, c); return (r, c, s)
The fact that S′ perfectly simulates conversations of the protocol can be proved by
means of the following sequence of games:
7.1. Sigma-Protocols 115
Protocol(x,w) ≃
{x}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s} c
$← {0, 1}k; Protocol(x,w, c)
≃
{x}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s} c
$← {0, 1}k; (r, s)← S(x, c)
≃
{x}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s} (r, c, s)← S
′(x)
The first and last equivalences are easily proved by inlining procedure calls using
the tactic inline, and reordering instructions in the resulting programs using swap.
To prove the second equivalence, the tactic eqobs_hd is used to get rid of the
instruction c $← {0, 1}k that is common to both games; the resulting goal matches
exactly the definition of sHVZK for S. ⊓⊔
In a sense, sHVZK is a stronger property than HVZK, because a protocol satisfy-
ing sHVZK can be shown to satisfy HVZK, while the converse is not generally true.
However, from every protocol (P,V) that satisfies HVZK it is possible to construct
a protocol (P′,V′) that satisfies sHVZK and is nearly as efficient as the original
protocol:
P′1(x,w)
def
= (r, state)← P1(x,w); c
′ $← {0, 1}k; return ((r, c′), (state, c′)))
P′2(x,w, (state, c
′), c) def= s← P2(x,w, state, c⊕ c
′); return s
V′1(x, (r, c
′)) def= c← V1(x, r); return (c⊕ c
′)
V′2(x, (r, c
′), c, s) def= b← V2(x, r, c⊕ c
′, s); return b
Essentially, the construction creates a new protocol for which HVZK and sHVZK
coincide. The difference is that in the new protocol the challenge that the verifier
chooses is xor-ed with a random bitstring sampled by the prover at the beginning
of the protocol.
Theorem 7.3 (sHVZK from HVZK). If a protocol (P, V ) is a Σ-protocol as
in Definition 7.1 but satisfying HVZK instead of sHVZK, then the protocol (P′,V′)
defined above is a Σ-protocol.
Proof.
Completeness
Follows easily from the completeness of protocol (P, V ) and the absorption property
of the exclusive or operator, i.e., (c⊕ c′)⊕ c′ = c.
Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge
The following is a sHVZK simulator for the protocol
Simulator S′(x, c) : (rˆ, cˆ, sˆ)← S(x); return ((rˆ, c⊕ cˆ), sˆ)
(The variables of the original protocol are decorated with a hat.) We prove this by
means of a sequence of program equivalences,
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Protocol′(x,w, c) ≃
{x,c}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s} Protocol(x,w); r ← (rˆ, c⊕ cˆ); s← sˆ
≃
{x,c}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s} (rˆ, cˆ, s)← S(x); r ← (rˆ, c⊕ cˆ)
≃
{x,c}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s} (r, s)← S
′(x, c)
The first and last equivalences are proved without much difficulty using the program
transformation tactics described in Chapter 3, while the second can be reduced to
the HVZK of S using the alloc and eqobs_tl tactics to simplify the goal.
Soundness
From a conversation ((r, c′), (c ⊕ c′), s) of (P′,V′) a conversation (r, c, s) of the
original protocol can be trivially recovered. Thus, the following knowledge extractor
proves special soundness of (P′,V′):
KE′(x, (r, c′), c1, c2, s1, s2) : w ← KE(x, r, c
′ ⊕ c1, c
′ ⊕ c2, s1, s2); return w
⊓⊔
7.2 Sigma Protocols Based on Special Homomorphisms
An important class of Σ-protocols are the so-called Σφ-protocols, that prove knowl-
edge of a preimage under a homomorphism. The Schnorr protocol [Schnorr 1991],
one of the most archetypal zero-knowledge proofs, is an instance of a Σφ-protocol
that proves knowledge of a discrete logarithm in a cyclic group, i.e. the homo-
morphism is in this case exponentiation, φ(x) = gx, where g is a generator of the
group.
Our formalization of Σφ-protocols is constructive. We provide a functor that,
given a homomorphism φ together with proofs that it satisfies certain properties,
builds a concrete Σ-protocol for proving knowledge of a preimage under φ. This
protocol comes with proofs of completeness, soundness, and sHVZK. Thus, all that
it takes to build an instance of a Σφ-protocol is to specify a homomorphism and
prove that it has the necessary properties. In this way, we give several examples
of Σφ-protocols, including the Schnorr, Guillou-Quisquater and Feige-Fiat-Shamir
protocols. Although using the Σφ construction spares us the hassle of proving each
time the properties in Definition 7.1, these instantiations remain non-trivial because
one needs to formalize the homomorphisms themselves, which in turn requires to
give representations of the groups over which they are defined.
In the remaining of this subsection we let (G,⊕) be a finite additive group and
(H,⊗) a multiplicative group.
Definition 7.4 (Σφ-protocol). Let φ : G→ H be a homomorphism, and define
R def= {(x,w) | x = φ(w)}. The Σφ-protocol for relation R with challenge set
C ⊂ N is the Σ-protocol (P,V) defined as follows:
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P1(x,w)
def
= y $← G; return (φ(y), y)
P2(x,w, y, c)
def
= return (y ⊕ cw)
V1(x, r)
def
= c $← C; return c
V2(x, r, c, s)
def
= return (φ(s) = r ⊗ xc)
It can be shown that the above protocol satisfies the properties of a Σ-protocol when
C = {0, 1}. However, a cheating prover could convince the verifier with probability
1/2; this probability may be reduced to 1/2n (at the cost of efficiency) by repeating
the protocol n rounds. We will see that a certain class of homomorphisms defined
below admits a much larger challenge set, and thus achieves a lower soundness error
in a single execution of the protocol.
Definition 7.5 (Special homomorphism). An homomorphism φ : G → H is
special if there exists a value v ∈ Z \ {0} (called special exponent) and a PPT
algorithm that given x ∈ H computes u ∈ G such that φ(u) = xv.
To formalize Σφ-protocols, we extended the language of CertiCrypt with types for
the groups G,H and operators for computing the group operation, exponentia-
tion/product, and inverse; we also added operators φ(·), u(·), and a constant ex-
pression v denoting the special exponent of the homomorphism as in Definition 7.5.
In addition, we wrote an expression normalizer that simplifies arithmetic expres-
sions by applying the homomorphic property of φ; normalization is done as part of
the ep tactic.
A Σφ-protocol built from a special homomorphism admits as a challenge set
any natural interval of the form [0..c+], where c+ is smaller than the smallest prime
divisor of the special exponent v.
Theorem 7.6 (Σφ-protocols for special homomorphisms). If φ is special and
c+ is smaller than any prime divisor of the special exponent v, then the protocol in
Definition 7.4 is a Σ-protocol with challenge set C = [0..c+].
Proof.
Completeness
We must prove that a honest prover always succeeds in convincing a verifier, i.e.
∀m. R(m(x),m(w)) =⇒ Pr [Protocol,m : b = true] = 1
Note that this can be reformulated in terms of a program equivalence as follows
Protocol(x,w) ≃
R(x,w)
{b} b← true
To prove this, we inline all procedure calls in the protocol and simplify the re-
sulting program performing expression propagation, normalization, and dead code
elimination. We use the following proof script:
inline P1; inline P2; inline V1; inline V2; ep; deadcode.
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The resulting goal has the form
y $← G; c $← [0..c+]; b← (φ(y)⊗ φ(w)c = φ(y)⊗ xc) ≃
φ(w)=x
{b} b← true
We use the tactic ep_eq x φ(w) to simplify the last instruction in the game on the
left hand side to b← true, tactic deadcode to remove the first two instructions that
are no longer relevant, and eqobs_in to conclude.
Protocol(x,w, c) :
(r, state)← P1(x,w);
s← P2(x,w, state, c);
b← V2(x, r, c, s)
inline_l P1;
inline_l P2;
ep; deadcode
1
y $← G;
r ← φ(y);
s← y ⊕ cw
≃{x,w,c}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s}
s′ $← G;
y ← s′ ⊕−cw;
s← y ⊕ cw;
r ← φ(y)
s′ $← G;
s← s′;
r ← φ(s′)⊗ φ(w)−c
4
alloc_r s s′
s $← G;
r ← φ(s)⊗ φ(w)−c
ep; deadcode
3
≃{x,w,c}∧R(x,w)
{r,c,s}
6
s′ $← G;
r ← φ(s′)⊗ x−c;
s← s′
sinline_r S
Simulator(x, c) :
(r, s)← S(x, c)
alloc_r s′ s;
ep_eq_r x φ(w);
swap;
eqobs_in
2
5
swap;
eqobs_tl;
alloc_l y s′;
clean_nm;
apply sum_otp
Fig. 7.2. A game-based proof that S is a sHVZK simulator for the Σφ-protocol in Theo-
rem 7.6.
Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge
The following is a sHVZK simulator for the protocol:
Simulator S(x, c) : s $← G; r ← φ(s) ⊗ x−c; return (r, c, s)
A proof that S perfectly simulates conversations of the protocol is illustrated in
Figure 7.2; we briefly explain the numbered steps in the figure.
1. Similarly to the proof above, we inline calls to P1 and P2, and simplify the goal
using tactics ep and deadcode.
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2. We introduce an intermediate game using the transitivity of observational equiv-
alence. To prove that the new game is observationally equivalent to the previ-
ous one, we first reorder the instructions using swap to obtain a common suffix
which we then remove using the tactic eqobs_tl. The resulting goal is
⊢ y $← G ≃
{x,w,c}∧R(x,w)
{y,w,c} s
′ $← G; y ← s′ ⊕−cw
Since variables w and c are not modified, we can remove them from the output
set using tactic clean_nm. We next use tactic alloc y s′ to sample s′ instead
of y in the game on the left, and we weaken the pre-condition to true, which
results in the goal
⊢ s′ $← G; y ← s′ ≃{y} s
′ $← G; y ← s′ ⊕−cw
This equivalence holds because −cw acts as a one-time pad; we have proved
this as a lemma called sum_otp that we apply to conclude the proof.
3. Using ep, we propagate throughout the code the value assigned to y and then
remove the assignment using deadcode. The expression normalizer automati-
cally simplifies (s′ ⊕−cw)⊕ cw to s′, and φ(s′ ⊕−cw) to φ(s′)⊗ φ(w)−c using
the homomorphic property of φ.
4. We introduce a new intermediate game; to prove that is equivalent to the pre-
vious one, we allocate variable s into s′; the resulting game is identical to the
one on the left hand side.
5. We substitute variable s for s′ in the game on the right hand side of the equiv-
alence, and use the pre-condition R(x,w)—which boils down to x = φ(w)—to
substitute x by φ(w). The resulting games are identical modulo reordering of
instructions.
6. We conclude by inlining the call to S in the simulation.
Soundness
Soundness requires the existence of an algorithm KE that given two accepting con-
versations (x, r, c1, s1), (x, r, c2, s2), with c1 6= c2, efficiently computes a w such that
x = φ(w). We propose the following knowledge extractor:
KE(x, c1, c2, s1, s2) :
(a, b, d)← extended_gcd(c1 − c2, v);
w← a(s1 ⊕−s2)⊕ b u(x);
return w
where extended_gcd efficiently implements the extended Euclidean algorithm. For
integers a, b, extended_gcd(a, b) computes a triple of integers (x, y, d) such that d
is the greatest common divisor of a and b, and x, y satisfy the Bézout’s identity
ax+ by = gcd(a, b) = d
Since all computations done by the knowledge extractor can be efficiently imple-
mented, KE is a PPT algorithm. We have to prove as well that KE computes a
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preimage of the public input x. For two accepting conversations (x, r, c1, s1) and
(x, r, c2, s2), we have
φ(s1) = r ⊗ x
c1 ∧ φ(s2) = r ⊗ x
c2
and thus
xc1−c2 = φ(s1 ⊕−s2) (7.1)
Furthermore, since φ is special we can efficiently compute u such that xv = φ(u).
The triple (a, b, d) given by the extended Euclidean algorithm satisfies the Bézout’s
identity
a(c1 − c2) + bv = gcd(c1 − c2, v) = d (7.2)
Both c1 and c2 are bounded by c
+, which is in turn smaller than the smallest prime
that divides v. Thus, no divisor of |c1 − c2| can divide v and
d = gcd(c1 − c2, v) = 1
In addition, since φ is a homomorphism, from (7.1) and (7.2) we conclude
φ(w) = φ(a(s1 ⊕−s2)⊕ bu) = x
a(c1−c2) ⊗ xbv = x
⊓⊔
7.2.1 Concrete Instances of Sigma-Phi Protocols
We have formalized several Σφ-protocols using the functor described in the pre-
vious section. For each protocol, we specify the groups G,H and the underlying
special homomorphism φ : G→ H , and provide appropriate interpretations for the
operator u(·) and the constant special exponent v. Table 7.1 summarizes all the
protocols that we have formalized.
Table 7.1. Special homomorphisms in selected Σφ-protocols. In the table, Z+q stands for
the additive group of integers modulo q, Z∗p for the multiplicative group of integers modulo
p; N is an RSA modulus and e a public RSA exponent coprime with ϕ(N).
Protocol G H φ u v
Schnorr Z+q Z
∗
p x 7→ g
x x 7→ 0 q
Okamoto (Z+q ,Z
+
q ) Z
∗
p (x1, x2) 7→ g
x1
1 ⊗ g
x2
2 x 7→ (0, 0) q
Fiat-Shamir Z∗N Z
∗
N x 7→ x
2 x 7→ x 2
Guillou-Quisquater Z∗N Z
∗
N x 7→ x
e x 7→ x e
Feige-Fiat-Shamir {−1, 1} × Z∗N Z
∗
N (s, x) 7→ s x
2 x 7→ (1, x) 2
The Schnorr [1991] and Okamoto [1993] protocols are based on the discrete
logarithm problem. For prime numbers p and q such that q divides p−1, a Schnorr
group is a multiplicative subgroup of Z∗p of order q with generator g. A Σ-protocol
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for proving knowledge of discrete logarithms in the Schnorr group is obtained by
instantiating the construction of Definition 7.4 with the homomorphism
φ : Z+q → Z
∗
p
φ(x) = gx
Since the order q of the Schnorr group is known, it suffices to take q as the special
exponent of the homomorphism, and u(x) = 0 for all x ∈ Z+q . The Okamoto
protocol is similar to Schnorr protocol but it works with two Schnorr subgroups of
Z∗p with generators g1 and g2, respectively (it can be naturally generalized to any
number of generators). In this case φ maps a pair (x1, x2) to g
x1
1 ⊗ g
x2
2 .
Let N be an RSA modulus with prime factors p and q, and let e be a public
exponent; emust be co-prime with the totient ϕ = (p−1)(q−1) (i.e. gcd(e, ϕ(N)) =
1). The Guillou-Quisquater [Guillou and Quisquater 1988], Fiat-Shamir [Fiat and
Shamir 1987], and Feige-Fiat-Shamir [Feige et al. 1988] protocols are based on the
difficulty of solving the RSA problem: given N , e and y ≡ xe mod N , compute x,
the eth-root of y modulo N .
The Guillou-Quisquater protocol is obtained by taking
φ : Z∗N → Z
∗
N
φ(x) = xe
The Fiat-Shamir protocol is obtained as a special case when e = 2. The Feige-Fiat-
Shamir is obtained by taking
φ : {−1, 1} × Z∗N → Z
∗
N
φ(s, x) = s x2
Remark
We note that our results hold independently of any computational assumption.
Certainly, it is the difficulty of inverting the underlying homomorphism what makes
a Σφ-protocol interesting, but this is inessential for establishing the properties we
prove about the protocol.
7.2.2 Composition of Sigma-Phi Protocols
Let φ1 : G1 → H1 and φ2 : G2 → H2 be two special homomorphisms with special
exponents v1, v2 and associated algorithms u1, u2, respectively. We give below two
useful ways of combining the Σφ-protocols induced by these homomorphisms.
Theorem 7.7 (Direct product of special homomorphisms). The following
homomorphism from the direct product of G1 and G2 to the direct product of H1
and H2 is a special homomorphism:
φ : G1 ×G2 → H1 ×H2
φ(x1, x2)
def
= (φ1(x1), φ2(x2))
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Proof. It suffices to take
v def= lcm(v1, v2)
u(x1, x2)
def
= (u1(x1)
v/v1 , u2(x2)
v/v2 )
Indeed,
φ(u(x1, x2)) = (φ1(u1(x1)
v/v1), φ2(u2(x2)
v/v2))
= (x
v1v/v1
1 , x
v2v/v2
2 )
= (x1, x2)
v
⊓⊔
This yields an effective means of AND-combining assertions proved by Σφ-
protocols. The result generalizes the protocol of Maurer [2009,Theorem 6.2]; we do
not require that the special exponent be the same.
Theorem 7.8 (Equality of preimages). Suppose that the domain of both homo-
morphisms is the same, G1 = G2 = G, v1 = v2, and u1, u2 are such that
∀x1 ∈ H1, x2 ∈ H2. u1(x1) = u2(x2)
Then, the following homomorphism from G to the direct product of H1 and H2 is
a special homomorphism:
φ : G→ H1 ×H2
φ(x) def= (φ1(x), φ2(x))
Proof. Take v def= v1 and u(x1, x2)
def
= u1(x1),
φ(u(x1, x2)) = (φ1(u1(x1)), φ2(u2(x2)))
= (xv11 , x
v2
2 )
= (x1, x2)
v
⊓⊔
We can use this latter theorem to construct a Σ-protocol that proves correctness
of Diffie-Hellman keys. Given a group with prime order q and a generator g, this
amounts to prove that triples of group elements of the form (α, β, γ) are Diffie-
Hellman triples, i.e. that if α = ga and β = gb, then γ = gab. We instantiate the
above construction for homomorphisms φ1(x) = g
x, and φ2(x) = β
x. Knowledge
of a preimage a of (α, γ) implies that (α, β, γ) is a Diffie-Hellman triple (and thus
that γ is a valid Diffie-Hellman shared key).
7.3 Sigma Protocols Based on Claw-Free Permutations
This section describes a general construction in the same flavor as the Σφ con-
struction discussed in the previous section, but based on pairs of claw-free permu-
tations [Cramer 1996] rather than on special homomorphisms.
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Definition 7.9 (Claw-free permutation pair). A pair of trapdoor permutations
f = (f0, f1) on the same domain D is claw-free if it is unfeasible to compute x, y ∈ D
such that f0(x, pk) = f1(y, pk).
Given a claw-free permutation pair f , and a bitstring a ∈ {0, 1}k, we define
f[a](b)
def
= fa1(fa2(. . . (fak(b)) . . . ))
where ai denotes the i
th bit of a.
Theorem 7.10 (Σ-protocol based on claw-free permutations). Let (f0, f1)
be a pair of claw-free permutations on D and let R be such that
R(pk, sk) ⇐⇒ ∀x. f−10 (sk, f0(pk, x)) = x ∧ f
−1
1 (sk, f1(pk, x)) = x
The following protocol is a Σ-protocol for relation R:
P1(pk, sk)
def
= y $← D; return (y, y)
P2(pk, sk, y, c)
def
= return f
−1
[c] (sk, y)
V1(pk, r)
def
= c $← {0, 1}k; return c
V2(pk, r, c, s)
def
= return
(
f[c](pk, s) = r
)
except that it might not satisfy the knowledge soundness property.
Proof.
Completeness
The proof follows almost the same structure as the completeness proof for Σφ-
protocols. After inlining procedure calls in the protocol, we are left with the goal
b← f[c](pk, f
−1
[c] (sk, y)) = y ≃
R(pk,sk)
{b} b← true
We use the fact that the pair (pk, sk) is in R to prove that f[c](pk, f
−1
[c] (sk, y)) = y
by induction on c.
Special Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge
The following is a sHVZK simulator for the protocol,
Simulator S(pk, c) : s $← D; r ← f[c](pk, s); return (r, s)
To prove that
Protocol(pk, sk, c) ≃
{pk,c}∧R(pk,sk)
{r,c,s} (r, s)← S(pk, c)
we inline every procedure call in both games and perform expression propagation
and dead code elimination, we are left with the following goal:
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⊢ r $← D; s← f
−1
[c] (sk, r) ≃
{pk,sk,c}
{r,s} r ← f[c](pk, s)
which is provable from the fact that f is a permutation pair. ⊓⊔
We observed that the above protocol does not necessarily satisfy the special
soundness property. Instead, it satisfies a property known as collision intractability:
no efficient algorithm can find two accepting conversations with different challenges
but same commitment (a collision) with non-negligible probability. Interactive
proof protocols that are complete, sHVZK but only satisfy collision intractability
have important applications as signature protocols.
Theorem 7.11. It is unfeasible to find a collision for the protocol in Theorem 7.10.
Proof. By contradiction. Assume two accepting conversations (r, c1, s1), (r, c2, s2)
for a public input pk with c1 6= c2. We show that it is possible to efficiently compute
a claw (b, b′) such that f0(b) = f1(b
′). Since the two conversations are accepting,
f[c1](pk, s1) = f[c2](pk, s2) = r
The following algorithm computes a claw
find_claw(s1, c1, s2, c2) :
if head(c1) = head(c2)
then find_claw(tail(c1), s1, tail(c2), s2)
else if head(c1) = 0
then(f[tail(c1)](pk, s1), f[tail(c2)](pk, s2))
else (f[tail(c2)](pk, s2), f[tail(c1)](pk, s1))
The algorithm executes in polynomial-time provided permutations f0 and f1 can
be evaluated in polynomial time, and c1, c2 are polynomially bounded. For a poly-
nomially bounded challenge set, this contradicts the assumption that (f0, f1) is
claw-free. ⊓⊔
7.4 Combination of Sigma-Protocols
There are two immediate, but essential, ways of combining twoΣ-protocols (P 1, V 1)
and (P 2, V 2) with knowledge relations R1 and R2 respectively: AND-combination,
and OR-combination. The former allows a prover to prove knowledge of witnesses
w1, w2 such that R1(x1, w1) and R2(x2, w2). The latter allows a prover to prove
knowledge of a witness w such that either R1(x1, w) or R2(x2, w), without revealing
which is the case. This can be naturally extended to proofs of any monotone
Boolean formula by nested combination (although there exist a direct, more efficient
construction based on secret-sharing schemes, cf. [Cramer 1996]). Even though
simple, such constructions are incredibly powerful and form the basis of many
practical protocols, like secure electronic voting protocols.
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7.4.1 AND-Combination
Two Σ-protocols can be combined into a Σ-protocol that proves simultaneous
knowledge of witnesses for both underlying knowledge relations, i.e. a Σ-protocol
with a knowledge relation:
R def= {((x1, x2), (w1, w2)) | R1(x1, w1) ∧R2(x2, w2)}
We have formalized a functor AND, that combines two public-coin Σ-protocols
(P 1, V 1) and (P 2, V 2) in this form. Without loss of generality, we assume that
both protocols mandate that honest verifiers choose challenges uniformly from a
set of bitstrings of a certain length k. The construction is straightforward; the
combination is essentially a parallel composition of the two sub-protocols using the
same randomly chosen challenge:
P1((x1, x2), (w1, w2))
def
=
(r1, state1)← P
1
1(x1, w1);
(r2, state2)← P
2
1(x2, w2);
return ((r1, r2), (state1, state2))
P2((x1, x2), (w1, w2), state1, state2, c)
def
=
s1 ← P
1
2(x1, w1, state1, c);
s2 ← P
2
2(x2, w2, state1, c);
return (s1, s2)
V1((x1, x2), (r1, r2))
def
= c $← {0, 1}k; return c
V2((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c, (s1, s2))
def
=
b1 ← V
1
2(x1, r1, c, s1)
b2 ← V
2
2(x2, r2, c, s2)
return (b1 = true ∧ b2 = true)
Observe that V1 is not built from V
1
1 and V
2
1. The reason for this is that in order to
prove soundness, two runs of the protocol for the same public input x with the same
commitment r, but with different challenges c 6= c′, must yield two runs of each of
the sub-protocols with distinct challenges. If the challenge for the main protocol
were built from the challenges computed by V11 and V
2
1, e.g. by concatenating them,
we would not be able to conclude that the challenges in each pair of conversations
extracted for the sub-protocols are different—one could only conclude that this
is the case for one of the sub-protocols. Instead, we make use of the public-coin
property and simply draw in V1 a new random challenge that is used in both sub-
protocols. This solves the above problem, but also requires that the sub-protocols
satisfy the special honest verifier zero-knowledge property, since we need to be able
to simulate the sub-protocols for any fixed challenge.
Since AND combination essentially amounts to pairing the two sub-protocols
while respecting the structure of aΣ-protocol, all proofs have the same general form:
procedure calls are first inlined, and then the goal is manipulated using program
transformations to put it in a form where the properties of the sub-protocols can be
applied to conclude. We give below a proof sketch of sHVZK and special soundness;
a more detailed proof of these properties and a proof of completeness can be found
in [Barthe et al. 2010b].
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Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge
The sHVZK simulator for the protocol simply runs the simulators of the sub-
protocols to obtain a conversation for each sub-protocol with the same challenge c,
the conversations are then combined to obtain a conversation of the main protocol:
Simulator S((x1, x2), c) :
(r1, s1)← S1(x1, c);
(r2, s2)← S2(x2, c);
return((r1, r2), (s1, s2))
Soundness
Soundness requires us to give a PPT knowledge extractor that computes a witness
for the knowledge relation R from two accepting runs of the protocol with different
challenges but the same commitment. This amounts to computing a witness for each
of the sub-protocols and can be done using the corresponding knowledge extractors
as follows:
KE((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c, c
′, (s1, s2), (s
′
1, s
′
2)) :
w1 ← KE
1(x1, r1, c, c
′, s1, s
′
1);
w2 ← KE
2(x2, r2, c, c
′, s2, s
′
2);
return (w1, w2)
Note that an accepting conversation of the main protocol yields an accepting conver-
sation for each one of the sub-protocols. Moreover, since the challenge of the main
protocol is used as the challenge in both sub-protocols and c 6= c′, the extracted
conversations have different challenges. Concretely, from
Pr [b← V2((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c , (s1, s2)),m : b = true] = 1
Pr [b← V2((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c′, (s′1, s
′
2)),m : b = true] = 1
we can prove that for i = 1, 2,
Pr
[
wi ← KE
i(xi, ri, c, c
′, si, s
′
i),m : Ri(xi, wi)
]
= 1
from the soundness of the sub-protocols and from the fact that
Pr
[
bi ← Vi2(xi, ri, c , si),m : bi = true
]
= 1
Pr
[
bi ← Vi2(xi, ri, c
′, s′i),m : bi = true
]
= 1
⊓⊔
7.4.2 OR-Combination
Two Σ-protocols can also be combined to obtain a protocol that proves knowledge
of a witness for the knowledge relation of one of the sub-protocols, but without
revealing which. The construction relies on the ability to simulate accepting runs;
the basic idea is that the prover runs the real protocol for which it knows a witness,
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and uses the simulator to generate a run of the other protocol. The knowledge
relation suggested by, e.g. Damgård [2010],
Rˆ def= {((x1, x2), w) | R1(x1, w) ∨ R2(x2, w)}
suffers from placing unrealistic demands on the simulator. As pointed out by
Cramer [1996], it is important to allow the simulator to fail on an input x 6∈ dom(R).
However, in order to prove completeness for the above relation, the simulator must
be able to perfectly simulate outside the domain of the respective knowledge re-
lation. Instead, we can prove completeness (and sHVZK) of the combination with
respect to a knowledge relation whose domain is restricted to the Cartesian product
of the domains of the knowledge relations of the sub-protocols, i.e.
R def=
{
((x1, x2), w)
∣∣∣∣ (R1(x1, w) ∧ x2 ∈ dom(R2)) ∨(R2(x2, w) ∧ x1 ∈ dom(R1))
}
Unfortunately, we cannot prove soundness with respect to R, we can only prove it
with respect to Rˆ. The reason for this is that an accepting run of the combined
protocol only guarantees the existence of a witness for the public input of one of
the protocols, the simulation of the other protocol may succeed even if the input
is not in the domain of the respective relation. Otherwise said, from two accepting
runs of the combined protocol with distinct challenges we might not be able to
extract two accepting runs with distinct challenges for each of the sub-protocols;
we can only guarantee we can do that for one of them. Observe that we do not
really lose anything by proving completeness with respect to the smaller relation
R. If we admitted pairs (x1, x2) as public input where one component does not
belong to the domain of the corresponding knowledge relation, we would not be
able to say anything about the success of the simulator. The simulator might as
well fail, trivially revealing that the prover could not have known a witness for the
corresponding input, and rendering the protocol pointless for such inputs.
Compared to the AND combination, the OR combination is harder to fit into
the structure of a Σ-protocol. The reason for this is that the first phase of the
prover needs to use the simulator of one of the sub-protocols, which results in a
full (accepting) conversation that has to be passed over to the second phase of
the prover. Given R1(x1, w), the OR prover runs the prover of the first protocol
and the simulator of the second, and returns as a commitment a pair with the
commitments of each protocol; it passes over in the state the challenge and the
reply of the simulated conversation,
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P1((x1, x2), w)
def
=
if (x1, w) ∈ R1 then
(r1, state1)← P
1
1(x1, w);
c2 $← {0, 1}
k;
(r2, s2)← S2(x2, c2);
state← (state1, c2, s2)
else
(r2, state2)← P
2
1(x2, w);
c1 $← {0, 1}
k;
(r1, s1)← S1(x1, c1);
state← (state2, c1, s1)
return ((r1, r2), state)
Above, the test (x1, w) ∈ R1 is an encoding of the fact that the prover knows to
which knowledge relation corresponds the witness w, and thus which protocol it
can run for real, while simulating the other one. The commitment (r1, r2) is passed
along to the verifier that simply replies by returning a randomly chosen bitstring
to the prover, the combination is a public-coin protocol,
V1((x1, x2), (r1, r2))
def
= c $← {0, 1}k; return c
Assume without loss of generality that R1(x1, w). In the second phase the prover
constructs the challenge for the first protocol by xor-ing the challenge c of the OR
protocol with the challenge used in the simulation of the second protocol in the first
phase. It then runs the second phase of the prover of the first protocol to compute
a reply. The result of the second phase is constructed from the challenges for each
protocol and the prover replies (the ones coming from the simulated protocol are
recovered from the state):
P2((x1, x2), w, (state, c
′, s), c) def=
if (x1, w) ∈ R1 then
state1 ← state; c2 ← c
′; s2 ← s;
c1 ← c2 ⊕ c;
s1 ← P
1
2(x1, w, state1, c1)
else
state2 ← state; c1 ← c
′; s1 ← s;
c2 ← c1 ⊕ c;
s2 ← P
2
2(x2, w, state2, c2)
return ((c1, s1), (c2, s2))
The verifier accepts a conversation when the runs of both protocols are accepting
and the challenge is the xor of the challenges used in each of the combined protocols,
V2((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c, ((c1, s1), (c2, s2)))
def
=
b1 ← V
1
2(x1, r1, c1, s1);
b2 ← V
2
2(x2, r2, c2, s2);
return (c = c1 ⊕ c2 ∧ b1 = true ∧ b2 = true)
Completeness
The proof is slightly more involved than the proof for the AND combination, since
only one of the protocols is run for real, while the other is just simulated, and this
depends on the knowledge of the prover. Thus, the proof is split into two cases:
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• case (x1, w) ∈ R1: the outline of the proof is as follows:
Protocol((x1, x2), w) ≃ Protocol1(x1, w); c2 $← {0, 1}k; (r2, s2)← S2(x2, c2)
≃ Protocol1(x1, w); Protocol2(x2, w′)
The first equivalence is immediate from inlining procedure calls and simplifica-
tion. The second equivalence follows from the fact that ∃w′. R2(x2, w′) and the
sHVZK property of the second protocol. The proof concludes by application of
the completeness property of each of the sub-protocols.
• case (x2, w) ∈ R2: Idem.
Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge
The simulator for the OR combination is easily built from the simulators of the
sub-protocols:
Simulator S((x1, x2), c) :
c2 $← {0, 1}
k;
c1 ← c⊕ c2;
(r1, s1)← S1(x1, c1);
(r2, s2)← S2(x2, c2);
return ((r1, r2), ((c1, s1), (c2, s2)))
As before, the proof is split into two cases:
• case (x1, w) ∈ R1:
Protocol((x1, x2), w) ≃ Protocol1(x1, w); S2(x2)
≃ S1(x1); S2(x2)
≃ S((x1, x2), c)
Where the first and last steps are immediate from inlining, and simplification,
whereas the second step is a direct application of the HVZK property of S1 (which
follows from sHVZK by Theorem 7.2).
• case (x2, w) ∈ R2: Idem.
Soundness
(With respect to Rˆ). Unlike the AND combination, the OR combination does not
have the property that runs with distinct challenges guarantee that the challenges
used in the sub-protocols are also distinct. This is not as problematic as in the case
of the AND combination, since it suffices to compute a w such that either R1(x1, w)
or R2(x2, w). Furthermore, from
c = c1 ⊕ c2 6= c
′ = c′1 ⊕ c
′
2
we have either c1 6= c′1 or else c1 = c
′
1, in which case necessarily c2 6= c
′
2. Thus, the
knowledge extractor simply needs to do a case analysis:
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KE((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c, c
′,
((c1, s1), (c2, s2)), ((c
′
1, s
′
1), (c
′
2, s
′
2))) :
if c1 6= c
′
1 then
w← KE1(x1, r1, c1, c
′
1, s1, s
′
1)
else
w← KE2(x2, r2, c2, c
′
2, s2, s
′
2)
return w
Assume two accepting runs of the combined protocol with the same commitment
and c 6= c′:
((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c, ((c1, s1), (c2, s2)))
((x1, x2), (r1, r2), c
′, ((c′1, s
′
1), (c
′
2, s
′
2)))
We have to establish that for an i ∈ 1, 2,
Pr
[
wi ← KE
i(xi, ri, ci, c
′
i, si, s
′
i) : Ri(xi, wi)
]
= 1
depending on whether c1 6= c′1 or c1 = c
′
1 ∧ c2 6= c
′
2,
• case c1 6= c′1: From the special soundness of Protocol1,
Pr
[
w1 ← KE
1(x1, r1, c1, c
′
1, s1, s
′
1) : R1(x1, w1)
]
= 1
• case c1 = c′1 (and thus c2 6= c
′
2): From the special soundness of Protocol2
Pr
[
w2 ← KE
2(x2, r2, c2, c
′
2, s2, s
′
2) : R2(x2, w2)
]
= 1
⊓⊔
7.5 Related Work
Our work participates to an upsurge of interest in Σ-protocols, and shares some
motivations and commonalities with recently published papers. Specifically, our ac-
count of Σφ-protocols coincides with Maurer’s [2009] unifying treatment of proofs of
knowledge for preimages of group homomorphisms. Concretely, Maurer exhibits a
main protocol that uses a group homomorphism—which in our setting corresponds
to the definition of the module of Σφ-protocols in Section 7.2—and shows (in his
Theorem 3) that under suitable hypotheses the main protocol is a Σ-protocol. He
gives several instances of the main protocol by picking suitable group homomor-
phisms and showing that they satisfy these hypotheses.
Our work is also closely connected to the recent effort of Bangerter et al. [2008,
2010] to design and implement efficient zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge. They
provide both a set of sufficient conditions on a homomorphism φ under which
the corresponding Σφ-protocol can be viewed as a Σ-protocol [Bangerter et al.
2008,Theorem 1], and a generalization that allows to consider sets of linear rela-
tions among preimages of group homomorphisms [Bangerter et al. 2008,Theorem
2]. The latter result is used to justify the soundness of a compiler that generates
efficient code from high-level descriptions of protocols. As future work, the authors
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of [Bangerter et al. 2008] mention that they plan to make their compiler certifying,
so that it would generate proofs accompanying the code. Doing so from scratch
remains a daunting task. By building on CertiCrypt, our formalization could be
readily used as a stepping stone for a modular certifying compiler, in which (high-
level, unoptimized) code is certified, and then compiled to efficient code using a
certified or certifying compiler; see e.g. [Barthe et al. 2009b; Leroy 2006] for an
instance of applying ideas from certified/certifying compilation to cryptography.
Cryptographic primitives need not only be secure; they must also be used cor-
rectly. In a series of papers, Backes, Hritcu, and Maffei [2008b]; Backes, Maffei,
and Unruh [2008c] develop sound analysis methods for protocols that use zero-
knowledge proofs, and apply their analyses to verify the authentication and secrecy
properties of the Direct Anonymous Attestation Protocol. One extremely ambitious
objective would be to use their results, which complement ours, to fully certify the
security of the protocol in the computational model. Intermediate results would
involve formalizing computational soundness results [Abadi and Rogaway 2002;
Cortier and Warinschi 2005], which represents a substantial amount of work on its
own.
7.6 Perspectives
We have presented a formalization of Σ-protocols in CertiCrypt. The highlights
of our formalization are its generic account of the class of Σφ-protocols and the
detailed treatment of the AND/OR composition. Our work complements recent
advances in the field, and takes a first but important step towards formalizing a
rich theory of zero-knowledge proofs. In our opinion, and judging by the myriad of
small variations in definitions we have found in the literature, this effort would be
worth pursuing for a field that strives for definitional clarity and consistency.
Compared to other applications of CertiCrypt, like the verification of security
proofs of encryption and signature schemes discussed in previous chapters, the
formalization presented here imposes challenges of a different nature to the user.
In contrast to earlier case studies, for which we have developed a mature set of
techniques that mechanize most of the reasoning patterns appearing in proofs, we
found that the formalization of Σ-protocols does not require as much complex
reasoning, but is more demanding with respect to the compositionality of proofs.
This led us to revise some design choices of CertiCrypt and has given us ideas on how
to improve the framework so that results can be reused and composed more easily.
For instance, when composing proofs of observational equivalence statements the
user often needs to manually rename variables to match the names of the context
where the proof is being reused; currently the user has to appeal to the alloc tactic
to do this, but a simply heuristic may suffice in most cases.
We can build on the existing formalization to verify other important results
about zero-knowledge proofs. These include other means of composing protocols:
sequential [Goldreich and Oren 1994] and concurrent [Damgård 2000; Garay et al.
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2006] composition; transforming public-coin zero-knowledge proofs in general zero-
knowledge proofs [Goldreich 2002], or different formulations like non-interactive
zero-knowledge proofs [Blum et al. 1988] or properties, i.e. statistical zero-
knowledge and computational zero-knowledge instead of perfect zero-knowledge.
Moreover, Σ-protocols form the base for a number of important and intriguing pro-
tocols for electronic voting schemes [Cramer 1996], identity schemes [Cramer 1996],
and commitment schemes [Cramer 1996; Damgård 1990]. All are prime targets for
future formalizations.
8
Related Work and Conclusion
8.1 Related Work
Cryptographic protocol verification is an established area of formal methods, and
a wealth of automated and deductive methods have been developed to the purpose
of verifying that protocols provide the expected level of security [Meadows 2003].
Traditionally, protocols have been verified in a symbolic model, for which effective
decision procedures exist under suitable hypotheses [Abadi and Cortier 2006]. Al-
though the symbolic model assumes perfect cryptography, soundness results such
as [Abadi and Rogaway 2002]—see [Cortier et al. 2010] for a recent survey—relate
the symbolic model with the computational model, provided the cryptographic
primitives satisfy adequate notions of security. It is possible to combine symbolic
methods and soundness proofs to achieve guarantees in the computational model,
as done e.g. in [Backes and Laud 2006; Backes et al. 2010; Sprenger and Basin
2008]. One drawback of this approach is that the security proof relies on intri-
cate soundness proofs and hypotheses that unduly restrict the usage of primitives.
Besides, it is not clear whether computational soundness results will always exist
to allow factoring verification through symbolic methods [Backes and Pfitzmann
2005]. Consequently, some authors attempt to provide guarantees directly at the
computational level [Blanchet 2008; Laud 2001; Roy et al. 2008].
In contrast, the formal verification of cryptographic functionalities is an emerg-
ing trend. An early work of Barthe et al. [2004] proves the security of ElGamal
in Coq, but the proof relies on the generic model, a very specialized and idealized
model that elides many of the issues that are relevant to cryptography. Den Har-
tog 2008 also proves ElGamal semantic security using a probabilistic (non-relational)
Hoare logic. However, their formalism is not sufficiently powerful to express pre-
cisely security goals: notions such as well-formed and effective adversary are not
modeled.
Blanchet and Pointcheval [2006] were among the first to use verification tools to
carry out game-based proofs of cryptographic schemes. They used CryptoVerif to
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prove the existential unforgeability of the FDH signature scheme, with the original
security bound given in Section 5.1, which is much looser than the one given in
Section 5.2. CryptoVerif has also been used to verify the security of many protocols,
including Kerberos [Blanchet et al. 2008]. It is difficult to assess CryptoVerif ability
to handle automatically more complex cryptographic proofs (or tighter security
bounds), e.g. for schemes such as OAEP; on the other hand, compiling CryptoVerif
sequences of games in CertiCrypt is an interesting research direction that would
increase automation in CertiCrypt and confidence in CryptoVerif—by generating
independently verifiable proofs.
Impagliazzo and Kapron [2006] were the first to develop a logic to reason about
indistinguishability. Their logic is built upon a more general logic whose soundness
relies on non-standard arithmetic; they show the correctness of a pseudo-random
generator and that next-bit unpredictability implies pseudo-randomness. Recently,
Zhang [2009] developed a similar logic on top of Hofmann’s SLR system [Hofmann
1998] and reconstructed the examples of Impagliazzo and Kapron [2006]. These
logics have limited applicability because they lack support for oracles or adaptive
adversaries and so cannot capture many of the the standard patterns for reason-
ing about cryptographic schemes. More recently Barthe et al. [2010a] developed a
general logic, called Computational Indistinguishability Logic (CIL), that captures
reasoning patterns that are common in provable security, such as simulation and
reduction, and deals with oracles and adaptive adversaries. They use CIL to prove
the security of the Probabilistic Signature Scheme, a widely used signature scheme
that forms part of the PKCS standard [Bellare and Rogaway 1996]. CIL subsumes
an earlier logic by Courant et al. [2008], who developed a form of strongest post-
condition calculus that can establish automatically asymptotic security (IND-CPA
and IND-CCA2) of encryption schemes that use one-way functions and hash func-
tions modeled as random oracles. They show soundness and provide a prototype
implementation that covers many examples in the literature.
In parallel, several authors have initiated formalizations of game-based proofs
in proof assistants and shown the security of basic examples. Nowak [2007] gives a
game-based proof of ElGamal semantic security in Coq. Nowak uses a shallow em-
bedding to model games; his framework ignores complexity issues and has limited
support for proof automation: because there is no special syntax for writing games,
mechanizing syntactic transformations becomes very difficult. Affeldt et al. [2007]
formalize a game-based proof of the PRP/PRF switching lemma in Coq. How-
ever, their formalization is tailored towards the particular example they consider,
which substantially simplifies their task and hinders generality. They deal with a
weak (non-adaptive) adversary model and ignore complexity. In another attempt
to build a system supporting provable security, Backes et al. [2008a] formalize a lan-
guage for games in the Isabelle proof assistant and prove the Fundamental Lemma;
however, no examples are reported. All in all, these works appear like preliminary
experiments that are not likely to scale.
Leaving the realm of cryptography, CertiCrypt relies on diverse mathematical
concepts and theories that have been modeled for their own sake. We limit ourselves
to singling out Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring [2009] formalization of the measure
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monad, which we use extensively, and the work of Hurd et al. [2005], who devel-
oped a mechanized theory in the HOL theorem prover for reasoning about pGCL
programs, a probabilistic extension of Dijkstra’s guarded command language.
8.2 Conclusion
CertiCrypt is a fully formalized framework that supports machine-checked game-
based proofs; we have validated its design through formalizing standard crypto-
graphic proofs. Our work shows that machine-checked proofs of cryptographic
schemes are not only plausible but indeed feasible. However, constructing machine-
checked proofs requires a high-level of expertise in formal proofs and remains time
consuming despite the high level of automation achieved. Thus, CertiCrypt only pro-
vides a first step towards the completion of Halevi’s program, in spite of the amount
of work invested so far (the project was initiated in June 2006). A medium-term
objective would be to develop a minimalist interface that eases the writing of games
and provides a fixed set of mechanisms (tactics, proof-by-pointing) to prove some
basic transitions, leaving the side conditions as hypotheses. We believe that such
an interface would help cryptographers ensure that there are no obvious flaws in
their definitions and proofs, and to build sketches of security proofs. In fact, it is
our experience that the type system and the automated tactics provide valuable
information in debugging proofs.
Numerous research directions remain to be explored. Our main priority is to
improve proof automation. In particular, we expect that one can automate many
proofs in pRHL, by relying on a combination of standard verification tools: weakest
pre-condition generators, invariant inference tools, SMT solvers.
In addition, it would be useful to formalize cryptographic meta-results such as
the equivalence between IND-CPA and IND-CCA2 under plaintext awareness, or the
transformation of an IND-CPA-secure scheme into an IND-CCA2-secure scheme [Fu-
jisaki and Okamoto 1999]. Another direction would be to formalize proofs of com-
putational soundness of the symbolic model, see e.g. [Abadi and Rogaway 2002]
and proofs of automated methods for proving security of primitives and protocols,
see e.g. [Courant et al. 2008; Laud 2001]. Finally, it would also be worthwhile to
explore applications of CertiCrypt outside the realm cryptography, in particular to
randomized algorithms and complexity.
Complexity and termination analysis of probabilistic programs
CertiCrypt provides the necessary ingredients to reason about termination and com-
plexity of programs. Yet cryptographic applications only make a limited use of
them; e.g. we only use simple closure properties of PPT programs. It would be
instructive to extend our formalization to define standard complexity classes and to
prove the complexity of well-known probabilistic algorithms. More generally, we are
interested in developing automated methods to carry such analyses for programs
with loops and recursive calls.
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Reasoning about probabilistic programs
The pWhile language is sufficiently powerful to program widely used randomized
algorithms, and it would be attractive to endow the formal semantics in Coq with
a mechanized program logic that allows proving formally properties of these algo-
rithms, in the spirit of the work of Hurd et al. [2005].
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Certification Formelle de Preuves Cryptographiques Basées sur les
Séquences de Jeux
Résumé : Les séquences de jeux sont une méthodologie établie pour structurer les preuves crypto-
graphiques. De telles preuves peuvent être formalisées rigoureusement en regardant les jeux comme
des programmes probabilistes et en utilisant des méthodes de vérification de programmes. Cette
thèse décrit CertiCrypt, un outil permettant la construction et vérification automatique de preuves
basées sur les jeux. CertiCrypt est implementé dans l’assistant à la preuve Coq, et repose sur de
nombreux domaines, en particulier les probabilités, la complexité, l’algèbre, et la sémantique des lan-
gages de programmation. CertiCrypt fournit des outils certifiés pour raisonner sur l’équivalence de
programmes probabilistes, en particulier une logique de Hoare relationnelle, une théorie équation-
nelle pour l’équivalence observationnelle, une bibliothèque de transformations de programme, et des
techniques propres aux preuves cryptographiques, permettant de raisonner sur les évènements. Nous
validons l’outil en formalisant les preuves de sécurité de plusieurs exemples emblématiques, notam-
ment le schéma de chiffrement OAEP et le schéma de signature FDH.
Mots clés : Cryptographie, langages de programmation, complexité, vérification de programmes,
preuves formelles, assistant à la preuve Coq
Formal Certification of Game-Based Cryptographic Proofs
Abstract: The game-based approach is a popular methodology for structuring cryptographic proofs
as sequences of games. Game-based proofs can be rigorously formalized by taking a code-centric
view of games as probabilistic programs and relying on programming language techniques to justify
proof steps. In this dissertation we present CertiCrypt, a framework that enables the machine-checked
construction and verification of game-based cryptographic proofs. CertiCrypt is built upon the general-
purpose proof assistant Coq, from which it inherits the ability to provide independently verifiable evi-
dence that proofs are correct, and draws on many areas, including probability and complexity theory,
algebra, and semantics of programming languages. The framework provides certified tools to reason
about the equivalence of probabilistic programs, including a relational Hoare logic, a theory of obser-
vational equivalence, verified program transformations, and ad-hoc programming language techniques
of particular interest in cryptographic proofs, such as reasoning about failure events. We validate our
framework through the formalization of several significant case studies, including proofs of security of
the Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding scheme against adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks, and
of existential unforgeability of Full-Domain Hash signatures.
Keywords: Cryptography, programming languages, complexity, program verification, formal proofs,
Coq proof assistant
